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Coloquio en homenaje por el 90 aniversario  
del Embajador Javier Pérez de Cuéllar

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## Javier Pérez de Cuéllar

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Javier Pérez de Cuéllar's tenures embraced the most frustrating but perhaps the most productive experiences of the Office of Secretary-General. Until 1987/8, the United Nations was often marginalized within a general climate of political ill-will and beset by financial crises. On many issues — especially regional conflicts entangled in the upsurge of superpower hostility — the Secretary-General was either emasculated or excluded. Conversely, the changes in the international political environment commonly associated with the ending of the Cold War resulted in great changes in the activities of the Secretary-General. In conflict management and settlement, in particular, the conflicts which were tied to Cold War dynamics became ripe for settlement. The new atmosphere of cooperation, at least initially, seemed positive to the development of the Office, although the new consensus in the UN and among the Permanent Five transpired not always to result in an enhancement of the Secretaryship-General.

Pérez de Cuéllar's tenures straddled the Cold War post-Cold War cleavage; he 'presided over the transition'.<sup>1</sup> He had just the right reputation and skills to fulfil the opportunities presented by the easing of superpower tension towards the end of the 1980s. The Peruvian helped to keep the UN afloat in a time of great doubt, and then tirelessly exploited the opportunities when able to do so. As with all Secretaries-General, Pérez de Cuéllar was not the first choice of all the Permanent Members of the Security Council and his appointment continued the tradition of finding the most compliant individual for the job. The words most often used to describe Pérez de Cuéllar are quiet, diplomatic, discreet and polite.

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Este artículo fue publicado en 1998 en el libro *The UN Secretary-General from the Cold War to the New Era. A Global Peace and Security Mandate?* por Palgrave MacMillan.

However, given the opportunity, he could and would be creative, persistent and outspoken. Attitudes towards Pérez de Cuéllar, especially towards the end of his tenure and after, have been exclusively positive. Although he remained rather colourless in the eyes of the press, he earned the respect of governments and diplomats alike. His colleague described him as ‘exactly the kind of Secretary-General that governments like and the media hates’, taking care not to jeopardize the personal relationships he had cultivated with the major states in the UN and winning the confidence and respect of those he dealt with.<sup>2</sup> For himself, Pérez de Cuéllar claimed to strike a balance somewhere between the extremes of counter-productive exuberance and self-effacement.<sup>3</sup>

Much of such praise resounded at the point of Pérez de Cuéllar’s climactic departure. The drama of his delayed exit, due to the eleventh-hour El Salvador settlement in the early hours of 1 January 1992, was symptomatic of the transformation of the UN in conflict settlement that he had both encouraged and been a beneficiary of. This was in stark contrast to the first year of Pérez de Cuéllar’s tenure when he lamented that the Organization was frequently being ‘set aside or rebuffed’ and the international community was ‘perilously near to a new international anarchy’.<sup>4</sup> The upturn of the Office of Secretary-General towards the end of the 1980s was largely a consequence of the rapidly increasing utility of the UN. This, in turn, was a reflection of the changing perceptions of key international actors to a number of issues. In this sense the Secretary-General proved most successful in facilitating the end of the Iran—Iraq war, and in ending the superpower dimension to the conflicts in Cambodia, Central America, and Afghanistan.

To an extent, Pérez de Cuéllar’s achievements are explained by the changing political climate, and as such he was at the right place at the right time. However, it is to his credit that he managed, orchestrated, and exploited this changing context. Yet it is also important to consider that Pérez de Cuéllar’s experiences were not necessarily to set the tone of the Office in the post-Cold War world, in so far as he was involved in dealing with the residue of the Cold War and contributing to a superpower climb-down from previous commitments.

### **THE GENERAL ENVIRONMENT: FROM THE ‘CRISIS OF MULTILATERALISM’ TO THE ‘NEW ERA’**

Until 1987/8 the poor performance of the Organization – by almost any standard<sup>5</sup> – can be seen in its relationship to the ‘second Cold War’ and a number of ongoing conflicts.<sup>6</sup> The UN was at its nadir when Pérez de Cuéllar became Secretary-General, and the constraints and frustrations

that this entailed clearly pervaded the activities of the Office. The 1980s witnessed the culmination of trends which were in evidence in the previous decade: disillusionment towards and within the United Nations, the ‘nefarious influence’ of the Cold War,<sup>7</sup> East-West and North-South bloc manoeuvring, a reversion to unilateralism, the seeming inability of the Security Council to address a number of threats to international peace and security, the de facto abstention of key UN members from certain programmes and agencies, and severe financial problems. In addition, certain circumstances – not least the rise of the New Right in the West and the lack of direction of the UN’s Third World membership – created an environment which, at times, threatened to undermine the Organization. The absence of new peacekeeping operations between 1978 and 1988 was one indicator of this organizational blight.

The United Nations of the early 1980s represented a clash of ideals and the continuation of the struggle between revisionist and status quo forces. The Third World continued to exploit its numerical advantage to exert leverage upon the agenda of organs which were conducive to majority influence. The realities of universality of membership and majoritarianism provided opportunities for bloc leverage in the interests of egalitarianism and social ‘justice’, in harsh dissonance to the pervading neo-liberal ethos in Washington and much of the West. The creation in 1964 of the UN Conference on Trade and Development had been an earlier demonstration of this. The clauses relating to the establishment of an International Seabed Authority in the Law of the Sea Convention clearly reflected the spirit of public ownership of natural resources. Indeed, Krasner suggested that ‘[d]eveloping countries have rejected liberal regimes’.<sup>8</sup> Again, it was a triumph of collective leverage that the developing countries managed to influence the final form of the Law of the Sea Convention to the extent that they did, in an attempt to challenge the superpowers’ monopoly over the sea. This was perhaps a last vestige of the declining centre-periphery or structuralist challenge to the systemic status quo. With the grand revisionist schemes of the 1960s and 1970s — such as the New International Economic Order — largely without hope, the ‘renaissance’ of the Third World shifted in the 1980s towards rhetoric and posturing. One might say that the cohesion of the ‘new majority’ was waning.

There was still an institutionalized hostility towards South Africa and Israel in the General Assembly, which clearly undermined the role of the Secretary-General in his efforts to settle the conflict to which these two states were a party. For example, in very common General Assembly terminology, a Resolution requested that the Secretary-General work towards the implementation of UN resolutions concerning Namibia while condemning South Africa’s ‘racist regime’, its ‘illegal occupation of Namibia, its brutal repression of the Namibian people and its ruthless exploitation of



the people and resources of Namibia', and [r]eaffirming its [the General Assembly's] full support for the armed struggle of the Namibian people under the leadership of the South West Africa Peoples' Organization'.<sup>9</sup> On many occasions the West, and particularly the United States, perceived itself also to be the object of attack. The drifting Third World was exploited by the Arab contingent, and the Soviet Union — although since the intervention into Afghanistan somewhat estranged from the majority — was happy either to acquiesce or to encourage this. The politicization of the specialized agencies and the creation of apparently politically orientated and sometimes extravagant programmes were also manifestations of the excesses which Ambassador Scali, US Permanent Representative to the UN, had described as the 'tyranny of the majority' a decade earlier.

In addition to tensions associated with the Third World, there was also a deterioration in East-West relations as the years of *détente* gave way to renewed confrontation. This was partly a result of Soviet adventurism in Africa, Afghanistan and Central America, the Sandinista victory in Nicaragua, the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, the Soviet deployment of SS-20 missiles towards the end of the 1970s, and martial law in Poland. In the West, the ascendancy of the New Right in the US and Britain, the challenge to Soviet influence in the Third World, the establishment of diplomatic relations between the US and China, the deployment of cruise missiles and the development of Strategic Defence Initiative antiballistic missile technology, and the imposition of sanctions on the Soviet Union by the US in December 1981, all contributed to the 'second Cold War'. The comfortable bipolar stability of *détente* was swept away by a resurgence of ideological fervour in the West and by the mismanagement and excesses of the Soviet Union's foreign policy. The United Nations had little impact on this process, but it did suffer as a result of it. The Security Council failed to fulfil its Charter responsibilities until the late 1980s and a climate of ill-will pervaded the whole Organization. The Secretaryship-General was consequently stymied and tainted.

As the primary diplomatic, economic and military sponsor of the United Nations, it is necessary to pay particular attention to US attitudes and practice towards the Organization during the 1980s. During the 1970s the Nixon-Kissinger-Ford attitude had been largely one of sceptical and often scornful circumnavigation of the UN in the sphere of high politics. The Organization had little substantive role to play in their grand agenda, apart from serving as an instrument to aid the balance between East and West, such as in the settlement of the Yom Kippur War, and in the provision of certain functional services. However, the agenda of the New Right, epitomized by Reagan and Representative Jeane Kirkpatrick, was much more combative and largely viewed *détente* as a mistake which had resulted in Soviet gains. At the UN, the Kirkpatrick team — in a manner

reminiscent of Representative Patrick Moynihan — made quite clear the Reagan administration's intolerance to the Soviet and Third World 'antics'. Outside the UN the administration was shedding the Vietnam syndrome: it would meet Soviet adventurism. It may be that '[i]n the space of 40 years, the United States had gone from believing that the United Nations should and could do anything, to believing that it should and could do nothing'.<sup>10</sup>

Kirkpatrick's aim was to halt the decline of the West, and especially the US, in international politics and at the UN. Her style was forthright, confrontational, unapologetic, sometimes undiplomatic, and not afraid of isolation. This was not just her personality, but represented the cleavage between the Reagan and Carter attitudes. Deeper still, the Reagan approach reflected declining '[n]orthern commitment to universal multifunctional organizations'.<sup>11</sup> Haas borrowed the concept of regime decay and applied it to the declining-hegemony thesis to find some link to the waning capability of the Organization in conflict management.<sup>12</sup> From the 1970s, indignation grew as the UN reflected the end of American dominance and Western cultural universalism, yet the US was still shouldering the heaviest financial burden.

Kirkpatrick embraced this populist attitude. She was a vociferous critic of the declining US influence at the UN, which she felt was a result of mismanagement rather than an historical process. Therefore, '[m]y mandate was to go forth and represent the policies of the Reagan administration and certainly those involve a restoration of American influence and an end of the period of American retreat and apology'.<sup>13</sup> There was a certain idealism to the project of the New Right in attempting to halt, or turn back, the clock of systemic change and globalization. Similarly, Margaret Thatcher drew a parallel between her and Reagan's ascendancy, putting the 'reassertion of western influence' in a heroic context.<sup>14</sup>

The Kirkpatrick team at the UN felt that the Organization — and especially the General Assembly and the specialized agencies — were 'irretrievably politicized',<sup>15</sup> wasteful, bureaucratic, and actually made conflict worse. The latter argument, also strongly emphasized by the conservative Heritage Foundation, suggested that conflicts were exacerbated by the UN because the number of parties to a conflict became extended as countries felt obliged to take sides, even if they had no direct interest. The Arab group using the Afro-Asian bloc against the US and Israel could be an example. It was in accordance with this that the frustrations of the US resulted in a resurgence of unilateralism. The policies towards Angola, Israel, Namibia, Nicaragua, El Salvador, the Law of the Sea Convention, the specialized agencies, and the 'liberation' of Grenada, are a few examples.<sup>16</sup> In addition, the US began to monitor the behaviour of countries

## THE COLD WAR'S END

The changes within states and across the international system commonly associated with the winding down of the Cold War brought significant changes to the activities of the Secretary-General. Explanations for the end of the Cold War need not be given here, although Western military superiority, Soviet over-stretch, and Soviet liberalization at home all played an important part. The bilateral rapprochement between East and West was signified by summits in Reykjavik in October 1986 and in Washington in December 1987. The signing of the intermediate nuclear forces treaty, calls by the Warsaw Pact for a large reduction of conventional forces in Europe, and Gorbachev's internal reforms also helped to change the atmosphere at the UN. More importantly, cooperation between the superpowers would encourage the resolution — or at least the cessation — of a number of conflicts. The Soviet 'new thinking' manifested itself in the innovative statements and articles by Gorbachev and Deputy Foreign Minister Petrovsky which called for an enhancement of UN machinery for the settlement of conflict and the maintenance of international peace and security.<sup>17</sup> In encouraging the greater use of peacekeeping, preventive diplomacy and deployments, and a greater role for the Secretary-General in the provision of good offices and mediation, the 'new thinking' marked a reversal of forty, and perhaps sixty-five, years of Soviet practice towards international organization.

President Bush's election to the Presidency brought with it a greater level of sympathy and support for multilateralism, which was to blossom into the New World Order ethos. Following Kirkpatrick's resignation in early 1985, the US approach towards the UN had become less confrontational and more constructive in the hands of Representative Vernon Walters and the likes of Representative Thomas Pickering under George Bush, who was said to symbolize the seriousness with which the new administration took the Organization.

Partly as a result of US economic and political pressure, the excesses of the General Assembly were curtailed in an atmosphere of new realism. Confrontation was increasingly recognized as being counterproductive and the continuing disintegration of the Third World bloc pointed to short-term objectives, rather than grand schemes. Moreover, there was a certain amount of disillusionment among African states towards the Arab states, their former guiding light. The revocation in 1991 of the 1975 General Assembly Resolution which equated Zionism with racism was an important symbol of the majority's desire for moderation. Similarly, Assembly spending was cut in a number of controversial areas and the more radical political antics were curtailed; the US apparently was appeased.

in the Organization and to hold them accountable. The US — and to a lesser extent the United Kingdom — also imposed a number of economic sanctions and withdrew or restricted their diplomatic support of agencies which manifested the worst excesses.

It was not just the economic sanctions which defined the general environment of disillusionment and UN impotence. The resurgence of Cold War polarization contributed to the prolongation of regional conflicts in Afghanistan, Indo-China, between Iran and Iraq, in Africa, and in Central America. The US and the Soviet Union obstructed efforts by the Council and the Secretary-General to address such issues until the latter half of the 1980s, and there was a general reversion to unilateralism and bilateralism. The ill-fated 'multinational' force in Lebanon was a striking symbol of this, and part of a trend lamented by Pérez de Cuéllar in his historic first annual report.

In this report, of September 1982, the Secretary-General expressed his frustration at the failure of the Security Council to operate effectively and a climate which was 'perilously near to a new international anarchy'. He continued,

I believe that we are at present embarked on an exceedingly dangerous course, one symptom of which is the crisis in the multilateral approach in international affairs and the concomitant erosion of the authority and status of world and regional intergovernmental institutions ... Such a trend must be reversed before once again we bring upon ourselves a global catastrophe and find ourselves without institutions effective enough to prevent it.

The general environment for the first half of Pérez de Cuéllar's incumbency saw a continuation of the tension between *status quo* and revisionist Third World forces against a backdrop of inflamed Cold War antagonisms. The Office of Secretary-General was either barred from a substantive role or severely constrained, and tainted by the machinations of the deliberative organs which made it difficult to establish credibility or autonomy. At other times, the Secretary-General was able to establish credibility with parties, but the Security Council members were unwilling to apply pressure upon their clients to end conflict and Pérez de Cuéllar was relegated to a secondary role. Many conflicts were tied to external historical trends, so the Office had to wait until there were changes in the external dynamics.

The Soviet Union matched its new thinking with a commitment to pay all outstanding debts, and the US finally began to release money owed and to accept its obligations; some countries even made advance payments. Finally, there was a healthy increase of ideas to improve the effectiveness of the UN and its Secretary-General in the areas of peacekeeping, preventive diplomacy, and the maintenance of international peace and security. Immediately after the Cold War there was a blossoming of UN activity in this area, and commensurately the political role of the Secretary-General also appeared to be expanding. The question is, how did the historic developments of the 1980s have a bearing upon this Office? To answer this, a number of cases will be presented to illustrate the historical context of the Secretary-General's peace and security activities.

### ***The Falklands Crisis***

In many ways, the Falklands was a traditional type of war, involving pride, principle and territory.<sup>18</sup> There was no strong Cold War dimension to Pérez de Cuéllar's role. The crisis resulted from Argentina's seizure of the British Falkland Islands after a history of dispute between these states. Legally, Britain was the victim of aggression, according to the UN Charter and Resolution 502, for which Britain's Permanent Representative Anthony Parsons mustered support with the utmost urgency. As he recalled, 'we would obviously prefer implementation of the central paragraph of SCR502 — total Argentine withdrawal — but we would not in the meantime allow anything to inhibit us from exercising our inherent right to self defence under Article 51 of the Charter'.<sup>19</sup> Although there were colonial overtones to the British position the balance of opinion at the UN was in Britain's favour due to Argentina's use of force. Britain activated a military response in parallel to the acceptance of diplomacy and mediation, notably through the US Secretary of State and the UN Secretary-General.

The first phase of mediation was under the auspices of US Secretary of State Alexander Haig's shuttle diplomacy. This is generally recognized as being a failure, and some have speculated that the outcome might have been different if Pérez de Cuéllar had taken the role earlier.<sup>20</sup> Pérez de Cuéllar remained courteously on the sidelines until Haig faltered, recognizing the influence of the United States and the possibility that his South American background might jeopardize his credibility with the British.<sup>21</sup> However, he discreetly established a Falklands crisis team on 8 April in the Secretariat to consider contingency plans in the event of Haig's failure.<sup>22</sup> On 1 May, Pérez de Cuéllar subsequently offered to mediate,<sup>23</sup> and the UN mediation phase began, even though the Secretary-General was not mentioned in Resolution 502. We are concerned here as much with process as outcome: what was the authority and status of Pérez de

Cuéllar, with whom did he have contact, and what leverage did he exert upon the parties? Could he have averted war, or was he an instrument of the diplomatic manoeuvring of the protagonists?

With regard to the Secretary-General's role as a mediator and intermediary, a certain amount of authority was self-evident. Immediately, he presented to Foreign Secretary Francis Pym and his Argentine counterpart a 'set of ideas' for a negotiated settlement. These involved a mutual withdrawal of military forces, the commencement of diplomatic negotiations for a full settlement; which could involve some form of interim UN administration, the lifting of sanctions and exclusion zones, and the establishment of transitional arrangements in the Falklands in advance of the outcome of the negotiations. Pérez de Cuéllar was seeking to freeze the situation and to encourage the protagonists to commit themselves to a diplomatic solution before the military point of no return was reached, especially by the British. On the basis of these ideas the parties accepted Pérez de Cuéllar's mediation. As Parsons explains:

The most intensive and vigorous series of negotiations, attended by maximum public interest, continued until 19 May. The Secretary-General saw myself and my Argentine colleague, vice-Minister Enrique Ross, once or more often twice a day throughout the whole period, weekends included, working in an orderly and systematic way towards the elaboration of an agreement which would embrace the points in his original document, and which would put the islands under temporary UN administration for a defined period during which negotiations for a final settlement would be carried out under his auspices.<sup>24</sup>

This indicates a key creative mediatory role of the Secretary-General. By participating on this basis, Argentina had relinquished its former demand that sovereignty be transferred to it as a prerequisite for talks. Britain had agreed to negotiate substantive issues — including the possibility of an interim UN administration — when it would have been within its legal rights to demand an unconditional return to the *status quo ante*, under Article 51 of the UN Charter and customary international law. Both sides had also committed themselves to the process; both had an interest in being seen by UN allies as trying to avoid war, so they listened and responded to the Secretary-General. Pérez de Cuéllar was also the chief channel of communication between the parties. After Parsons was recalled to London 15-16 May, the 'final position' of the British government was communicated to Pérez de Cuéllar immediately upon Parsons' return to New York, and the closing responses by both sides likewise were channelled through the Secretary-General.<sup>25</sup>

If the obstacles to a settlement had been simply practical then war might have been averted. However, President Galtieri had incited a great



deal of popular support for his stance, and so had Thatcher for the defence of people, territory, and 'our honour as a nation'.<sup>26</sup> Neither side could be seen to back down without an extremely effective face-saving device, and Pérez de Cuéllar provided the best hope for this.

As military skirmishes increased Britain made clear that it would veto any resolution for a ceasefire that was not tied to an Argentine withdrawal, as it did on 4 June. However, Council Resolution 505 had been passed on 26 May 1982, which asked the Secretary-General to 'enter into contact immediately with the parties with a view to negotiating mutually acceptable terms for a cease-fire, including, if necessary, arrangements for the dispatch of United Nations observers to monitor compliance with the terms of the ceasefire'.<sup>27</sup> This put a tight time-frame upon his efforts and by this stage few people expected a peaceful solution. As Anthony Parsons recalled, given the weather and logistical considerations, the British Task Force in the south Atlantic could not be maintained indefinitely 'while we fought over words in New York'.<sup>28</sup> While Pérez de Cuéllar had been making last minute appeals to Galtieri and Thatcher, he admitted defeat in early June.

On a superficial level, the Secretary-General achieved status and influence in his mediatory role, through the structure of mediation, as a channel of communication, and as an organ of creative diplomacy. However, the wider picture is less positive. A number of observers have suggested that the protagonists' contact with the Secretary-General was largely a disingenuous manoeuvre to cover themselves diplomatically.<sup>29</sup>

If Thatcher's memoirs are to be believed, this opinion appears to be borne out and Pérez de Cuéllar's role was more one of procedure than substance. At key stages of the mediation effort there were clear signs that the British government was 'going through the motions' in order to maintain legitimacy for its own agenda, and American support. Most strikingly:

That Sunday [16 May] at Chequers was mainly spent in drafting our final proposals, to be put to the Argentinians by the UN Secretary-General. The vital consideration was that we bring the negotiating process to an end — ideally, before the landings — but in such a way as to avoid appearing intransigent. It became clear that we would have to make a very reasonable offer. I accepted this because I was convinced that the Argentinians would reject it, and strictly on a take-it-or-leave-it basis: the Argentinians must accept the offer as a whole, or not at all, and once rejected, it would be withdrawn.<sup>30</sup>

### *The Rainbow Warrior dispute*

The *Rainbow Warrior* arbitration demonstrated the utility of face-saving through a public servant. The constitutional authority and personal reputation of the Secretary-General were theoretically brought into play in the interests of justice and international harmony. However, the eventual outcome of the case casts some doubt on the constitutional authority of the Secretary-General, especially when sensitive national interests are perceived to be at stake.

On 10 July 1985 the Greenpeace ship *Rainbow Warrior* was sunk in Auckland harbour while preparing to demonstrate against French nuclear testing in the Pacific. One member of the vessel died. At first the French government dissociated itself from the two French people arrested and tried for the crime.<sup>31</sup> However, it eventually became known that the two agents were members of an official operation to halt the activities of the *Rainbow Warrior* in a region which opposed nuclear testing. The French agents attracted a great deal of sympathy from their compatriots and pressure mounted upon the government to secure their release. Europe is New Zealand's largest market and France was capable of tightening the European Community quota on New Zealand products. Under the threat of economic sanctions New Zealand reluctantly realized that the case had to be reopened. However, Prime Minister David Lange had taken a strong domestic line against the French attack, earlier insisting that justice had been served by the imprisonment of the agents. Public opinion was high; how could Lange bow to French pressure and compromise on an issue of principle?

The Secretary-General was well placed to provide a face-saving mechanism, and as arbiter performed a role rarely undertaken by the Office; under Article 33(1) of the Charter he was able to accept such a role without a formal request from an organ of the UN. The decision was to be binding, which put significant authority and responsibility in Pérez de Cuéllar. He too had to accept the political realities of the situation, most notably the leverage which France holds within the Organization.

The ruling eventually decided that the French government should pay financial compensation to New Zealand, the two agents were to be confined to a remote island for three years, and the French government had to apologize and agree not to oppose access of New Zealand's products to Europe.<sup>32</sup> To add to New Zealand's chagrin, the agents were allowed by their government to return home in advance of the agreed three years; the arbitration ruling was not fulfilled.

Did the final outcome challenge the authority and the legitimation role of the Secretaryship-General? Some might suggest that the outcome laid bare the Office's dependence on good-will and political realities. In fact, Thakur has questioned the wisdom of the Secretary-General's decision to take the role. The cooperation of France was necessary for his re-election and the effectiveness of the Organization; 'Pérez de Cuéllar could not, therefore, afford to antagonize France.'<sup>33</sup> Despite this, having committed itself to the process France could hardly have rejected it out of hand. The Secretary-General, while balancing political realities with the demand for organizational integrity, performed a useful task.

### *Afghanistan*

The withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan was the result of diplomatic and military factors at a number of levels, in the context of the decline of Cold War tensions and internal Soviet developments. This case is one of a number where external leverage came to bear upon a client patron relationship and UN mediation provided a legitimation and facilitation framework for the negotiations and a settlement. Simultaneously, military pressure on the part of the US and Pakistan was critical. This case was also one of a number of examples when the Secretary-General found it necessary to create some independence from the deliberative organs because of the history of the Organization's resolutions and attitude towards the parties.

Since the 1979 Soviet intervention into Afghanistan an East—West proxy-war became entrenched. The Soviets installed a puppet government and mujahidin rebels provided an Islamic-oriented military opposition dependent upon Pakistani and American assistance. In the US attitudes were split. Some felt that the situation could be exploited to help bring down the Soviet Union by perpetuating the costly Afghan adventure and harrying the pro-Soviet government at every opportunity. This attitude was dominant during the first half of the 1980s and was a major cause of the UN's failure. Others sought a negotiated withdrawal. The influence of these attitudes indicates how the US was more conciliatory towards the end of the 1980s. The Soviet Union would have been satisfied with a much earlier withdrawal if a suitable face-saving mechanism had existed, and if it had received guarantees that the Americans and the Pakistanis would stop their support for the efforts of the *mujahidin*.

However, for many years the efforts of Pérez de Cuéllar and special representative Diego Cordovez were frustrated — and even obstructed — by the machinations engendered on all sides by the political climate. A General Assembly Resolution of 18 November 1981 instructed the Secretary-General to attempt to negotiate a political settlement and

'proximity talks' began in June 1982. The Assembly Resolution emphasized the importance of the sovereign territorial integrity of the state of Afghanistan and the need for 'foreign' forces to withdraw.<sup>34</sup> Pakistan would not recognize or communicate with the Kabul regime, and as the Resolution called for immediate troop withdrawal, the Afghan and Soviet governments were not comfortable with it as a basis for negotiation. Therefore, Pérez de Cuéllar's approach involved distancing the talks from the Resolution in order to retain an element of manoeuvrability: 'a variation of the "Peking Formula"'.<sup>35</sup> For many years Cordovez worked on the ground with frequent interventions by Pérez de Cuéllar, who was chiefly encouraging progress at the superpower level. It is important to consider that a patron—client conflict involves different levels of negotiations, both formal and informal. The evolving global political climate was critical — the changing attitude of the US and Soviet Union to each other and towards their Third World proxy conflicts — but it could take time to filter down to the warring factions. In addition, for a number of years the hawks in Washington were particularly unsupportive of Cordovez and there was therefore little incentive for Pakistan to curtail its support for the mujahidin. As Harrison observed, the divided Reagan administration often insinuated that the UN effort was being exploited for Soviet propaganda purposes, and when a breakthrough seemed possible early in 1983, 'the administration sent negative signals ranging from scepticism to bitter hostility'.<sup>36</sup>

After the first Reagan—Gorbachev summit the US at least publicly supported Cordovez and Washington began to consider the UN framework for a monitored withdrawal of Soviet troops in exchange for US and Pakistani assurances that military assistance to the rebels would cease. So, '[i]t was only after Gorbachev took the diplomatic initiative that the dealers in Washington made their first tentative moves to assist Cordovez.'<sup>37</sup> When the superpowers were willing to disengage — and in the case of the US, allow the Soviets to disengage — the UN was well situated to overcome the stalemate and to facilitate the modalities. The remaining distrust between the superpowers, and the fact that Pakistan did not recognize Kabul, placed the UN in a critical position. However, it would be wrong to believe that the US and the Soviet Union exerted complete control over their clients in this conflict. Satisfying the concerns of the local actors — particularly the Afghan government, Pakistan, and the *mujahidin* — was a difficult aspect of the process.

Throughout the 1980s Pérez de Cuéllar had been in contact with the Soviet Union and the US, both of whom were sensitive to the fate of post-Soviet Afghanistan and distrustful of each other regarding intervention and interference. The Secretary-General held talks with Reagan in January 1983, in which he pushed the ideas of a timetable of phased Soviet

withdrawal and the return of Afghan refugees, in return for assurances of non-interference by the US, and an eventual coalition government.<sup>38</sup> These were the bases of the eventual April 1988 accords, but the UN efforts were stymied until the superpowers were prepared to use their leverage in the region. In March 1983 Pérez de Cuéllar had talks in Moscow with communist party leader Andropov and Foreign Minister Gromyko, while Cordovez held proximity talks in Geneva between the parties directly involved. This was the pattern of UN mediation throughout, until Pérez de Cuéllar announced — after the accords had been signed — that he was taking personal charge of efforts to find a political settlement in the country.

The roles of the Secretary-General, in person or inter alia through Diego Cordovez, involved creative mediation — for example through the development of a ‘package of understandings’ regarding Soviet withdrawal, guarantees against further intervention, and reconstruction — and face saving, in enabling the Soviet Union to make a dignified retreat. One observer stated that Cordovez ‘mediated and largely crafted the accords’.<sup>39</sup> The utility of the Secretary-General was contingent upon the will of the US to exert leverage where necessary in particular upon Pakistan and to desist in its own support for the Afghan rebels. In addition, given that the US clients had the upper hand militarily, especially with the success of the ‘stinger’ anti-aircraft missiles, the peace process was largely tied to US willingness to allow the Soviet Union to make a negotiated withdrawal. Thus, a hawk might suggest that the ‘stinger’ was more responsible for the settlement than the UN Secretary-General. For the Soviet Union, internal changes and the wish by Gorbachev to improve relations with the West provided the impetus for a role by the UN. The Secretary-General was a facilitator through which these historical changes could have practical effect. Pérez de Cuéllar later suggested that ‘the UN role was essential but not decisive’.<sup>40</sup> In addition, in the midst of the civil war which continued to afflict the country, the UN and its Secretary-General were moving towards the ‘new era’ of domestic peace-building and reconstruction. In late 1989 the General Assembly adopted a resolution which asked the Secretary-General to ‘facilitate ... a comprehensive political settlement’.<sup>41</sup>

### *Hostages held in Lebanon*

The Office of Secretary-General has been involved in efforts to release prisoners or hostages on a number of occasions.<sup>42</sup> As with other UN activities this can involve mediation, facilitation, and face-saving. The humanitarian dimension is thought to make this area of activity particularly suitable for the Secretary-General. The Office is often the channel through which powerful forces are at work, and this was partly the case in Lebanon, through the influence of the US. However, there is also evidence that the hostages had simply outlived their usefulness and

that the Secretary-General was a convenient mechanism through which their release could be facilitated.

After other intermediaries — in particular the Swiss foreign minister — failed to achieve the release of the hostages, the Secretary-General began his efforts without any formal authorization from either the Council or Assembly. Special envoy Giandomenico Picco was sent to the area to negotiate with the groups and governments involved. Syria exerted considerable influence in Lebanon and Iran held sway over the fundamentalist groups in the territory which held the prisoners, in particular Hezbollah and Islamic Jihad. Among their objectives was the release of Islamic brothers-in-arms held in Israel or by its client militia, the South Lebanon Army. Israel had its own reasons for exchanging some of the prisoners it held, in particular to secure the return of seven Israeli prisoners held in Lebanon. However, the influence of the US in encouraging Israel to release some of the 375 Shiite ‘prisoners’ was important to the freedom of many Western ‘hostages’. Pérez de Cuéllar and Picco were therefore important in encouraging the various parties to bring their influence to bear upon the situation, and in representing the public face of the releases.

During 1991, while Picco was spending considerable time in the Middle East, Pérez de Cuéllar presented proposals directly to Iran’s representative to the UN, Kamal Kharrazi. The Secretary-General was evidently able to help convince Iran that its post-Gulf War position in the region and its relations with the West would be served by using its influence to hasten the release of the Israelis and Western captives. Similarly, he urged Israel to release the Islamic prisoners, realizing that a reciprocal arrangement would appear the most honourable. Given that the UN Secretary-General did not enjoy a particularly favourable relationship with Israel, this involved urging the US to exert pressure upon Israel. The US clearly took the Secretary-General’s plan seriously, for Pérez de Cuéllar had a secret line to President Bush via National Security adviser Brent Scowcroft; apparently the two had meetings which were not even known to the US Ambassador to the UN Thomas Pickering.<sup>43</sup>

When Briton John McCarthy was released by Islamic Jihad in August 1991 he held a confidential message to Pérez de Cuéllar from his captors.<sup>44</sup> McCarthy was certain that ‘these people wanted this business concluded, and that they had a huge trust in Pérez de Cuéllar as a man of honour’. Surely Islamic Jihad also savoured the prospect of being taken seriously and raising their profile, both inevitable results of having John McCarthy as their envoy to the UN.

The final chapter was signalled by a meeting between Pérez de Cuéllar and President Hashemi Rafsanjani in Tehran on 11 September 1991. The

President promised that Iran would use its influence to end the plight of the hostages, and by the end of the year this was achieved. The hostages had outlived their usefulness, and after the Oliver North controversies their captors and Iran realized they could not be used as bargaining chips on substantive issues with the US. Although all sides denied the existence of deals there were inevitably rumours. The releases were linked by some to the speeding up of compensation to Iran resulting from the US impounding of Iranian assets as a result of the events of 1979-80, and in December 1991 the Secretary-General issued a report which blamed Iraq for starting the Iran—Iraq war. While the full story may never be known, it is clear that the constitutional authority and the personal reputations of Pérez de Cuéllar and Picco encouraged and facilitated the release of the hostages.

### *Western Sahara*

A further instance where the evolving international power complexion held parallels to the fortunes of the Secretary-General was Western Sahara. Since Spain ceded this territory in November 1975, Morocco's occupation of the territory has been a source of tension with Algeria and the secessionist Polisario movement. Polisario proclaimed the independence of the territory as the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, and serious fighting was frequent in its war of national liberation. A number of external actors recognized the need for a referendum on the future of the territory and had sympathy for the group's cause. The US and the West generally desired stability in the area and this was likely to result from a settlement of the conflict and improved relations between Algeria and Morocco.<sup>45</sup> The US had, however, come to accept de facto Moroccan administration and was providing the moderate and secular government with military support. This was later to provide a valuable source of leverage.

In 1975 the General Assembly passed a resolution affirming the right of the people there to self-determination and asked the Secretary-General to 'make the necessary arrangements for the supervision of this'.<sup>46</sup> For a decade there was little movement. In 1985 an Assembly resolution called for direct negotiations between the parties, and the Secretary-General and the Organization of African Unity were involved in encouraging the process. However, King Hassan of Morocco would not communicate with Polisario, and although he acknowledged in principle the need for a referendum many felt that he looked upon it as a means of confirming Moroccan rule.<sup>47</sup> Furthermore, Polisario would not accept a referendum under the 'occupation' of Morocco. A number of factors came together towards 1988 to make timely the proposal of a plan by Pérez de Cuéllar. Improved relations at the superpower level resulted in a decrease of superpower support to both sides, an increase of pressure by the US upon Morocco

to accept a referendum, and a consensus within the Security Council to bring the conflict to an end. Relations between Algeria and Morocco were improving, and more than seventy countries and the Organization of African Unity had recognized Polisario as the representative of the territory. In addition, the Secretary-General was a suitable intermediary between Morocco and Polisario. After presenting his findings to the Council the Secretary-General was requested to 'transmit to it as soon as possible a report on the holding of a referendum for self-determination'.<sup>48</sup> Pérez de Cuéllar broke the deadlock on the ground with a plan which envisaged that Morocco withdraw two-thirds of the estimated 150 000 troops from the territory and confine the remainder to barracks during the UN supervised referendum. A further point of importance was the criteria upon which the right to vote would be based.

The proposals were accepted in principle, and once again the Secretary-General managed to cajole the interested parties towards a settlement. However, the referendum did not occur during Pérez de Cuéllar's tenure and fighting flared up. It appeared that — in contrast to certain other conflicts — external actors did not have sufficient weight or will to push the parties to compromise and evidently Morocco was still reluctant to hold the referendum. The Secretary-General's proposals still held and were accepted by the Security Council at the end of Pérez de Cuéllar's tenure.<sup>49</sup> The manner in which the Western Sahara conflict was not overtly driven by Cold War dynamics — and more by the politics of a secular struggle against Islam in a North African context — may help to explain why the end of the Cold War did not enable the Secretary-General to facilitate a solution at that time.

### *Cyprus*

The Cyprus conflict is essentially intercommunal and has not been strongly linked to global political developments. However, changing attitudes at the UN towards Cyprus and towards peace and security in general have been reflected in the Secretary-General's engagement with the conflict. Pérez de Cuéllar inherited a frustrating task in Cyprus. During his tenures the catalogue of disappointments continued. His personal skill and reputation could not overcome the entrenched, and sometimes intransigent, positions of the parties. This was apparently worsened by the Greek efforts to further internationalize the issue, which had the result of hardening the position of the Turkish Cypriots. The Security Council requested, on a regular basis, that the Secretary-General 'continue his mission of good-offices'.<sup>50</sup> In 1983 Pérez de Cuéllar attempted to restart talks by introducing 'three indicators' which sought to establish parameters for negotiation. However, these efforts were overtaken by the Turkish Cypriot unilateral declaration of independence in November. As



their leader explained, '[t]he way to make the world face reality was to assert our right of self-determination and declare our Statehood. Only then would the world realize that two nations lived in Cyprus and that the Greek Cypriots had no mandate to speak for the Turkish Cypriots.'<sup>51</sup> This solidified the Turkish-defended northern enclave and was met with wide condemnation. However, it did have the effect of forcing the Greek Cypriots' hand somewhat and the following year Pérez de Cuéllar judged that progress was possible.

The Secretary-General was still working on the basis of a bicomunal federal framework with certain shared central institutions, which was established in principle in the 1970s. On 16 March 1984 Pérez de Cuéllar gave each party a five-point paper involving confidence-building measures, ideas for the development of a governmental structure, and territorial adjustments. On the basis of these, 'proximity talks' began in September 1984 in New York. Progress was made on a number of issues under Pérez de Cuéllar's auspices, and a package arrangement was worked out. His formula involved agreement on a bizonal, bicomunal federation, with the withdrawal of a proportion of Turkish troops, a bicameral legislature and a Greek Cypriot President. On the basis of apparent agreement the Secretary-General scheduled a summit to conclude publicly the new arrangements. The proximity talks were handled by Pérez de Cuéllar — involving creative mediation — and a summit was subsequently planned for January 1985. The role of outside parties was important, but not decisive. The US and Britain, in particular, were keen to prevent serious conflict between two NATO members, and both supported the UN effort. Pérez de Cuéllar reportedly required US pressure upon Turkey to encourage Denktash to make concessions. Indeed, according to one analyst, the January 1985 summit 'resulted in large part from an important reversal of US policy toward the Cyprus problem'.<sup>52</sup> He suggested that the two sides were brought together by Congressional pressure and a letter in November 1984 from President Reagan to Turkish officials, urging Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots to make concessions.

Pérez de Cuéllar played an important part in arranging the first face-to-face meeting between Kyprianou and Denktash in six years. However, the summit was yet another disappointment, through misunderstanding and last-minute policy reversals, apparently on the Greek Cypriot side.

After the summit collapsed Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash realized that he had conceded too much and seemed relieved that he would not be held to what he had offered. Furthermore, he felt that he might not make such concessions again.<sup>53</sup> Such a setback was typical of the history of this issue and the volatility of the parties. Pérez de Cuéllar could bring them together but the will of the communities, and the pressure of external

actors, was not sufficient to take advantage of the opportunity for progress. Kyprianou complained — correctly — that the Secretary-General did not have the necessary leverage to bring to bear.<sup>54</sup>

Even with the lessening of East—West tensions and the declining threat to NATO, the increasing climate of the cooperation within the UN and the international community could not induce substantive progress during Pérez de Cuéllar's incumbency. The Secretary-General continued to mediate, although it seemed that a solution was possible only through significant outside pressure; the parties themselves, and in particular the Turkish community, were not particularly uncomfortable with the situation as it stood. Pérez de Cuéllar presented a 'Draft Framework Agreement' in March 1986, and brought Denktash and the new Greek Cypriot leader Vassiliou together in August 1988 in Geneva. This led to talks later that year, and in 1989 and 1990. Pérez de Cuéllar continued to produce 'ideas' to little avail. Furthermore, the relationship between the Secretary-General and Denktash became strained from July 1989; Denktash believed that Pérez de Cuéllar had overstepped his authority through one particular 'set of ideas'.<sup>55</sup> The peacekeeping force meanwhile continued its work in crisis diffusion and truce maintenance, and perhaps helped reduce the urgency of the situation.<sup>56</sup> Greek President Papandreou and Turkish premier Ozal met at the Swiss - resort of Davos in January 1988, giving hope for a wider political agreement necessary for settlement. Unfortunately the interests at stake continued to defy settlement. The Secretary-General's involvement here was a reflection more of the nature of intercommunal conflict than evolving international structures and evolving attitudes towards peace and security.

### *Namibia Angola*

The course of developments in south western Africa was connected strongly to developments outside, and especially the attitude of the US. The role — or lack of a role — for the UN and the Secretary-General reflected this reality. A number of levels of patron client relationships existed and provided the opportunity for leverage by outside actors. In the early 1980s Reagan and Thatcher's New Right agenda of 'constructive engagement' with South Africa involved alleviating pressure from Pretoria and steering clear of UN mediation. While the US was indeed the decisive influence upon South Africa, South Africa itself had clearly rejected a substantive role for the UN in the region many years before Reagan's election. Frequent attacks upon South Africa's domestic and regional practices and the support of such groups as the South West Africa People's Organization and the African National Congress by the General Assembly had undermined the Secretary-General's mediation efforts. While the Secretary-General had managed to create some independence



from the deliberative organs in cases such as Cambodia, Afghanistan and Iran—Iraq, the history of hostility between South Africa and the UN majority was simply too great for the Secretary-General to overcome. This was compounded by the US attitude. Initially, the Reagan administration was wary of UN involvement, and even later when the attitude improved the State Department wished to keep the thrust of the mediation under Chester Crocker and US auspices. Nevertheless, when the December 1988 accords were signed it was with an element of UN facilitation, and the Organization was to play a leading functional role in the reconstruction of Angola and Namibia.

In 1970 the General Assembly declared that the occupation by South Africa of Namibia was illegal and declared support for the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) in 1973. The general framework for the decolonization of Namibia was agreed among the Western Contact Group - Canada, Britain, France, Germany and the US - in its work towards the end of the 1970s, and embodied in Security Council Resolution 435.<sup>57</sup> However, the position of South Africa under P.W. Botha hardened, and with Reagan came a more conciliatory attitude towards South Africa. Indeed, the new administration saw the question of Namibia in the context of Soviet-sponsored aggression throughout southern Africa, and viewed South Africa as a bastion of capitalism. Therefore, the US administration felt that the decolonization of Namibia should be linked to Soviet or communist concessions, especially in Angola. The Security Council continued to condemn South Africa's occupation of Namibia and unrealistically mandated the Secretary-General to 'undertake consultations with a view to securing the speedy implementation of Security Council resolution 435'.<sup>58</sup>

The approach of Chester Crocker and 'constructive engagement' was that of linkage. As Thatcher recalled, 'I knew that the Americans would not press the South Africans to withdraw from Namibia unless the 20,000 or so Cubans also withdraw from neighbouring Angola. What is more, I privately thought they were fully justified in asserting this linkage.'<sup>59</sup>

Pérez de Cuéllar was out of touch with reality in rejecting US efforts to link the withdrawal of Cuba from Angola with that of South Africa from Namibia. This, in addition to the South African and American attitude to the UN, ruled out a substantive role for the Secretary-General. He did make the first visit to Namibia by a Secretary-General in 1983, and visited South Africa in 1988 in preparation for a settlement. However, the latter visit - the first since 1983 - was largely the result of progress made by Crocker, and was primarily to assure South Africa of the impartiality of the UN in the transition of Namibia to independence. On that occasion Pérez de Cuéllar made clear that it would not be proper for him to speak

to Cuba on the subject of its withdrawal from Angola, or to involve himself in the next round of talks between Angola, South Africa, Cuba and the US'. The Security Council was still demanding the unilateral withdrawal of South Africa, and the Secretary-General's status was conditioned by this.<sup>60</sup> It was clear that the US, while hardly an impartial mediator, could exert leverage upon all the parties, and help give rise to a settlement which was basically acceptable to all.<sup>61</sup> The Secretary-General's Special Representative, Martti Ahtisaari, played a key role in negotiating in the wake of Crocker's momentum and informally building on the work of the US while carefully trying not to appear out of step with UN declarations.<sup>62</sup>

By mid-1988 military stalemate and war weariness on the ground coincided with Soviet 'new thinking' and the general climate of cooperation between the superpowers.<sup>63</sup> The 'superpower midwifery' of the US,<sup>64</sup> and the realization by Angola and the Soviet Union that this was backed-up by superior firepower, provided the momentum which resulted in the 1988 accords. In turn, Soviet diplomatic pressure upon Angola and Cuba to induce flexibility - and to agree to the exit of Cuban troops - was significant. The UN role was then one of implementation: assisting in the transition of Namibia to independence, monitoring the withdrawal of Cuban troops, and legitimizing the guarantees for the settlement. This was in itself an achievement. Pérez de Cuéllar had gone some way towards mending relations with South Africa. Furthermore, when violence threatened the accords in 1989 Pérez de Cuéllar was at the forefront - with Under Secretary-General Marrack Goulding - of efforts to investigate the problems and report to the Council.

### *Iran-Iraq War*

In his first tenure Pérez de Cuéllar's involvement in the Iran-Iraq war demonstrated his understanding of the constraints inherent in the international environment and an entrenched conflict. Similarly, when the military circumstances of the parties and the diplomatic climate were later to change, he urged the Security Council into action. The Secretary-General's efforts may be divided into four interlinked areas: his attempts to limit the targets and destructiveness of the war; urging the Council to adopt the ceasefire resolution, mediating the acceptance and implementation of the resolution, and after the ceasefire mediating the modalities of the peacekeeping operation. This was in the context of — and partly responding to — regional and international changes.

The 1979 revolution in Iran had upset the regional balance. Saddam Hussein believed that there existed the opportunity to establish regional hegemony and to deter or preempt a future Iranian attack.<sup>65</sup> Years of territorial and religious differences were thrown into crisis by the fun-

damentalist upheaval. The reaction of the international community to Iraq's attack upon Iran was somewhat muted and the West perhaps even gave tacit approval. Security Council Resolution 479 lamely referred to 'the situation between Iran and Iraq', called upon the countries to 'refrain immediately from any further use of force' and casually supported the 'efforts of the Secretary-General and the offer of his good offices'.<sup>66</sup> As the victim of aggression, Iran felt that these non-mandatory words were far too even-handed. However, the West feared the prospect of a fundamentalist hegemony in a strategically important area. The US and the Soviet Union appeared to be in tacit agreement that a major change in the region's power balance or direct intervention by either superpower was undesirable.<sup>67</sup> Subsequently, in the context of the general problems and inadequacies of the UN in the first half of the 1980s the Security Council was not disposed to take positive action as long as the flow of oil was not interrupted. There was an air of bias against Iran, from which Pérez de Cuéllar struggled to dissociate himself.

While Iraq had superiority in weaponry and organization, Iran's soldiers were motivated and plentiful. The war settled into an entrenched and bitter struggle, lurching from stalemate to advantage for one side or the other. The war was characterized by the targeting of civilians and cities, the use of chemical weapons, and the, targeting of other Gulf states in the 'tanker war' in 1986.<sup>68</sup> While both Iran and Iraq favoured a military solution and harboured hope of victory, and while the Council remained indifferent, efforts by Pérez de Cuéllar were stymied. He followed a two-track approach which involved seeking to end the conflict, but also managing and limiting the war's effects, especially upon non-combatants. In March 1985 Pérez de Cuéllar met with both sides separately in New York and presented his 'eight-point plan' embracing these objectives. He subsequently presented his proposals to the Security Council and then visited the region in April. In ten days he visited Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, Iraq's largest financial backer for the war. Apparently, the Secretary-General made his visits conditional upon their consent to discuss all aspects of the conflict, and he reportedly received such assurances.<sup>69</sup> Pérez de Cuéllar was essentially the only channel of communication between the two countries and he had won the confidence of both the protagonists. Indeed, Iran had rejected the resolutions of the Council, perhaps correctly perceiving them to be politicized, yet was prepared to receive the Secretary-General.

In April 1985 Pérez de Cuéllar made no progress on a ceasefire so continued efforts to limit fighting. He had sent observers to both countries in 1984 and 1985 to investigate the use of chemical weapons, brokered a moratorium on attacks against cities which held for six months, and in early 1985 he sent a team of experts to both countries to investigate the

treatment of prisoners of war. These efforts to alleviate suffering and to manage the conflict were of the greatest significance in a context where substantive progress towards a ceasefire was not possible. Boudreau suggested that '[t]hrough these initiatives, the Secretary-General created, in effect, a humanitarian regime in the midst of a savage and bloody war.'<sup>70</sup>

By January 1987 the political climate of the Security Council was improving and Pérez de Cuéllar urged the Permanent Members to coordinate their influence with him informally to find a settlement. He called publicly for the Permanent Five to act and also 'arranged' for them to meet informally.<sup>71</sup> For the next six months representatives of the Permanent Members discussed issues for the most part suggested by Pérez de Cuéllar. These included responsibility for the war, the protection of merchant shipping, chemical weapons, the supply of weapons, a ceasefire and withdrawal of troops, and reparations.<sup>72</sup> The Permanent Members finally worked out a mandatory ceasefire resolution which represented a juncture in the Council approach to this conflict and in a wider sense.<sup>73</sup> Resolution 598, acting under Articles 39 and 40 of the Charter, demanded that Iran and Iraq immediately observe a ceasefire and withdraw forces to recognized boundaries. It also authorized an inquiry into responsibility for the war, and gave the Secretary-General a clear mandate to negotiate the implementation of the resolution. His role thereafter theoretically had the backing of Chapter VII Security Council action.

In September 1987 Pérez de Cuéllar made a four-day visit to the Gulf in an effort to gain compliance with the ceasefire resolution, which Iran was resisting.<sup>74</sup> Iran placed great emphasis on the inquiry into responsibility for the conflict, wishing this judgement — against Iraq — to be reached before ceasefire and withdrawal. Iraq maintained that the resolution should be implemented according to the order of its paragraphs, beginning with the ceasefire. Pérez de Cuéllar's efforts in the Gulf and in trying to push the Security Council into action to back up Resolution 598 did not have much impact. Serious fighting continued, including the use of chemical weapons and the bombing of cities. Iraq had taken the military advantage, and it was now Iran which sought a way out of the conflict. With a loss of morale and a number of serious battlefield blows, Rafsanjani needed to settle. The accidental loss on 3 July 1988 of an Iranian civilian airliner to US forces provided the opportunity to announce compliance with the ceasefire.<sup>75</sup> It should be noted that Iran expressed its intention to Pérez de Cuéllar.<sup>76</sup>

Following the ceasefire, Iran and Iraq met officially under Pérez de Cuéllar, in proximity, in Geneva. In effect, the Secretary-General 'renegotiated' the Security Council ceasefire resolution with the parties, perhaps to remove the political taint.<sup>77</sup> He told Iranian Foreign Minister Akbar

Valayeti and Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz of his proposals for a timetable for negotiations on the exchange of prisoners, the withdrawal of troops, and an investigation into responsibility. Pérez de Cuéllar shortly appointed Jan Eliasson as his personal representative and the Secretary-General continued to enjoy the confidence of the parties. On 9 August the Security Council adopted Resolution 619, setting up the UN Iran/Iraq Military Observer Group. Although progress was slow, the two foreign ministers met in person under Pérez de Cuéllar. However, it was Iraq's invasion of Kuwait which appeared finally to result in a full withdrawal from Iran. Nevertheless, in his relationship with the parties, and his nudging of the Security Council, the Secretary-General helped to hasten the settlement.

### *Central America: El Salvador and Nicaragua*

During the Reagan administration the UN was almost as marginalized from the Central American conflicts as it had been from the Vietnam war. Yet the El Salvadoran settlement at the end of Pérez de Cuéllar's tenure was a victorious parting achievement. It had been another client—patron proxy conflict with indigenous causes and superpower support. During the early 1980s US unilateralism and confrontationalism was most evident towards this region. The US has a long history of hegemony and protectiveness over the southern Americas, based on material and security interests. The upsurge of Cold War proxy confrontation in the Third World from the 1970s and the ascendancy of the New Right in Washington provided the pretext for a rigorous defence of US interests around the world. Pro-Western or capitalist regimes and insurgencies — even those of a totalitarian nature — were deemed worthy of support against the forces of communism, and Central America was a stark example of this. Indeed, Nicaragua was a test case for the 'Reagan doctrine'.<sup>78</sup> So confrontational and unapologetic was US policy in this case that it was found by the International Court of Justice, for its support of right-wing contra rebels, to have acted 'in breach of its obligation under customary international law not to intervene in the affairs of another state'.<sup>79</sup>

During at least the Reagan period there was little incentive for the rightist government of El Salvador to compromise with the rebel Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) because of the steady flow of US aid. Similarly, the rebels were the beneficiaries of Soviet aid via the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. Neither side, but especially the El Salvador government, was interested in serious negotiations while a military solution appeared to be possible, and while their external sponsors continued to support their efforts. Negotiations subsequently failed during much of the 1980s, until international political changes came to bear.

The government of El Salvador wanted the FMLN to disarm and to accept the constitution, an amnesty, and elections. The rebels, however, would not accept the constitution or elections in a climate of oppression. They wanted power-sharing, land reform, a reform of the army and the brutal police, and an investigation of abuses of human rights. By the end of the 1980s certain internal and extraneous developments pushed the parties towards an acceptance of mediation on a more serious basis. The decline of Cold War hostility was decreasing external aid, and in particular the US was increasingly doubtful of the nature of the El Salvadoran practices. The hard-line approach of the Reagan administration had given way to a more flexible policy that could no longer justify supporting a regime associated with atrocities; the murder of six Jesuit priests brought this home. In El Salvador a military stalemate and the realization that external aid was drying up convinced the parties, and most importantly the government, that a negotiated settlement was unavoidable. The new President, Alfredo Cristiani, was also more pragmatic. The military officers under him remained reluctant to give away their power, however.

In November 1989 FMLN leaders contacted the UN and met Pérez de Cuéllar's mediator, Alvaro de Soto, in December. Concerned Central American presidents also invited the UN to take a greater role and in April 1990 Pérez de Cuéllar announced that he would oversee a political settlement. Subsequently, Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, and Spain formed the 'Group of Friends' to assist the Secretary-General's efforts. The two broad strands of the mediation concerned political issues and a ceasefire. The central obstacles appeared to concern the reform of the armed forces, a purge of human rights abusers, and the integration into the army of the FMLN, before genuine reconstruction could be achieved. However, while deadlock existed here Alvaro de Soto managed to maintain momentum by the achievement of smaller agreements on human rights and a consensus to place greater emphasis on the role of the Secretary-General and his representative.

It was no coincidence that the flexibility on the part of the El Salvadoran government correlated with pressure and a reduction of aid from the US, its chief external sponsor. The US public, Congress, the European Community, the Group of Friends, and Central American presidents had been urging the US to press Cristiani. It is interesting to observe how a Cold War patron client relationship could be modified to exert leverage. Similarly, Soviet pressure and an agreement between the superpowers to push the 'endgame' and Pérez de Cuéllar's role therein were crucial. In the Summer of 1991 Bush and Gorbachev expressed their desire for the Secretary-General to become directly involved, and on 1 August Secretary of State Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh wrote a letter to Pérez de Cuéllar asking him to take personal charge.<sup>80</sup> In

accepting, Pérez de Cuéllar made it clear that he expected external actors to exert as much leverage as possible and he made specific suggestions to the US and Soviet Union, asking that the superpowers help him ‘to cut the Gordian knot’ facing the peace talks.<sup>81</sup>

With the genuine backing of the Security Council — both formally and informally — the key issues could be addressed. Council Resolution 693 was fully supportive of the Secretary-General’s efforts and established a UN Observer Mission in El Salvador to monitor all agreements made. After eighteen months of inconclusive and fractured talks Pérez de Cuéllar invited Cristiani and five rebel commanders to New York in mid-September. It was here that the Secretary-General tackled the central problem: instead of the FMLN occupying positions throughout the army, which the government rejected, it would be allowed representation in the new civilian police force. In addition, the National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace, agrarian reforms, and a committee to evaluate the armed forces were agreed. This was in the context of superpower support and pressure. For example, the US pledged a multi-million dollar assistance plan to help Salvadoran soldiers return to civilian life, in return for the government’s acceptance of reductions in the army. Pérez de Cuéllar had ‘revitalized’ the negotiations.<sup>82</sup>

In December 1991 the international community — the European Community, the Group of Friends, and the Central American Presidents — and the US channelled their influence into the peace process under the auspices of the Secretary-General. The parties were persuaded to return to New York in the middle of the month for an all-out effort before Pérez de Cuéllar’s tenure expired at the end of the year, which would risk upsetting the momentum.

The El Salvadoran government agreed to purge the officer corps, to incorporate former rebels into the police, and to embark upon a more reformist agrarian policy. The FMLN dropped its demands for broader socio-economic reform and participation in the army, and accepted the National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace, the Truth Commission, and the UN as the guarantor of security. Together with the constitutional, electoral and political reforms accepted earlier, an accord was reached. Pérez de Cuéllar delayed his departure from the UN to see the agreement signed, late at night on 31 December 1991: ‘a dramatic farewell gift’.<sup>83</sup> The historical context — the reversal from a supportive patron—client scenario into superpower leverage through the decline of Cold War hostility — was central to the successful outcome. In addition, the realization of military stalemate among the parties coincided with this external pressure.<sup>84</sup> The conflict was clearly ripe for settlement. However, this should not detract from the creative mediation and momentum provided by Alvaro de Soto

and Pérez de Cuéllar in providing an impartial framework for agreement and helping both parties to feel that they had won.

The Nicaraguan conflict and the various mediation efforts therein resembled the dynamics at work in El Salvador. During much of the 1980s US policy sought to dislodge the Sandinistas militarily through the support of contra rebels and to circumvent regional efforts at a political settlement formed around the Contadora peace process. Simultaneously, the Nicaraguan government received support from the Soviet Union. Thus, mediation efforts were frustrated until a decline in Cold War hostility, a reduction of external support for the parties, and momentum for a negotiated settlement engendered flexibility in the positions of the protagonists. The regional Contadora process — and the framework of the Esquipulas Agreement — comprised Panama, Mexico, Venezuela and Colombia and sought to separate Central American conflicts from the Cold War and thus hasten their settlement.

In late 1986 when the Contadora framework was losing steam, the Secretaries-General of the UN and the Organization of American States became informally involved.<sup>85</sup> The role of the UN Secretary-General primarily involved providing impartial assistance to the agreements which were brokered from 1989, and also in helping to diffuse the hostility which existed on the border between Nicaragua and Honduras, the location of many of the contra bases. Efforts by the UN, the Organization of American States and the Contadora Group resulted in a ceasefire in Nicaragua by 1988, an agreement on elections and contra demobilization in 1989, and in 1990 a national reconciliation commission.<sup>86</sup> Eventually, internationally supervised elections resulted in a relatively peaceful transition of power to an opposition coalition. The Esquipulas framework, and in particular the leadership of Oscar Arias, provided the main impetus to these accomplishments. However, when the timetable for elections became disrupted Pérez de Cuéllar mediated talks in New York, with the OAS Secretary-General, between Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega and the rebels.<sup>87</sup> Subsequently, talks on the demobilization and the ceasefire were re-established.

In addition, the implementation and verification of many aspects of the peace process were performed and guaranteed by the UN and its Secretary-General. The establishment of the UN Observer Mission to verify the electoral process in Nicaragua, and the UN Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA) were central to post-conflict reconstruction, and its creation and implementation were under the operational auspices of the Secretary-General.<sup>88</sup> Furthermore, the following year the Council mandated, upon the Secretary-General’s suggestion, an expansion of the tasks of ONUCA to undertake the ‘complete demobilization of the



Nicaraguan resistance'.<sup>89</sup> In common with other cases, Central America was interesting in the depth of international involvement and the extent to which the Secretary-General had interaction with non-state actors.

### *Lebanon*

For much of the 1980s Lebanon's travails continued whilst the UN remained on the sidelines. As was the case in the 1970s, the country suffered from a number of indigenous conflicts exacerbated by regional and international struggles. The President of Lebanon wrote, 'we are a nation of minorities.'<sup>90</sup> The conflict within this environment was exploited by the PLO in its war against Israel. Attacks and reprisals continued, until PLO provocation became unacceptable. Again, Israel invaded Lebanon, seeking to rout the PLO bases and re-establish a buffer between Israeli settlements and hostile forces north of the border. The 'multinational force' of US, French, Italian, and later British contingents, designed to facilitate the withdrawal of Israeli troops, seemingly epitomized the 'crisis of multilateralism' and US illusions of global unilateralism. There was little support by the Reagan administration for UN mediation efforts in this area, and sometimes actual competition.<sup>91</sup> The outright hostility of the Israeli government towards the Organization continued to rule out a substantive UN role, and continued to help undermine the UN Interim Force in Lebanon, despite the Council's ruling that the Secretary-General 'undertake all possible efforts' to encourage the cessation of the conflict.<sup>92</sup>

At a press conference in September 1982 Pérez de Cuéllar suggested that the UN Interim Force in Lebanon could reach Beirut in a short time,<sup>93</sup> and in early 1984 there were calls for a replacement of the multinational force by UN peacekeepers. Again, Pérez de Cuéllar noted that the UN was 'available and ready'.<sup>94</sup> The invasion of Lebanon, brushing aside as it did UNIFIL, was a blow to the UN at a difficult time. As the Secretary-General noted, 'the credibility both of the United Nations and of peacekeeping operations as such is severely shaken.'<sup>95</sup> The multinational force was, firstly, a challenge to the UN, and after massive American losses, a humiliation to the West. Pérez de Cuéllar could only express frustration, although he undertook measures to coordinate the activities of humanitarian agencies to help alleviate suffering.<sup>96</sup>

In UNIFIL the Secretary-General was saddled with the problems which resulted from its flawed terms of reference of 1978, and the Israeli invasion of 1982. The mandate remained as unrealistic as ever, because of the presence of PLO, Syrian and Israeli forces or client forces. UNIFIL did not represent an uninterrupted cordon along the Lebanese border. It appears that the initial rush and political pressure upon Waldheim to deploy left a legacy of political and organizational problems to his successor.

The Secretary-General's efforts in the 1980s — personally and through Brian Urquhart and then Marrack Goulding — to bring peace to southern Lebanon and 'restore' Lebanese authority were largely frustrated.

However, at a more local level opportunities to quell small-scale fighting, facilitate communication, and protect the local population were fulfilled to an impressive extent.<sup>97</sup> The UN continued to communicate with senior representatives of the principal parties, achieving minor agreements in an exercise of conflict management. The Secretary-General continued the interaction with the troop-contributing countries.<sup>98</sup> This involved the precarious management of finances and the difficulties inherent in maintaining a viable force with an operation which had a particularly hazardous reputation. The Secretary-General's Office continued to issue frank and sometimes outspoken public reports on the status and frustrations of UNIFIL, thereby exerting at least some leverage upon the parties. In addition, Pérez de Cuéllar frequently suggested methods of improving the UN's performance and extending its mandate, most notably in 1982 and 1984 when he suggested that UNIFIL extend north to Beirut to assist in the withdrawal of Israeli and multinational force troops. While this was politically unrealistic, it demonstrated the Secretary-General's wish to involve the UN substantively in an area where it was formerly something of a badly supported pawn.

At the operational peacekeeping level the Secretary-General was able to maintain some authority in trying circumstances and within a difficult mandate. This at least helped to keep UNIFIL operational, when troop-contributing countries might otherwise have withdrawn their support.

### *Cambodia*

The October 1991 Agreements on the Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict were the result of a convergence of interests of the Security Council and the diplomatic support of actors who had previously prolonged the conflict through the sponsorship of the warring factions. Superpower, regional and Cambodian actors had become war weary — for humanitarian, financial or military reasons — and more pragmatic, accepting the UN to facilitate the transition of the country.

There were a number of layers of patron—client support for the factions in Cambodia; it was indeed a kind of 'Southeast Asian Lebanon'.<sup>99</sup> Anti-Vietnamese opposition groups were sponsored by Thailand, China, and a number of Western states. The Vietnamese-supported government, since 1979, was dependent upon Vietnam which was in turn supported by the Soviet Union. The peace process, of which Pérez de Cuéllar played a significant part, therefore had to satisfy the Cambodian factions



but also their external patrons if it was to be lasting. For the Office of Secretary-General, 'his role as a neutral good officer was affected by a history of resolutions passed by the political organs.'<sup>100</sup> Indeed, the General Assembly continued to seat opposition factions, including the Khmer Rouge, and frequently demanded Vietnamese withdrawal. Subsequently, the Secretary-General had to assert some independence from the deliberative organs — à la 'Peking Formula' — in order to gain the confidence of the parties. His efforts were clearly in conjunction with the weight of international pressure behind the peace process, and perhaps the image that the UN had in some ways cleansed itself from the overtly politicized and biased stances of the past.

In early 1985 Pérez de Cuéllar visited the region, conferring with the influential Association of South East Asian Nations and Vietnam.<sup>101</sup> Although they received his overtures seriously, they still had faith in the military option and there was external support to encourage this thinking. Nevertheless, the Secretary-General outlined a number of elements which seemed to be generally acceptable as a basis for a settlement. Vietnam would not consider any settlement in which the Khmer Rouge would have a role, and China refused to negotiate. Crucially, the external parties which could encourage a more cooperative attitude through diplomatic and material pressure — primarily the Permanent Five — were still entrenched in a geopolitical and ideological struggle in that and other areas. The Secretaryship-General was stymied.

By 1988 regional and international developments engendered flexibility among the parties external to Cambodia, and this forced the warring parties to adopt a more cooperative attitude. Vietnam was looking for an end to its expensive occupation of Cambodia, and the Soviet Union was seeking to reduce its commitment to Vietnam.

In 1990 the major UN states began to put their weight behind the peace process and an enhanced UN peacemaking role. Moreover, the Permanent Five were particularly supportive of an initiative by the Australian Foreign Minister designed to overcome the power-sharing stalemate. The UN would assume responsibility for the administration of Cambodia — with the parties' consent — between the ceasefire and election, and the Council asked the Secretary-General to continue 'preparatory studies' regarding the form this would take.<sup>102</sup> In Paris on 23 October 1991 the accord was signed, and the Security Council endorsed it on 31 October. This involved a verified withdrawal of foreign forces, mine clearance, the disarmament and cantonment of factions, a UN administration to organize elections, ensure law and order, the repatriation of refugees, and the introduction of a rehabilitation and reconstruction programme.<sup>103</sup>

The peacekeeping mission was, as Pérez de Cuéllar observed, 'probably the most important and most complex in the history of the United Nations'.<sup>104</sup> Indeed, this was an example of what Boutros-Ghali would later describe as post-conflict peacebuilding: a wide involvement of international agencies to build a lasting peace.<sup>105</sup>

Moreover, within the context of this internal peace operation the Security Council had authorized the Secretary-General to prepare a plan for the UN mandate, and then to deploy UNTAC 'as rapidly as ... possible' in accordance with 'his plan'.<sup>106</sup> The UN was involved in a seemingly unprecedented situation at the implementation stage, exercising authority and undertaking tasks normally the responsibility of sovereign states. By extension, the Secretary-General, as executive head of such an operation, was on new ground. In combination with cases such as Central America, Namibia and Mozambique, this idea is given more support. The Secretary-General exercised his operative peacekeeping role to a qualitative and quantitative extent not experienced before 1988.

### *Iraq—Kuwait*

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, an attack by one state upon another, was characteristic of the type of conflict that the United Nations was established to deter and deal with. It is likely that such interstate war will continue to be a rarity compared to the trend of increasing civil war, state failure, and fragmentation. Therefore, it may be inappropriate to place too much emphasis on one case.

However, this case is significant in indicating possible trends in the Office of Secretary-General when the Security Council is in consent or under the will of activist states. Under such conditions, although the quantitative burden of the Office may flourish, the room for manoeuvre and quasi-independence of the Secretaryship-General may decrease in critical situations. This can be seen as a corollary of the Cold War context, when the Office often gleaned room for manoeuvre — with the informal support or acquiescence of major states — as a result of the inactivity of the deliberative organs.

In the case of the Iraq Kuwait crisis it was the agenda of the US, and to a lesser extent Britain, rather than the collectivity of the Council, which lay at the heart of Pérez de Cuéllar's marginalized status and the dominance of the activist states over the UN. This was indicated early on by the manner in which the US and Britain had maintained the right to act independently under Article 51 of the Charter and customary international law.<sup>107</sup> In addition, the galvanized Security Council — under the coaxing of the United States — was resolute that the UN live up to this

post-Cold War test case. The Security Council was in consensus when the key resolutions were adopted and these were explicit in their demand for Iraqi withdrawal. No independent room for manoeuvre existed for the Secretary-General. In fact, the activist states avoided any commitment to mediation which might be implied by the involvement - of the Secretary-General.

Nevertheless, in late August 1990 Pérez de Cuéllar claimed to be acting on his own initiative when he met Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz in Jordan.<sup>108</sup> The Secretary-General was attempting to persuade Iraq to release the remaining Western hostages and to convince Aziz that the Council was serious. The experience of a decade earlier, when the West essentially had acquiesced in the face of Iraqi aggression, could not have helped. Pérez de Cuéllar's personal relationship with Aziz was reasonably good. However, the Secretary-General notably announced that his mission was defined by the parameters of the Council resolutions.<sup>109</sup> The resolution of 29 October asked him 'to make available his good offices and, as he considers appropriate, to pursue and undertake diplomatic efforts in order to reach a peaceful solution to the crisis'.<sup>110</sup> Pérez de Cuéllar was actually only able to communicate the Council's demand for unconditional withdrawal. There was no room for manoeuvre, no independence from the Council in the tradition of the Peking formula. This was without doubt a source of frustration to Pérez de Cuéllar,<sup>111</sup> who might have had greater success in providing some form of face-saving mechanism for Iraqi withdrawal if given more authority.

Pérez de Cuéllar's second trip was even less productive for the settlement of the dispute and for the development of the Office of Secretary-General. After a number of mediation efforts by the Arab group, France, Russia and the US, there had been a 'pause of goodwill' leading to the 15 January deadline for final diplomatic efforts, but the US was not particularly comfortable with independent efforts which threatened to split the consensus. It was a sign of Saddam Hussein's lack of judgement that he remained defiant, for any meaningful concession might have postponed the use of allied force. Despite the 'pause of goodwill' in January, the Bush administration determined to remain dominant. Secretary of State James Baker failed to budge Aziz in Geneva, and the latter appeared not to have any authority to make concessions.<sup>112</sup> It was only after this failure and a telephone call by Baker that Pérez de Cuéllar was prompted to 'go through the motions' again. He spoke with Bush by telephone and at Camp David, and there was a strong feeling that he represented the last chance for peace. Theoretically, he still represented the hope that Iraq might accept some form of face-saving capitulation. In reality he was caught between the stalling tactics of Iraq and the desire of the activist states to be seen to have exhausted all peaceful channels. Pérez de Cuéllar stated: '[i]t is my

moral duty as Secretary-General of the United Nations to do everything in order to avoid war. My only strength is a moral strength.'<sup>113</sup> However, he clearly could not do much. Pérez de Cuéllar might have supported a tenuous linkage to a Middle East conference *after* Iraqi withdrawal to attempt to create a possible face-saving scenario, but he did not have the authority to negotiate on this basis.<sup>114</sup> His mission failed and had given support to the activist argument that the international community had given Iraq every opportunity to withdraw and restore the rule of law. The restrictions were overwhelming in the context of US and Council faith in a policy of coercion rather than 'stick and carrot'.<sup>115</sup> Richard Falk lamented that the last-ditch visit by Pérez de Cuéllar was 'belated and halfhearted and was explicitly restricted to the Bush guidelines that deliberately provided no room whatsoever for diplomatic manoeuvre'.<sup>116</sup>

During the fighting the UN played even less of a role. The UN had no preparatory framework for any such military campaign, and dependence upon US forces and command and control was unavoidable. The Security Council can act quickly in certain circumstances, but cannot conduct command and control. The Secretary-General is even less disposed to be involved.

After the war, however, the wide and unprecedented involvement of UN agencies in Iraq did constitute a significant array of activities that the Secretary-General was involved in, albeit again under the influence of the activist states. The 'mother of all resolutions', 687, and those thereafter, established an unprecedented width and depth of activities for humanitarian, arms control, compensation, peacekeeping and boundary demarcation under Chapter VII of the Charter. At the ground level the Secretary-General's Office, by extension, was on new ground, working under mandatory Council authority. This chiefly involved organizing the modalities of the Gulf War settlement and monitoring, verifying and assessing the implementation of the terms. The Commission on weapons of mass destruction — seemingly a post-war precedent in arms control enforcement — under Rolf Ekeus involved a multitude of innovative powers and investigative methods. The humanitarian agenda in the north and south — albeit with its political dimensions<sup>117</sup> — was of great significance. It gave rise to a number of organizational changes at the UN, such as the creation of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs, which saw an enhancement of the Secretary-General's organizational apparatus. The peacekeeping operation likewise broke new ground in including military observers from the Permanent Five and having the threat of enforcement action behind it. This tripwire with teeth invested a significant level of operational authority in the Secretaryship-General.

With the implementation of the settlement of the Gulf War the Secretary-General's authority and quantitative functions were enhanced,

largely by extension of the Security Council's appearance of consensus and activism. However, before Desert Storm the Office was marginalized by the activism of the Council and the concern of the leading powers to maintain control over the situation.

### INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE AND SECURITY

The Secretaryship-General, since its inception, has developed roles in early warning, preventive diplomacy and international responses to conflict. The Office-holders constantly struggled against the constraints inherent in the organizational and political environments. These constraints had resulted in a reactive, ad hoc, and politicized institutional framework, which had lapsed into cynicism and almost disuse in the 1980s. Pérez de Cuéllar made an admirable attempt to fight this condition, an effort which transpired to be before its time. His celebrated first annual report urged:

In order to avoid the Security Council becoming involved too late in critical situations, it may well be that the Secretary-General should play a more forthright role in bringing potentially dangerous situations to the attention of the Council within the general framework of Article 99 of the Charter ... I wonder if the time has not come for a more systematic approach.<sup>118</sup>

Although this report created a great deal of discussion, the condition of the UN at that time stifled any genuine progress in early warning and preventive action in the attitude of members. In institutional terms the creation of the Office for Research and the Collection of Information (ORCI) in March 1987 did represent an important development, although evidently superficially. Its functions were to assess global trends; to prepare country, regional and issue-related profiles; to provide early warning of developing situations requiring the Secretary-General's attention; to monitor factors related to refugee flows and comparable emergencies; and to carry out ad hoc research and assessments for the Secretary-General.<sup>119</sup> The office was practically important because it provided a support network for the Secretary-General's everyday tasks and sought to enhance his institutional early warning capability by way of information gathering and 'perceptive analysis'.<sup>120</sup> Given that the Secretaryship-General is endowed with an early warning function under Article 99 of the Charter, such a body was overdue. ORCI was also symbolically significant: a quasi-independent office of international civil servants performing fact-finding and analysis under the auspices of the Executive Office of the Secretary-General.

The immediate attitude of many UN members was that ORCI represented an intrusive intelligence gathering operation which was not befitting of the international bureaucracy.<sup>121</sup> This was in spite of the fact that ORCI worked largely upon the basis of public information and the sources from Secretariat officials around the world. Nevertheless, political support for the new office was weak. In addition, there were bureaucratic and administrative problems: 'it was not managed well, [and] it faced enormous internal opposition from people within the Secretariat who, for one reason or another, thought it was going to be an invasion of their camp.'<sup>122</sup> Subsequently, ORCI became a rather disheartened collection of individuals who spent their time reading the newspapers and writing the Secretary-General's speeches.<sup>123</sup> The fate of ORCI cannot be attributed wholly to a hostile external political environment, although ultimately one could locate the frustrations of early warning and preventive diplomacy in the context of a statist system. The systemic context is such that anything which appears remotely intrusive, especially under the auspices of the Secretary-General, is regarded with suspicion by member states.

Although the easing of Cold War tensions did encourage discussion of early warning and preventive diplomacy, it is still too early to judge if this can overcome the systemic obstacles that exist. In the case of Iraq—Kuwait the Office of Secretary-General should have had access to information which would have enabled preventive action. For practical and political reasons this was an organizational failure.<sup>124</sup> Evidence has indicated that Pérez de Cuéllar was aware of the movement of Iraqi troops toward the Kuwaiti border prior to the invasion, yet discreet approaches to Arab representatives did not shed much light on the situation. However, at that point the US and Russia held satellite photographs which indicated massive forces. Pérez de Cuéllar believes that if he had known this he would have brought the threatening situation to the Council, possibly through the formal use of Article 99, and that might well have dissuaded Iraq from a dangerous course of action. A Council challenge to Iraq *before* it had actually invaded Kuwait would have given Saddam Hussein cause for pause. Thus, if the Secretary-General had access to an effective early warning and analysis office, he might have helped prevent the Gulf War. Yet, as one veteran UN employee suggested after working under five Secretaries-General, 'anything that makes the Secretary-General either more influential or more independent, governments will resent'.<sup>125</sup>

### CONCLUSION

The first half of Pérez de Cuéllar's tenure reflected the frustrations and constraints which were a result of the condition of the Organization. In turn, this 'crisis of multilateralism' was a reflection of historic trends

which coalesced around an upsurge of Cold War hostility and Third World discontent and militancy. Major actors — and most notably the US — circumvented the UN at critical stages, and proxy Cold War confrontations were impervious to constructive intervention by the UN. Financial crises and disillusionment within and outside the UN compounded the Organization's despair. Subsequently, the Office of Secretary-General was stymied both as a result of the and lack of support invested by the major members towards the UN in general, and the involvement of Security Council members in many of the regional conflicts and hence their obstruction to a substantive UN involvement. The institutional improvements urged by Pérez de Cuéllar for maintaining peace and security and early warning went largely unheeded; the innovative Office for Research and the Collection of Information foundered under member states' suspicions and lack of support. Nevertheless, the intervention of the Secretary-General in cases such as the Rainbow Warrior arbitration and the Falklands crisis illustrated the inherent utility of the Secretaryship-General in spite of a difficult political climate in Pérez de Cuéllar's first tenure. Similarly, the attempts by the Office at conflict management during the Iran—Iraq war indicated the opportunities possible with a skilled Secretary-General.

From 1987 the international political tide changed and the Organization's activities flourished, especially in the settlement of conflict. The Permanent Members of the Security Council had rediscovered the utility of the UN and appeared to support the Organization in the areas of international peace and security. Former Cold War patron—client relationships between warring parties and their superpower sponsors underwent an important transformation with the decline of Cold War hostility. In areas such as Central America, Afghanistan, Iran-Iraq, Western Sahara and Cambodia, this global change coincided with a local movement towards political settlement on the part of the combatants. The new climate of cooperation was manifested in the Security Council with a consensus among the Permanent Five and the application of collective leverage upon these conflicts in tandem with, and often under the auspices of, the Secretary-General. Thus, from a position of frustration and in some cases even irrelevance until 1986-7, the Secretaryship-General came to represent an organ of authority and facilitation in the roles of creative mediation, face-saving, and facilitation. In the context of the historical and external factors which came to bear upon the Secretaryship-General, one must also note the personality factor. Throughout his tenures Pérez de Cuéllar had always been very careful never to sour his relationship with the Permanent Members of the Council.<sup>126</sup> This was an acceptance of political realities — in contrast perhaps to Trygve Lie — which some may have regarded as over-compliance until 1987. However, when the time came Pérez de Cuéllar was reprieved by the involvement he played

in conflict settlement, and this undoubtedly derived in large part from the confidence and trust built up over the years.<sup>127</sup>

In cases such as Iran—Iraq and Central America the Secretary-General informally urged the Council to work in unison with him and on an informal basis in a manner rare before 1987. Clearly the activism of the Security Council, and the determination of the Secretary-General to be involved as a vanguard of the new climate of consensus, was resulting in a quantitative and possibly qualitative expansion of the Secretaryship-General's roles. In the window of opportunity between 1987 and 1992, the Secretary-General was a useful instrument through which a superficially united Security Council could bring to an end some of the residual conflicts of the Cold War. It is interesting therefore that the source of Pérez de Cuéllar's earlier marginalization — superpower involvement — was later to pave the way to his activism. As he recalled, '[t]he necessary objective was, as it will continue to be, to mobilize the constructive efforts of the major powers toward an identified goal and to make known to them the particular contribution the United Nations could offer in bringing a solution. The contribution in each case was indispensable.'<sup>128</sup>

During this process another important feature was the extent to which the Secretary-General communicated and interacted with non-state actors with the support of the Security Council. Moreover, in a number of peacemaking efforts — such as El Salvador and Afghanistan— the superpowers explicitly called upon the Secretary-General to increase his involvement, and put their weight behind him. For the Soviet Union, this was a departure from more than forty years of attitude and practice towards the international Secretariat. Another notable characteristic of the Council's support of the Secretary-General in the 1987-92 period was that it was positive and cooperative, in tandem with Pérez de Cuéllar and in the context of an apparent resurgence of internationalism. In the past, numerous examples saw the Secretary-General acting in the face of Council paralysis and ill will, or fulfilling a need for a cynical trade-off between Council members, whose support of the Office was negative or acquiescent. In contrast, it has been suggested that Central America was the first time in history that the US allowed the UN to take the lead through the Secretaryship-General.<sup>129</sup> Pérez de Cuéllar's tenures have been a case study of how activism need not mean confrontation.

Many of the cases presented here demonstrate what could be achieved when the Secretary-General and a superficially united Security Council work together. However, this period saw the Office of Secretary-General blossom in clearing the residue of the Cold War. This mode of operation was not to continue in the patterns of conflict which emerged in the 1990s in the context of state failure, civil war, fragmentation and ethnic strife,



especially when the leading Council members did not perceive that they had an interest. In spite of a plethora of Council resolutions under — or alluding to — Chapter VII, earlier optimism has been undermined and the Secretaryship-General often thrown into disarray by lack of political will and support, financial constraints, isolationist tendencies, and splits within the Council. To a large degree the celebrated latter years of Pérez de Cuéllar represented the post-Cold War honeymoon and not the multilateral issues and problems of the international civil service in the post-Cold War world. Nevertheless, Pérez de Cuéllar's final achievements indicated the utility of his Office when the Security Council works on the basis of coherence in issues it has an interest in.

## NOTES

1. Sir Brian Urquhart, interview, 25 May 1994, New York. Pérez de Cuéllar recalled that this transition divided his two terms almost exactly, 'Reflecting on the Past and Contemplating the Future', *Global Governance*, vol. 1, no. 2, 1995, p. 159.
2. Interview, New York, 25 May 1994.
3. See J. Pérez de Cuéllar, 'The Role of the UN Secretary-General', in A. Roberts and B. Kingsbury eds, *United Nations, Divided World: the UN's Roles in International Relations*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993).
4. J. Pérez de Cuéllar, 'Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization', September 1982. He later conceded that this was something of an overstatement, 'Reflecting on the Past and Contemplating the Future', p. 161.
5. One must be cautious of judging the UN's performance: it is a subjective pursuit and there are no historical parallels against which to compare the Organization. See A. Roberts and B. Kingsbury, 'The UN's Roles in International Society since 1945', in their edited volume, op.cit., pp. 14-17.
6. F. Halliday, *The Makings of the Second Cold War*, (London: Verso, 1986).
7. J. Pérez de Cuéllar, 'Reflecting on the Past and Contemplating the Future', p. 153.
8. S.D. Krasner, *Structural Conflict. The Third World against Global Liberalism*, (California: University of California Press, 1985) p. 65.
9. General Assembly Resolution 37/233, 20 December 1982.
10. T.M. Franck, 'Soviet Initiatives: US Responses - New Opportunities for Reviving the United Nations System', *American Journal of International Law*, vol.83, no.3, July 1989, pp. 532-3.
11. S.D. Krasner, op.cit., p. 300.
12. E.B. Haas, 'Regime Decay: Conflict Management and International Organizations, 1945-1981', *International Organization*, vol. 37, no. 2, Spring 1983.
13. J.J. Kirkpatrick in L.M. Fasulo ed., *Representing America: Experiences of US Diplomats at the UN*, (New York: Praeger, 1984) p. 284.
14. M. Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years*, (London: Harper Collins, 1993) chapter 6.
15. W.C. Sherman, Deputy Representative to the Security Council 1981-83, in L.M. Fasulo ed., op.cit., p. 299.
16. J.J. Kirkpatrick, 'The Superpowers; is there a moral difference?', *The World Today*, May 1984, p. 185.
17. See T.M. Franck, op.cit., 'Soviet Initiatives: US Responses - New Opportunities for Reviving the United Nations system', pp. 536-7.
18. L. Freedman, 'The War of the Falkland Islands', *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 61, no. 1 Fall 1982, p. 196.
19. A. Parsons, 'The Falklands Crisis in the United Nations, 31 March-14 June 1982', *International Affairs*, vol. 59, no.2, Spring 1983, p. 172.
20. I.L. Claude Jr, 'UN Efforts at Settlement of the Falkland Islands Crisis', in A.R. Coll and A.C. Arend eds, *The Falklands War. Lessons for strategy, diplomacy, and international law*, (London, George Allen & Unwin, 1983) p. 119.
21. Interview with a former senior Secretariat officer and member of Pérez de Cuéllar's Falklands Islands crisis team. Despite initial worries about Pérez de Cuéllar's background, his 'quality of gaining confidence shone through'. New York, June 1994.
22. *The Times*, 17 April 1982, p. 4; A. Parsons, op.cit., p. 172.
23. *The Times*, 1 May 1982, p. 1.
24. A. Parsons, op.cit., p. 173, and a personal correspondence, 12 August 1995.
25. Ibid., p. 174.
26. M. Thatcher, op.cit., p. 173.
27. Security Council Resolution 505, 26 May 1982, paragraph 4.
28. Correspondence to the author, 12 August 1995.
29. I.L. Claude, op.cit., p. 122.
30. Ibid., p. 222. The *Sunday Times* Insight Team even claimed that '[i]t has to be said that the British never appeared anything except suspicious of the UN negotiations.' *The Falklands War*, (London: Sphere Books, 1982) p. 172. However, Anthony Parsons later claimed that the negotiations were in good faith, in a personal correspondence, 12 August 1995.
31. R. Thakur, 'A Dispute of Many Colours: France, New Zealand, and the "Rainbow Warrior" Affair', *The World Today*, vol. 42, no. 12, December 1986, p. 210. See also M. Pugh, 'Legal Aspects of the Rainbow Warrior Affair', *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, vol. 36, July 1987, p. 656.
32. *New York Times*, 8 July 1986, p. 1; *Financial Times*, 8 July 1986, p. 3.



33. R. Thakur, *op.cit.*, p. 211.
34. General Assembly Resolution 36/34, 62nd Plenary Meeting, 18 November 1981.
35. T.M. Franck and G. Nolte, 'The Good Offices Function of the UN Secretary-General', in A. Roberts and B. Kingsbury, *op.cit.*, p. 149; and J. Pérez de Cuéllar, 'Reflecting on the Past and Contemplating the Future', p. 153.
36. S.S. Harrison, 'Inside the Afghan Talks', *Foreign Policy*, no. 72, Fall 1988, p. 32. For an interesting analysis of the Secretaryship General's 'surrogates in the field' see D.J. Puchala, 'The Secretary-General and his Special Representatives', in B. Rivlin and L. Gordenker, eds, *The Challenging Role of the Secretary-General. Making The Most Impossible Job in the World Possible*, (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1993).
37. S.S. Harrison, *op.cit.*, p. 32.
38. *New York Times*, 25 January 1983, p. 10.
39. B.R. Rubin, 'Afghanistan. The Next Round', *Orbis*, vol. 33, no. 1, 1989, p. 57.
40. J. Pérez de Cuéllar, 'Reflecting on the Past and Contemplating the Future', p. 153.
41. General Assembly Resolution 44/15, 1 November 1989, paragraph 10.
42. The first prominent example was the celebrated case of Hammarskjöld assisting in the release of US pilots from China following the Korean War, giving rise to the 'Peking formula', whereby the Secretaryship-General cultivates some measure of autonomy. Waldheim was involved in the successful release of French hostages from Polisario and less successful attempts to secure the release of American hostages in Iran. Pérez de Cuéllar also attempted to secure the release of Western hostages in Iraq and Kuwait in 1990-91. In conflict situations the Secretary-General has also been involved in encouraging and facilitating the exchange of prisoners and hostages, for example in Cyprus and during the Iran Iraq war.
43. *Los Angeles Times*, 8 December 1991, p.1; *New York Times*, 6 December 1991, p. 1.
44. J. McCarthy and J. Morrell, *Some Other Rainbow*, (London: Corgi Books, 1994) p. 467.
45. Y.H. Zoubir, 'The Western Sahara Conflict: Regional and International Dimensions', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 28, no. 2, 1990, p. 232.
46. General Assembly Resolution 3458 A(XXX) 10 December 1975.
47. Y.H. Zoubir, *op.cit.*, p. 242.
48. Security Council Resolution 621, 20 September 1988.
49. Security Council Resolution 691, 6 May 1991.
50. Security Council Resolution 510, 15 June 1982; the same every six months afterwards.
51. R.R. Denktash, *The Cyprus Triangle*, (London: K.Rustem & Brothers, 1988) p. 117.
52. L.H. Bruce, 'Cyprus: A Last Chance', *Foreign Policy*, no. 58, Spring 1985, p. 115.
53. R.R. Denktash, *op.cit.*, p. 142.
54. *New York Times*, 3 March 1985, p. 8.
55. P. Oberling, *Negotiating for Survival. The Turkish Cypriot Quest for a Solution to the Cyprus Problem*, (Princeton: Aldington Press, 1991) pp. 31 and 39.
56. A. James, 'The UN force in Cyprus', *International Affairs*, vol. 64, no. 3, 1989, p. 499.
57. Security Council Resolution 435, 29 September 1978 established the UN Transition Assistance Group.
58. Security Council Resolution 532, 31 May 1983.
59. M. Thatcher, *op.cit.*, p. 157.
60. Security Council Resolution 602, 25 November 1987.
61. See V. Tome, 'Maintaining Credibility as a Partial Mediator: United States Mediation in Southern Africa, 1981-1988', *Negotiation Journal*, July 1992.
62. C.A. Crocker, *High Noon in Southern Africa. Making Peace in a Rough Neighborhood*, (New York: W.W. Norton, 1992) pp. 336-7.
63. For example see G.R. Berridge, 'Diplomacy and the Angolan/Namibian accords', *International Affairs*, vol. 65, no. 3, 1989, p. 465.
64. J.E. Spence, 'A Deal for Southern Africa?', *The World Today*, vol. 45, May 1989, p. 80. For C.W. Freeman Jr, the US was the 'indispensable mediator of peace', 'The Angola/Namibian Accords', *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 68, no. 3, Summer 1989, p. 126.
65. P. Robbins, 'Iraq in the Gulf War: Objectives, Strategies and Problems,' in H.W. Maull and O. Pick, *The Gulf War. Regional and International Dimensions*, (London: Pinter, 1989) p. 46.
66. Security Council Resolution 479, 28 September 1980, paragraphs 1 and 4. Resolution 514, 12 July 1982 used stronger language but on largely the same terms. In theory the Council could and should have taken mandatory action under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
67. H. Hubei, 'The Soviet Union and the Iran—Iraq War', in H.W. Maull and O. Pick, *op.cit.*, p. 140.
68. See D. Segal and E. Karsh, 'Lessons of the Iran—Iraq War', *Orbis*, Summer 1989; D. Segal, 'The Iran Iraq War: A Military Analysis', *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 66, no. 5, 1988.
69. *New York Times*, 1 April 1985, p. 9; *New York Times*, 8 April 1985, p. 9.
70. T.E. Boudreau, *op.cit.*, p. 92. On the basis of one of Pérez de Cuéllar's reports Council Resolution 612, 9 May 1988, condemned the continued use of chemical weapons.
71. J. Pérez de Cuéllar, 'Reflecting on the Past and Contemplating the Future', p. 163; C.R. Hume, 'Pérez de Cuéllar and the Iran Iraq War', *Negotiation Journal*, April 1992, p. 178.
72. C.R. Hume, *op.cit.*

73. Security Council Resolution 598, 20 July 1987. Pérez de Cuéllar wrote of dramatic and profound change in 1987, 'Reflecting on the Past and Contemplating the Future', p. 161.
74. *Los Angeles Times*, 16 September 1987, p. 23; C.R. Hume, *op.cit.*, pp. 180-1. According to one report, Secretary of State George Shultz said the Security Council wanted the two sides to 'sit down with the Secretary-General.' *Chicago Tribune*, 22 July 1987, p. 6.
75. F. Halliday, 'Iran—Iraq: the Uncertainties of Peace', *The World Today*, vol. 44, no. 10, 1988.
76. *Newsday*, 19 July 1988, p. 5.
77. Interview with a former aide of Pérez de Cuéllar, June 1994, New York. Apparently Pérez de Cuéllar felt that his involvement in the Iran-Iraq and Central American conflicts were his two greatest achievements.
78. For example P. Kornbluh, 'The Covert War', in T.W. Walker ed., *Reagan Versus the Sandinistas. The Undeclared War on Nicaragua*, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1987) p. 21.
79. Cited in H.W. Briggs et.al., 'Appraisals of the ICJ's decision: Nicaragua v. United States', *American Journal of International Law*, vol. 81, no. 1, 1987, p. 79.
80. *New York Times*, 21 August 1991, p. 7.
81. *Ibid.*
82. J.G. Sullivan, 'How Peace Came to El Salvador', *Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs*, vol. 38, no. 1, 1994, p. 93.
83. T.L. Karl, 'El Salvador's Negotiated Revolution', *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 71, no. 2, 1992, p. 159. For *The Times*, 2 January 1992, 'El Salvador pact crowns UN leader's 10-year reign'.
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86. P. Wehr and J.P. Lederach, 'Mediating Conflict in Central America', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 28, no. 1, 1991, pp. 90-98.
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89. Security Council Resolution 653, 20 April 1990.
90. A. Gemayel, 'The Price and the Promise', *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 63, no. 4, Spring 1985, p. 760.
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106. Security Council Resolution 745, 28 February 1992.
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108. *New York Times*, 27 August 1990, p. 10.
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110. Security Council Resolution 674, 29 October 1990, paragraph 12.
111. Interview with a senior member of the Executive Office of the Secretary-General under Pérez de Cuéllar, New York, June 1994.
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113. *New York Times*, 10 January 1991, p. 1.

114. Interview with a senior member of the Executive Office of the Secretary-General under Pérez de Cuéllar, New York, June 1994.
115. S. Greffinius and J. Gill, 'Pure Coercion vs. Carrot and Stick Offers in Crisis Bargaining', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 29, no. 1, 1992.
116. *Ibid.*, p. 178.
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121. Interviews with former ORCI officials, New York, May and June 1994. Also J. Pérez de Cuéllar, 'Reflecting on the Past and Contemplating the Future', p. 153.
122. Interview with a founder of ORCI, New York, June 1994.
123. Interviews with former ORCI officials, New York, May and June 1994.
124. This account derives from an interview with a former senior member of the Executive Office of the Secretary-General, New York, June 1994.
125. Interview, May 1994, New York.
126. Interview with a former close colleague of Pérez de Cuéllar, New York, June 1994.
127. Interview, *ibid.*
128. J. Pérez de Cuéllar, 'Reflecting on the Past and Contemplating the Future', p. 163.
129. Interview, former colleague of Pérez de Cuéllar, New York, June 1994.

## Changing Tides

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“Humanity stands today at the crossroads.” On January 1, 1986, Pérez de Cuéllar inaugurated the International Year of Peace by challenging the world community—nations, NGOs, academics, organizations, and citizens everywhere—to focus on the “vision and forbearance that peace requires.” A few days later, delivering a speech at Harvard University, he offered the United Nations as a possible brokering agency to achieve peace. It was an arena where the superpowers might resolve their long-term struggle, “to reduce together their nuclear arsenals to a level at which their use will not threaten the existence of other nations” (January 10). If this appeared to be a minimalist hope, it was probably because the latest round of summit diplomacy had brought the superpowers together the previous November for an inconclusive meeting. Deep philosophical differences over the SDI system had prevented Reagan and Gorbachev from achieving any advance toward disarmament. Without such movement, the planned installation of another generation of missiles in Europe had proceeded as several NATO nations announced acceptance of Tomahawks and Pershings. Gorbachev adroitly seized his propaganda opportunity. Acting as a statesman whose concern was the welfare of the planet, he had unilaterally banned Soviet underground nuclear testing while challenging the United States to follow his lead. But Pérez de Cuéllar understood that the tone and content of subsequent diplomatic notes between the superpowers offered little in the way of optimism.

Delegates at the UN blamed Washington, not Moscow, for the superpower impasse and the continuation of international tension. A series of votes on nuclear policy taken by the General Assembly late in 1985

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provided stark proof that the UN's greatest advocate had strayed far from the course of world opinion. On December 12 the United States had weakly organized its NATO allies to oppose a nuclear-weapons freeze (120-17), but it stood alone against world denunciation of the naval arms race (146-1) and development of weapons of mass destruction (128-1). It was part of a tiny minority opposing the prohibition of nuclear-weapons tests (120-3) and of a space arms race (123-2), and opposing the call for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty (116-4). The U.S. delegation also opposed resolutions denouncing Israel's nuclear arsenal (101-2) and South Africa's potential nuclear capabilities (135-4). The debate of December 13 dealt with individual liberty, certainly an area of intense concern to Washington, but the language of resolutions authorizing the Commission on Human Rights to examine alternative approaches to their enjoyment (130-1) and another on the world's social situation (122-1) made it the lone dissenter. On December 16, the United States was again the only state to oppose a proposal that the secretary-general study the possible climatic effects of nuclear war.

Many of these General Assembly directives were innocuous, and none had any binding effect, yet their cumulative impact placed the United States in opposition to general world opinion. Analysis of the completed 1985 session was soon to reveal that in the assembly only 19 of 159 member nations voted with the United States even 50 percent of the time. Amazingly, countries such as Egypt, El Salvador, and Honduras, recipients of vast American largesse, were recorded in opposition to Washington on 70 percent of the ballots. If the United States had a UN policy, it clearly had failed, since on most votes it could not even count on the support of its normal allies. But the Reagan administration hardly seemed to care. Its indifference mirrored general American opinion, for polls showed that only a quarter of the population supported the world organization. So meager was national interest that among all major media in 1986 only the venerable *New York Times* kept a full-time correspondent at Turtle Bay. Altering the image of the UN would be difficult, and it was obvious that initiatives would have to come from Pérez de Cuéllar rather than the Oval Office. As the secretary-general began what was scheduled to be the last year of his term, it was uncertain whether he would even attempt such an onerous task.

## HOUSEKEEPING CHORES

The secretary-general's most immediate problem as the new year began was the fiscal crisis forced upon the organization by the Kassebaum Amendment. Although the United States had willingly taken the lead against the assessment system, there was no doubt that other modern

states besides Washington resented the UN's cavalier attitude toward money. The financial burden of supporting the UN system was largely borne by the world's sixteen largest economies, which together paid over 80 percent of all costs. Within the secretariat, there was rueful recognition that the profligate practices of the past needed to end unless the Americans changed their minds.

In December, Maurice Bertrand of the Joint Investigation Unit delivered a confidential report to Pérez de Cuéllar that highlighted some of the administrative deficiencies so galling to UN critics. Bertrand advocated restructuring the organization so that economic and social issues could be addressed by regional bodies, a reform that might end the political posturing that afflicted the General Assembly. The procedures through which multilateral aid was requested and allocated were antiquated, while the overambitious nature of development programs merited the close attention of the secretary-general. Bertrand was frankly doubtful that UN bureaucracy was capable of such effort, because fully a quarter of them did not have college degrees and many others, he asserted, lacked a decent work ethic. Although the words *nepotism* and *patronage* did not appear, their presence lay heavy in Bertrand's text.

Few nations were surprised when Japan took the initiative. Now the second-largest contributing nation and eager to assume a leadership role, Japan asked the General Assembly to authorize the secretary-general to appoint a committee to identify "measures for further improving the efficiency of administrative and financial functioning" (GA Res. 40/237) at all levels of the world organization. Pérez de Cuéllar quickly named an eighteen-member Group of High-Level Inter-Governmental Experts under the leadership of Tom Eric Vraalsen (Norway) to perform the thankless chore. Some facts were immediately apparent. Secretariat budgets had tripled since 1974, and three-quarters of all expenditures went for salaries. The General Assembly's predilection for holding conferences and demanding reports (over a hundred annually) from the secretary general only added to the red ink; at least a billion pages of data were generated annually. Although the budget approved by the assembly on December 18 was only \$1.663 billion for two years, it was certain to be distorted by "add-ons"; in fact it was already estimated to be \$300 million in deficit. This vast shortfall was not entirely due to U.S. action, but reflected the slow payment of annual assessments by other nations. The secretary-general's experts were expected to report in nine months; they actually provided Pérez de Cuéllar with their findings on August 18, 1986, but the thrust of their herculean task was obvious from the start.

In the meantime, Pérez de Cuéllar attempted to carefully distribute the money he had to the secretariat, the General Assembly, UN intergovern-



mental agencies, and expert bodies. He informed the assembly that 20 percent reductions had already been achieved in travel and consultant costs, that some maintenance had been halted, hiring frozen, promotions suspended, and a cost-of-living adjustment deferred. Savings of \$30 million had already been achieved, and \$70 million might be added in 1986 if the assembly killed certain construction projects, ceased buying furniture, and shortened the meeting time for its 41st Session. Even as he maneuvered, however, pressure from the United States increased. Assistant Secretary of State Alan Keyes boastfully informed Congress that U.S. action had created sufficient leverage so that the nation's delegation could press forcibly for program alterations. But even America's closest European allies appeared less than impressed with the administration's argument, and a letter from the European Community to the State Department was highly critical of a Washington policy that approached vindictiveness. By the end of April, U.S. outstanding debt to the UN was estimated at \$253 million, as opposed to only \$43 million on January 1. Nevertheless, the right-wing coalition that controlled Congress intended to slash contributions to the UN even further. Despite pro forma opposition from the White House, and defying claims that their action violated treaty obligations, Congress appropriated only \$100 million of the \$210 million designated for the world organization within the State Department budget. By year's end there would be fiscal chaos at Turtle Bay.

## GLOBAL DISORDER

It is too often forgotten that the United Nations, despite its universality and high principles, can actually do very little to alter the violence that stalks the globe. In January of 1986 there were thirty-six wars under way across the earth, a litany of terror and destruction that the world organization could only lament. The UN lacks the right to intervene in the domestic life of its members. Forty years of history had demonstrated that the possibility for UN peacekeeping operations normally arises only after all other avenues of action have been used or the participants are exhausted. Moreover, the General Assembly had shown a reluctance to consider acts of terrorism as criminal, but rather as reflecting a desire for liberation. Only in this winter of discontent, after a series of bizarre terror attacks shocked the world, did the General Assembly for the first time condemn all acts of international terrorism (December 6, 1985). As if in choreographed response, terrorists slaughtered travelers standing at Israeli airport travel desks in Rome and Vienna. The inevitable countermeasures by the Israeli military were extremely punitive. In this atmosphere of violence and uncertainty, world tourism virtually withered away for months.

The worst terrorism of 1985 was centered in the Mediterranean area, but every incident merely highlighted the escalating tide of bombings and kidnappings that afflicted the globe. Terrorism had been a factor in international politics since the Munich Massacre of 1972, but it had appeared with new force after Israel's abortive invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and the subsequent PLO expulsion from that stricken nation. Although Israel withdrew into the south of the nation, PLO zealots continued their battle against Zionism on both land and sea. Lebanon itself, and particularly its capital of Beirut, became a shadowy battleground between widely diverse elements seeking political or religious advantage. Kidnapping for ideological impact soon became an accepted part of its chaotic reality. No one was safe; the president of the American University in Beirut, wealthy entrepreneurs, clergy of every denomination, UN aid workers, and media representatives were among the many victims. In April 1986 a teacher and a TV journalist were taken, and three other hostages were murdered. Pérez de Cuéllar led a chorus of world condemnation, but the phenomenon only intensified as months passed. For example, Terry Waite, the personal envoy of the Archbishop of Canterbury who won fame for personally negotiating freedom for several hostages during 1986, was himself victimized (January 1987) and placed in confinement for five years.

But even more disturbing to headquarters was the fact that the United States, once the staunchest supporter of multilateral programs, continued to act as if it were exempt from ordinary rules of international conduct. On January 9, claiming a victory for antiterrorism, Washington had frozen all Libyan assets in the United States. It simultaneously released aerial photos of fifteen guerrilla training sites in the desert nation as justification for its action. At the same time, it beefed up its naval forces in the Mediterranean and announced that these units would begin to patrol the international waters of the Gulf of Sidra. A confrontation between David and Goliath seemed inevitable. After it occurred on March 24, U.S. planes destroyed Libyan fighters, radar stations, and patrol boats. Shortly thereafter, a U.S. soldier died in a Berlin bombing that was blamed on Libyan agents. In open retaliation, U.S. planes flew six thousand miles on April 14 to carry out bombing attacks on Libyan targets, only narrowly failing to assassinate Colonel Qaddafi himself. After a U.S. veto prevented Security Council condemnation (9-5-1) of the raid, the General Assembly declared that Libya was entitled to compensation (Res. 41/38, 79-28-33). Obviously, many UN members were unhappy when the G-7 industrial nations endorsed the American attack as legitimate. In all this escalating violence, the UN could play no effective role, although many states were convinced it was the United States that was demonstrating terrorist tactics. America's attitude was summarized by Senator Paul

Trimble (Rep.-Va.), who believed that the General Assembly devoted too much energy to attacks on the United States.

Nor did Washington win applause at headquarters for its continued defiance of world opinion in the Caribbean. Facing the virtual certainty that the International Court of Justice would condemn its warlike actions against Nicaragua, the Reagan administration decided to exempt the United States from its obligation to abide by ICJ decisions. When the court's long-anticipated decision was finally rendered on June 27, 1986, in *Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua*, it was hailed by Third World nations but ignored by the United States. An angered General Assembly demanded that Washington comply with the ruling (94-3-47), and Ambassador Walters was forced to veto a similar Security Council resolution (July 31, 11-1-4), even though it did not mention the United States by name. Although the ICJ's verdict made little impact on the course of events in the Caribbean, it provided yet another opportunity for Nicaragua's President Ortega to denounce the Reagan administration for state terrorism.

Exactly what constituted "terrorism" was much on the mind of concerned people everywhere in 1986. Was it to be discovered in Washington's unilateralism or in Libya's support of secret warriors? Was U.S. military and financial support of the contras or UNITA or the Afghan mujahideen the same as Iran's support of Hizbollah kidnappings in Lebanon? Olaf Palme, Pérez de Cuéllar's special nominee to mediate the Iran—Iraq War, was assassinated on February 28, and his death only added to the pervasive unease. Was it terrorism when South African troops raided neighboring states in order to prevent guerrilla attacks against their own territory? Was it terrorism when the legally constituted government of the Philippines sought to repress the "people power" movement that was peacefully attempting to overthrow it? Was even the discussion of terrorism merely a facade to cover naked political calculations that the UN could never hope to settle?

Some critics of the United Nations believed that it displayed so much concern for smaller crises simply because its delegations needed to hide the overwhelming fears produced by the intense superpower nuclear rivalry. The Geneva summit of 1985 had failed to produce any accommodation between the giants, but Gorbachev adroitly appealed to world opinion by continuing the Soviet ban on underground nuclear testing. When the United States resumed testing in March and April 1986, the Russian leader won a significant propaganda victory. Soviet psychological advantage increased after Washington decided (May 1986) that American national defense requirements required it to exceed the limitations of the SALT II treaties. The nuclear maneuvering of the superpowers was of even greater

concern to nations in 1986 because the immense dangers inherent even in the peaceful uses of atomic energy had become gruesomely evident. On April 26, at Chernobyl in the Ukraine SSR, the largest reactor in the Soviet Union had exploded. The Chernobyl catastrophe killed 31 persons immediately and forced the evacuation over 130,000 others; its long-range effects are still debated within the medical community. For most nations its most frightening effect as the release of radioactive clouds that dropped their fallout in unpredictable patterns across all Eastern Europe and Scandinavia. An accident stemming from human failure made the world more aware of the multiple ways in which human error could lead to nuclear war. Even though the UN's International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) performed admirably in the wake of Chernobyl, awareness of the danger of nuclear exchanges was heightened. Perhaps this was the ultimate terror of 1986.

### RETHINKING THE SECRETARY GENERALSHIP

The UN's budgetary crisis and shifting superpower relationships represented perennial conditions. As secretary-general, Pérez de Cuéllar had served a difficult apprenticeship, but he now seemed relatively confident of his ability to respond effectively to these challenges. But he was unprepared for the humiliation the UN experienced after investigative reporting revealed that former secretary-general Kurt Waldheim, whose service in the German army was well known, had in fact concealed important parts of his past and may have been involved in Nazi atrocities committed in the Balkans. The World Jewish Congress released documentation of these explosive charges on March 3, 1986, even as Waldheim was campaigning for the presidency of Austria. At headquarters, where there was initial reluctance to open wartime files dealing with alleged crimes, there was also profound relief that Waldheim had failed in his attempt to win a third term in 1981 and that he was no longer a United Nations official. But as the revelations escalated, it became apparent that information regarding Waldheim's wartime career had been available since the 1940s in the files of the UN War Crimes Commission. Moreover, it was almost impossible that the charges now levied against him had escaped the notice of the great powers. Entries on UN documents such as "murder" and "putting to death of hostages" would have been difficult to ignore, and Waldheim's name had been number seventy-nine on a list of possible war criminals compiled in 1948. After some difficult negotiations, the UN files were ultimately opened to scholars, but the deeper implications of the Waldheim affair festered. It seemed clear that permanent members of the Security Council must have known of Waldheim's past, and that it had made no difference to them. During his tenure as secretary-general, Waldheim's reputation was that of an ambitious man willing to accommodate the permanent

council leadership in all things. Perhaps his political adaptability counted far more in great-power calculations than his checkered background. The scandal seemed to place the entire UN structure in a rather dim moral light. Although Pérez de Cuéllar avoided speaking about Waldheim, the case did have an impact as he reassessed the parameters of the office he held. (See appendix 3A, “The Waldheim Affair,” located at the end of this chapter.)

Reconsideration was necessary because his tenure in office was ending. Having pledged in 1982 to serve only one term as secretary-general, Pérez de Cuéllar had as yet achieved little of substance. He always recognized that a leader of the world organization operated in a highly restricted environment; as spokesman for the concerns of 159 nations, any consensus was certain to be diluted. The office is limited by the authority of the charter and by the personality of the man who temporarily holds control of the thirty-eighth floor. The Peruvian diplomat had come to power as a last compromise choice, the quintessence of the discreet international civil servant. In December 1981 an unimpressed London Times had called him a “lowest common-denominator man, grey, two-dimensional and without a sharp edge to his character,” while the *New York Times* believed that “his favorite word is caution.” Hard experience in the Falklands and the Middle East taught Pérez de Cuéllar the operational limits of his position, but he had recently voiced an expanded view of his office. His speech at the Sorbonne and his desire to establish an “early warning” capability for the secretariat indicated a deep conviction that the secretary-general could become more active in dealing with world crises. But creating a new kind of leadership would require another term.

One key factor in Pérez de Cuéllar’s assessment of world conditions was a potential thaw in the superpower relationship. Ronald Reagan’s overwhelming reelection in November 1984 provided little indication that he would alter his attitude toward the UN, but Pérez de Cuéllar believed that the American president truly feared the specter of nuclear war and yearned to be a peacemaker. He may have harbored doubts about Reagan’s mental acuteness, but he had none about his heart. More important for long-term change was the advent to power of Mikhail Gorbachev in the USSR (March 1985). The Soviet leader’s stated goals of glasnost and perestroika were those of a pragmatist, and it was possible that he would use the UN to accomplish some of his goals. Although the first superpower summit between these two men had been inconclusive, another was scheduled. Pérez de Cuéllar dared to hope that wiser leadership might ease the confrontational stances that for so long had stalemated Security Council action. In passing, it ought to be noted that neither the United States nor Pérez de Cuéllar were yet aware of the dire economic condition of the USSR. It was growing crisis within the Soviet system

that forced Gorbachev’s cooperative words. Portents were mixed, but a secretary-general pondering his future course could believe that tangible successes for his twin goals of peace and development were possible in a second term. But any turn toward activism must remain beneath his imperturbable surface. His effectiveness, he told friends, depended on his discretion. “I am not running for a Nobel Prize.”

Pérez de Cuéllar understood that a more aggressive stance by the secretary-general might occur without any alteration in the existing charter. Its mandates and restrictions were so broadly phrased that they could encompass the activism of a Hammarskjöld or the inertia of a Waldheim. His style had always emphasized persistence and patience, attributes he continued to apply to every world problem that had so far resisted solution. The secretary-general took heart from the successful arbitration he had recently conducted between France and New Zealand. France’s responsibility for the attack on and destruction of the conservationist vessel *Rainbow Warrior* was finally settled on July 6. Only because of the secretary-general’s personal mediation had a mutually acceptable compensation been agreed upon. Careful diplomacy had averted further unpleasantness between two democratic nations. Might not his tact and staying power be capable of fostering superpower accommodation? By the summer of 1986 the secretary-general was seriously considering another term.

Even as he did so the rigors of his position became apparent. Whether it was the accumulation of crises, or the effects of the French cuisine he loved, doctors discovered a serious heart condition and recommended an operation. In July, on his return from an extensive and difficult trip to Europe, Pérez de Cuéllar entered Mount Sinai Hospital, where triple bypass surgery was performed on the twenty-fourth. The procedure was a complete success, and the recovery process was rapid. Within weeks, his physical ability to continue in office was not in question. And in the interim, despite both illness and his well-publicized intention to leave after a single term, no candidate had surfaced as a possible successor. Indeed, while recuperating, Pérez de Cuéllar received many expressions of future support, including encouraging messages from all members of the Security Council. Of the Permanent Five, only Britain seemed ambivalent regarding his candidacy. Margaret Thatcher had been quoted as musing, “He didn’t cause trouble the first time around,” but even this was a sort of endorsement. Therefore, as the time for another General Assembly neared, the secretary-general’s own balancing of personal ambition, the needs of the organization, and his health remained the unsettled questions.

World conflicts showing no lessening as Pérez de Cuéllar regained strength. The United States lost two of its authoritarian allies when

## FINANCIAL CRUNCH

revolutions swept away dictatorships in the Philippines and Haiti. The Reagan administration was also struggling to maintain policy coherence in both Nicaragua and South Africa after Congress legislated against its positions. Washington had been publicly flogged by the ICJ decision on Nicaragua, and Congress had moved to end the “constructive engagement” policy that seemed to accept apartheid. During the summer, the U.S. mission at the UN reported that member states during the recent session had voted with the world’s greatest power only 22.5 percent of the time, a dismal record that had to be improved. And finally, testiness in superpower relations was again evident as a “spy wars” spasm of mutual expulsions erupted in August. Pérez de Cuéllar may have felt that his accomplishments were few, but did he really wish to lead his organization again in such tumultuous times? Could a sixty-six-year-old man transform the UN into a place of “effectively structured multilateral cooperation”?

His September Report *... on the Work of the Organization* was a recapitulation of the world’s troubles. But he managed to discover hope in the Hong Kong agreement negotiated by London with the People’s Republic of China, the recent *Rainbow Warrior* settlement, and the performance of the IAEA after Chernobyl. There were 142 items on the upcoming agenda of the General Assembly, but all revolved around the issue of money. Financial solvency would be the primary concern of the forty-first session, and Pérez de Cuéllar began the debate with harsh words for the United States. The UN is “confronted with the likelihood of the withholding by the principal contributing State of a substantial portion of its assessed contribution to the regular budget.” Furthermore, “to express full confidence in the Secretary-general while failing to give the necessary support to the Security Council or to work constructively in the General Assembly . . . is fun fundamentally contradictory.” But his core belief remained unchanged: the peoples of the world continue to have faith in a United Nations that “offers almost unlimited potential for . . . peace and for . . . well-being.” Whether his Report would be a valedictory address was undecided until early in October. Only then did the permanent members of the Security Council formally advise Pérez de Cuéllar that he was their choice, and that he once again would be offered the position of secretary-general. On October 10, a relieved and totally supportive General Assembly unanimously accepted the council’s recommendation and appointed him to a second term. “I don’t see any reason why I should preside over the collapse of the UN,” he wrote, and to decline the appointment merely because of mounting crises and financial stringency “would have been tantamount to abandoning a moral duty.” Pérez de Cuéllar’s quiet crusade for a “less bureaucratic, more integrated and more efficient” UN had begun.<sup>2</sup>

In August 1986 the Group of Eighteen completed its consensus document on UN management, a forty-page report that made sober reading. Amazingly, the Vraalsen group agreed on many specifics demanding change, and his “high-level” task force found little difficulty in pointing out redundancies in administrative and budgetary practice. From the point of view of the United States, the USSR, and other industrial states that bore most of the UN’s financial costs, the commission’s conclusions had long been apparent. Developed nations fully supported its call for 15 percent reductions in staff and a 25 percent cut in senior staff, including a long-overdue statement that no UN post could ever be considered the property of a particular nation. The experts suggested that a budgetary committee be created to give high-contributing states more influence over total spending. Immediately the report was sent off to the Fifth Committee, where it would be trimmed and shaped for assembly consideration, and everyone seemed to agree that it demanded firm action. When President Reagan addressed the forty-first assembly on September 22, he commended the work of the Group of Eighteen as a vital “first step toward restoring the Organization’s status and effectiveness.” Only two weeks later, however, the U.S. Senate charged that one of Pérez de Cuéllar’s assistants was also a Russian agent.<sup>3</sup>

There was virtual unanimity that the secretariat, filled with overlapping satrapies, was a prime candidate for administrative reform. Pérez de Cuéllar had come to power in 1982 pledging to change the appointment system that staffed the administrative heart of the UN, but he had failed to break the tradition of regional preferences. Although his aides whispered that he was ready to act even before winning reappointment, the secretary-general did not issue his realignment order until October 31. Then, in what insiders termed the Halloween Massacre, he notified eleven undersecretaries that they would be out of work in 1987 and consolidated nine formerly independent fiefdoms into a single Department of Administration; budget cuts of 30 percent were mandated for the Division of Economic and Social Affairs. He appeared to be heeding the experts’ injunction to “exercise greater leadership in personnel matters to insure that the selection of staff is done strictly in accordance with the Charter.” So strong was the general desire to enact change that only his proposed budget committee was removed from the finally approved plan, a concession made largely to honor African fears of increasing the administrative power of a few Western nations. The General Assembly formally accepted Pérez de Cuéllar’s proposals for staff cuts and management reforms on December 19, 1986.



## SETTLEMENT OF THE IRAN—IRAQ WAR

The assembly's version of the expert proposals placed all spending on a two-year basis and created a Committee for Program and Coordination (CPC) to act as a "gatekeeper" over costs. Mostly representing the largest donor nations, the CPC was set up to receive budget proposals a year in advance, establish priorities, and control expenditures; its decisions were to be achieved by consensus, but the goal was zero real growth. Assembly "add-ons," the source of so much anger among outnumbered modern states, were now to be funded either by redeployment of already appropriated funds or deferred. "Extraordinary expenses" dealing with the maintenance of peace and international security were exempted from strict controls, but the secretary-general was told to attempt coverage of such spending through savings from the program budget. Overall, the reform effort pleased almost everyone at the UN. The United States, which held by far the most secretariat positions (seventeen hundred), professed its particular delight.

U.S. ambassador Vernon Walters said that the General Assembly's endorsement of change had transformed rhetoric into reality, and he envisioned a "better, leaner, more efficient United Nations." He believed now that the industrialized nations who contributed three-quarters of UN funding would no longer withhold assessments.<sup>4</sup> But even as the changes were effected, Washington continued to be laggard in its payments. By the spring of 1987 accusations of bad faith were common, and Walters admitted that his hallway discussions were often unpleasant. A revised Kassebaum Amendment had been rushed through Congress, and it mandated that the president certify the UN's progress in staffing, consensus budgeting, and "seconding" regulations. During his September appearance at headquarters, President Reagan had informed the secretary-general that he would seek restoration of all funds if the UN enacted reform procedures. But the president did not even request full funding of U.S. assessments in 1987, because he was certain that Congress would be recalcitrant. Despite public acknowledgments by both Walters and Secretary Shultz that the United States was satisfied with UN reforms, the Congress approved only \$144 million of Washington's \$212 million assessment (October 1987). Moreover, in December the president willingly signed additional legislation creating an investigative American Commission on Improving the Effectiveness of the United Nations, a ploy that gave Congress an additional reason to delay full payment of U.S. obligations. Not until January 1988 was Walters permitted to deliver \$100 million of the previous year's funding to the UN. Although the president, the secretary of state, and the U.S. ambassador all agreed that the UN was fulfilling its reform agenda, the Congress found "UN bashing" to be politically irresistible. By June 1988 U.S. delinquencies to UN programs totaled \$466 million.

In October 1986 the Gulf conflict between two major Islamic powers entered its seventh year. Despite seven Security Council resolutions and incessant efforts by a secretary-general with entree to both sides, the terrible fighting continued to cause high casualty lists for both participants. Human wave attacks, poison gas barrages, missile attacks on urban centers, and shipping raids were all phases of an interminable struggle whose origins had almost been forgotten. The superpowers had at first seemed favorable toward Iraq, but their commitment cooled over time, and by 1986 both desired a rapid settlement of the disruptive conflict. Moreover, in Washington the foolish administration effort to supply arms to Iran was about to escalate and surface as the Iran-Contra scandal, ongoing revelations of constitutional violations that undermined Reagan's last years in office. Thus, at the UN on October 8, the Security Council (Resolution 588) simply reiterated its call for settlement and encouraged Pérez de Cuéllar to intensify his efforts to achieve some compromise. His unexpected diplomatic success began a major turnaround for the UN.

In the winter of 1986 a series of meetings created the foundation for a new UN initiative. Britain's Sir John Thompson began the process by holding a "tea" where the permanent members of the Security Council "chatted" about the war. Once it became obvious that the superpowers were willing to cooperate in the Gulf, Pérez de Cuéllar convened a similar session of the Permanent Five in his Sutton Place apartment and asked that they all embargo arms shipments to the area. In his memoirs, the secretary-general cites this meeting as the start of U.S.—USSR cooperation at the Security Council. But clearing the Gulf area of hate and conflict so that a truce might be arranged was the task of the secretary-general. Pérez de Cuéllar was in Baghdad during March, dealt with new chemical-weapons charges against Iraq in April, and visited Gorbachev in May. His patient efforts combined with growing superpower accommodation to produce a strong Security Council Resolution 598 (July 20) calling for an immediate Persian Gulf cease-fire and withdrawal of forces; George Shultz attended the final council session and afterwards hailed its unprecedented "unanimous vote on an issue of real importance and difficulty."<sup>5</sup> Iran and Iraq were asked to cooperate with the secretary-general's efforts to achieve peace and repatriate all prisoners of war. Iraq, which had been on the defensive for years, immediately accepted the resolution. But Iran, knowing itself to be the attacked party, was distrustful of the council and fearful of an American ploy. It refused to countenance the initiative, and Pérez de Cuéllar spent the next year meeting Teheran's objections.

The path toward agreement was not easy. In August Iraq destroyed Iranian oil installations on the coast because of its failure to accept Resolution

598. The United States implemented a plan to reflag Kuwaiti freighters against attack, while its citizenry was enthralled by the unfolding Iran-Contra scandal. High-level UN negotiations went on continuously, “excruciatingly detailed discussions”<sup>6</sup> taking place in paneled rooms while the killing continued. Pérez de Cuéllar sought to convince Iran that he would name a truly nonpartisan panel to investigate the origins of the conflict. Attacks by U.S. aircraft to retaliate against Iranian mining of the Gulf (April 18, 1988), and its shooting down of a commercial airliner (July 3, 1988) further complicated the discussions. But finally, in a letter of July 18, Iran informed Pérez de Cuéllar that it accepted Resolution 598. The secretary-general had already dispatched a cease-fire team to the area, and on the weekend of August 6-7 Pérez de Cuéllar hurriedly returned from vacationing in the Hamptons to mediate final discussions with both foreign ministers. He then triumphantly announced that Gulf hostilities would halt on August 20, an achievement providing him the “greatest sense of fulfillment than any other action during my ten years.”<sup>7</sup>

On August 9, the Security Council approved the secretary-general’s plan to create an unarmed United Nations Iran—Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) to monitor the disengagement. Originally named for six months, UNIIMOG was twice renewed and effectively separated the two sides as fitful negotiations proceeded at headquarters. To keep 350 observers along the fourteen hundred—kilometer border between Iran and Iraq cost the United Nations \$235 million, but although not all assessments were paid it avoided running a deficit. Distrust between the two nations prevented a total repatriation of prisoners, and Iraq proved hesitant to remove all its troops from Iranian soil as it was obligated to do. The impasse in negotiations did not end until Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 changed the dynamics of the situation. In mid-February 1991 Iraq returned to its borders and the UNIIMOG mission was successfully concluded. It was not until December 1991, however, that a report prepared by Belgian jurists for the secretary-general confirmed that it was an unjustified attack by Iraq that precipitated the Gulf War. In a conflict where over a million persons died, neither side gained much, but the United Nations was revived and immensely strengthened. Settlement of the Gulf War initiated a period of intense UN activism.

### RUSSIAN—AMERICAN DETENTE

The basic underpinning for a successful UN was eased relations between the superpowers. By the summer of 1987, Gorbachev had ruled in the Kremlin for two years and had begun to reshape Soviet foreign policy. His new ambassador to Turtle Bay, Aleksandr Belonogov, carried the welcome message that the USSR intended to settle its financial debts to the

organization and that it would in the future support a more aggressive UN role in global affairs. The first fruits of this new attitude became apparent during 1986 when Moscow paid its assessments for UNIFIL, the Mideast peacekeeping force it had always opposed, and cooperated in creating Resolution 598. In September 1987 Gorbachev published simultaneous articles in *Pravda* and *Isvestia* arguing that the United Nations was vital if a comprehensive system of international peace and security was to be achieved. He showed an interest in a multilateral approach to world problems that would allow the UN to act effectively and so obviate the need for superpower interventions that could lead to conflict. desire to implement perestroika at home meant that costs abroad would have to be reduced, and using the United Nations would safeguard Soviet interests and create a more stable world community. In October, the Soviet Union not only paid its full regular budget assessments for 1987 but also announced that by 1990 it would completely settle \$197 million in debts stemming from previous peacekeeping operations (Sinai, Congo). In 1988 Soviet officials even suggested that the long-moribund UN Military Staff Committee be revived as a mechanism under which future UN actions could be coordinated. The cumulative effect of the new Russian attitude was to make the United States the outstanding “deadbeat” nation and to place it even more on the defensive within the UN.

The Soviet initiatives shocked the Reagan administration, which despite the passage of Resolution 598 continued to show little respect for the UN. In August 1987 Washington boycotted the UN conference on Disarmament even though it was in the process of finalizing an INF missile agreement with Gorbachev. President Reagan’s proposal for a “zero option” in midrange European missiles had been presented with the expectation that it would be rejected, but Gorbachev’s Kremlin had embraced the idea. To the unbounded joy of the world, a treaty providing for the destruction of an entire class of missiles was announced in September and formally signed in Washington on December 8. Washington also announced that it would no longer oppose Soviet membership in the World Bank, GAIT, and the IMF if it continued to reshape its economy along free-market lines. With the signing of the missile accord, U.S. relations with the USSR would dramatically improve during 1988 even as its standing at the UN fell.

So long as the United States refused to fulfill its financial obligations, the USSR won plaudits as the UN’s savior in time of need. As reduced U.S. contributions caused more administrative pain during 1988, criticism of Reagan’s policy escalated even within the United States. The *Washington Post* noted that the administration’s laggard payments, surpassing \$469 million at the end of July, were bringing the UN to the point of bankruptcy. Yet in the face of mounting delegate scorn and despite personal pleas

from Ambassador Walters, the administration and an ever more adamant Congress continued to withhold full payment of 1988 dues. It seemed that no amount of UN reform could satisfy their demands, and the tenuous fiscal solvency of the UN was maintained only by the Soviet reversal.

### SETTLEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN

When Gorbachev assumed power in 1985, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was already in its sixth year and had become a foreign-policy albatross. Brezhnev's desire to secure a docile client by deploying Soviet military forces had been consistently condemned at the United Nations, where it outraged the Third World coalition. As the incursion lengthened it damaged relations with China and stimulated a covert U.S. weapons-supply program that was exacting significant losses in men and material. The long series of "proximity talks" conducted since 1982 by Diego Cordovez had reached a dead end late in 1985, but Gorbachev encouraged Pérez de Cuéllar to continue them. During 1986, after the USSR orchestrated the replacement of Afghanistan's government, the talks showed progress. The improving circumstances, and the prospect of reductions in U.S. aid to the mujahideen, indicated that a settlement might be attainable. Pérez de Cuéllar and the UN had obtained the trust of all parties and continued the search for a withdrawal strategy.

Acting under a Security Council mandate dating back to 1985, Pérez de Cuéllar soon discovered that the major point of contention concerned an acceptable timetable for the removal of Soviet forces. The many variables in the settlement equation—the multiplicity of guerrilla factions, Pakistani border fears, the interests of four million refugees, the possible survival of the new Afghan government led by Najibullah—became almost incidental when the United States and the USSR agreed to guarantee any arranged peace. Pérez de Cuéllar's concern was international amity, and he did not believe that the UN ought to be involved in the process of national reconciliation which needed to ensue in a postwithdrawal Afghanistan. In December 1987, he was immensely heartened when Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze informed him that the Soviet Union was willing to accept staged withdrawal over a year-long period. Questions of repatriation and factional agreement remained to be addressed, but the primary barrier to peace had suddenly lifted.

On April 14, 1988, the Geneva Accords, under which the USSR would leave Afghanistan, were signed. Despite six years of sustained effort by Cordovez, two signatories, Pakistan and Afghanistan, never dealt directly with each other until they initialed the peace plan. Issues covering nonintervention, refugee return, Soviet withdrawal, and superpower

guarantees were incorporated into the settlement, and every delegation praised the efforts of the UN. The United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP), consisting of fifty men from ten nations, was created to monitor the Soviet retreat. Established by a prime example of Pérez de Cuéllar's diplomatic initiative, a mere exchange of letters between the secretary-general and the Security Council, UNGOMAP was the first instance of UN supervision over a superpower. Its role would be played as the larger civil war continued, and at first UNGOMAP did not even attempt to place monitors on the Pakistan border. The vital UN goal was that the USSR leave Afghanistan, and the front-loaded withdrawal schedule reduced Soviet forces 50 percent by August 15. In those months, attempts by the USSR to build support for an international peace conference failed to win much support. The civil war continued as the Kremlin's influence became ever weaker.

UNGOMAP was possible only because Gorbachev had decided to restructure Soviet foreign commitments. Financed directly from the UN general budget and hardly controversial, the mission cost only a total of \$14 million before being terminated in March 1990. Under the eyes of UN monitors, the last Soviet troops crossed the Afghan border in February 1989, a victory for the UN if not for a factionalized and bloody nation. UNGOMAP never affected the Afghan War, which went on for several years until the Taliban coalition seized control, but it did provide an acceptable exit for an embarrassed Soviet Union. Moscow and Washington cooperated closely to see that the withdrawal was successful. Although the General Assembly authorized the secretary-general and his representative to work toward a comprehensive peace settlement, the UN was never able to intervene effectively and settle the internal factionalism. In February 1990 Pérez de Cuéllar replaced Diego Cordovez, perhaps a small victory for the secretary-general, whose effectiveness had often been questioned by an official he brought to prominence.

### ADVANCES IN AFRICA

Since the great decolonization wave of the 1960s had brought the Third World into prominence, an assembly majority held as gospel the belief that Africa's economic development was hindered by its colonial heritage. Because Africa in 1986 still held three-quarters of the world's less developed nations, the Group of 77 (now grown to beyond 110 nations) felt the proposition was adequately demonstrated. Although international grants and much foreign aid had, indeed, been lavished on African states for over twenty years, these had failed to produce prosperity; money was often wasted on "prestige" projects that did little to improve national income. By the mid-1980s African standards of living were in decline:

as a continent it had the smallest percentage of the globe's industrial and agricultural production, the highest percentage of foreign debt, and the greatest number of refugees. The interminable crisis, particularly in sub-Saharan nations, prompted the United Nations to convene its first special session on a regional economic issue.

Discussion of the Economic Crisis in Africa was formally held May 27-31, 1986, under the leadership of Stephen Lewis (Canada). Preliminary declarations and memoranda had decided that agricultural development was the most essential area demanding international attention and national commitment, for without basic food production there was little chance of any economic takeoff. African leaders were loathe to admit that aid had been misdirected or wasted and that coveted manufacturing enterprises were in fact misconceived; their first inclination was simply to lay blame on debt load and Western unconcern. But Lewis deftly achieved consensus on a declaration that traced present-day difficulties to both the colonial past and postindependence errors. The final document was not agreed to until 5:30 A.M. on June 1, but Lewis hailed it as "a triumph for the spirit of Africa, its determination to engage in internal reforms and its new shared partnership with the international community."

The General Assembly adopted a five-year African development program costing \$128 billion, \$82.5 billion of which was to come from African states; its long-term goal was agricultural and commodity price stability. The UN Program of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development (UNPAAERD) planned new food-security arrangements and provided for the restoration and protection of arable land. It created programs for reforestation, to combat desertification, to create pure water supplies, and to build alternate energy supplies. The United States Agency for International Development praised Africa's recognition that its performance record would have to improve, but within less than a year the program was in serious trouble. Reporting to the General Assembly in October 1987, Pérez de Cuéllar predicted that a human toll as great as what occurred during the years of drought was imminent. There had been major internal African reforms, twenty-eight pages of which were detailed in his message, and thirty of the forty-five sub-Saharan states had instituted IMF-approved programs. Nevertheless, because world commodity prices had declined to their lowest levels since the 1950s, the entire UNPAAERD program appeared irrelevant.

In an interview given in November 1987, Stephen Lewis admitted that the program adopted in June 1986 was "the best we could get at the time," and that the continent was presently "going downhill and it's not Africa's fault."<sup>8</sup> He described a continent "on the knife's edge," facing net food decline without the possibility of additional aid. He argued that

serious debt write-offs by Western nations would be effective, but found little hope they would be forthcoming. His only solace was the fact that "the UN is the only international organization that never gives up." In December, an impassioned General Assembly demanded that the international community accept its responsibilities (Res. 42/163). It must provide debt relief by writing off previous loans, grant new nonconcessional loans, increase humanitarian aid, and arrange a program to stabilize commodity prices. But as continental debt surpassed the \$200 billion level, the world seemingly decided that Africa was simply not credit worthy. The phrase "donor fatigue" was increasingly used to explain why developmental assistance was not forthcoming. Because of Lewis, Canada did write off the debt of seven African nations, but its gesture was hardly enough to turn around the decline of a continent. Julius Nyerere, one of the original "Big Men" of African liberation, plaintively asked, "Must we starve our children to pay our debts?"

At best, the answer seemed to be "maybe." When UNPAAERD ended in September 1991, its results were reported to be "unsatisfactory."<sup>9</sup> Pérez de Cuéllar candidly admitted that Africa was indeed worse off after five years of effort, \$279 billion in debt, victimized by soaring population growth, low commodity prices, and donor fatigue. Per capita domestic production had fallen in five years, and the reluctance of African states to follow their own economic prescriptions was partly responsible. There had been marked "deterioration in the areas of education, health, nutrition, employment and incomes." As he had so many times before, Pérez de Cuéllar called again on Western states to write off their loans and to alleviate the private and commercial debts of the continent. Because the United Nations had no ability to enforce this recommendation, or any influence over the self-defeating economics practiced by many African states, the condition of the continent continued to decline. Africa's future had risen to the top of the international agenda only to be tabled, perhaps permanently.

The major exceptions to the dismal tale of African decline were found in the UN's continuing struggle to achieve freedom for Namibia and to combat apartheid. During 1986 continued opposition from the United States and Britain prevented the UN from imposing mandatory economic sanctions against Pretoria because of its racial policies. The South African occupation of Namibia also continued, now justified on the basis that any withdrawal would be exploited by foreign troops in Angola. The world organization was in fact only an unhappy observer as both superpowers continued to funnel arms to different Angolan factions and argue over the presence of Cuban forces in that nation. Until that issue could be settled, there would be no progress on other vital area concerns. Typical of superpower posturing was the American feting of UNITA guerrilla



## A NEW BEGINNING

chieftain Jonas Savimbi during his visit to Washington in November, even though his forces were considered to be impediments to any settlement. Nevertheless, in what was a meaningless but almost automatic response, the General Assembly stirred itself to ritually demand that South Africa withdraw from Namibia.

But the accumulated ice began to break early in 1987. The United States admitted in February that its existing policy of “constructive engagement” had not produced any significant change in South Africa’s racial segregation and hinted at future cooperation with UN efforts. A slow exodus of U.S. investment from South Africa was already under way, and in June, after the Rev. Leon Sullivan announced that his longstanding program to exert fiscal pressure on the apartheid regime had failed, it sped up even further. Moreover, South African forces present in Angola had been severely bloodied in battles against Cuban forces around Cuito Cuanavale. Those engagements ended in March with Pretoria humbled and the Cubans justly able to claim they had loyally defended an ally. In these changed circumstances, the untiring efforts of U.S. diplomat Chester Crocker finally made headway in negotiating a Cuban withdrawal from Angola. In January 1988 Angola announced that it accepted in principle that all Cuban units would have to leave, and during that summer Angola, Cuba, South Africa, and the United States engaged in tortuously detailed meetings. The UN and the USSR were reduced to observer status, and the secretary-general later admitted he felt “excluded.”<sup>10</sup> But the four participants did agree first on a plan (August) and then on a timetable (October) for Cuban withdrawal. Accordingly, they informed Pérez de Cuéllar that the United Nations could prepare to implement Security Council Resolution 435 (1978), which called for the independence of Namibia.

September 21, 1988, Pérez de Cuéllar flew to South Africa to obtain its vital cooperation with the United Nations Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG), which would oversee Namibia’s movement from colony to nation. In Pretoria he not only pledged UN impartiality but also promised that the assembly would remain silent on Namibian matters while the transition took place. Given the temper of the delegations there, and the passions stirred up by apartheid, his confidence was impressive. Yet on his return Pérez de Cuéllar still had to endure a scolding at the hands of the Security Council, spurred as ever by American fears of financial excess. The secretary-general was told that UNTAG would have to ensure that Namibia enjoyed free and fair elections, but do so more economically. Philosophically he accepted the mandate as reflecting the caution of states who would have to pay the bills. His preparations for the mission continued, and as the year ended, the secretary-general announced that April 1, 1989, was the target date for UNTAG’s deployment.

The year 1988 ended with Pérez de Cuéllar leading a much more vigorous United Nations organization than might have been predicted two years earlier. The Security Council was functioning effectively, and the organization had at least temporarily survived the threat of insolvency. Needed revenue had come from the Soviet Union, which, even as it struggled to regain economic balance and alter its political system, had settled a large part of its debt to the world organization. But the secretary-general was fully aware that such beneficence could only temporarily fill the huge fiscal gap caused by the increasingly arbitrary demands of the United States. Reagan’s seventh and final appearance before the United Nations (September 1988) had not been particularly pleasant. In his speech the president praised the UN as he unflinchingly did, but he was unable to fulfill his promises to settle America’s outstanding obligations. A smiling Reagan pledged that the next administration would pay America’s outstanding debt. Delegates sat on their hands during his presentation and clapped only once as he finished. In a subsequent letter to Pérez de Cuéllar, Reagan argued that despite administrative reforms already carried out at headquarters, additional ones and an austerity budget were needed before Washington could pay its full assessments. Famed diplomat George Ball, writing in October’s *Atlantic Monthly*, conceded that the United States “has repeatedly flouted established international principles and abused America’s privileged position in the United Nations.”

On the other hand, the UN was overjoyed when Mikhail Gorbachev appeared before the General Assembly. On December 7, the Soviet leader made an extraordinary speech announcing that his military forces in Western Europe would be unilaterally reduced by half a million men. He pledged that his nation would respect all ICJ rulings on human rights, endorsed international policing of the Afghan cease-fire, and promised that the USSR would actively support all UN environmental efforts. Even as he spoke, an earthquake devastated Soviet Armenia, and he had to leave immediately to direct relief efforts. The delegations and eager reporters had little opportunity to probe the full implications of his words, but the electric effect of his speech lingered. Many delegates predicted that Gorbachev’s pledges meant the end of the Cold War, and they were particularly gratified that he had decided to deliver his pledges before the UN. Unlike the Americans, the Soviets seemed to look upon the organization as a key player in the world of the 1990s.

Until that time, it was enough that both leaders had endorsed UN peacekeeping missions directed to the borders of Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and the USSR. Led by the superpowers, the world had placed its imprimatur on the UN peacekeeping concept. In September, the Nobel Peace Prize

was awarded to the blue-helmeted forces that had for forty years actively put themselves in peril to maintain tenuous truces. In its citation, the Nobel Committee noted that “UN forces represent the manifest will of the community of nations to achieve peace through negotiations” and that 730 of these heroic international warriors had lost their lives in the service of peace. By honoring them the Nobel Committee also honored the larger UN organization, which represented the highest ideals of humanity. It was with these thoughts in mind that Pérez de Cuéllar traveled to Oslo to formally accept the prize. On December 10 he accepted a check for \$ 339,000 in the name of the more than half a million persons who had participated in fifteen field operations. Uppermost in his thoughts were the 10,500 troops from thirty-five nations who were still on active duty in Cyprus (UNFICYP, 1964—), the Golan Heights (UNDOF, 1974—), and Lebanon (UNIFIL, 1978—), as well as the observer missions in the Sinai and Kashmir. He asserted that a memorial to all the Blue Helmets would be constructed at headquarters, although its construction would be long delayed. But the secretary-general was also aware that UN officials on humanitarian missions were always targets, and sadly noted that kidnappings in Lebanon were becoming commonplace. And finally his oration praised the newest observer missions, UNGOMAP and UNIIMOG. Their insertion into dangerous territory had eased two international crises, and the secretary-general was already preparing to dispatch a third emergency mission to leave for Namibia. It appeared that after years of being bypassed, the United Nations was finally achieving recognition as a preferred mechanism for settling disputes. If the momentum for peace could be maintained, the last years of his tenure might be truly significant. Acceptance of the Peace Prize was not an ending, but rather another milestone on the road to a more activist UN.

### APPENDIX 3A: THE WALDHEIM AFFAIR

For the decade before Javier Pérez de Cuéllar took office, Kurt Waldheim of Austria served as secretary-general of the United Nations. In 1971, Waldheim’s candidacy had been endorsed by the Soviet Union, ultimately supported by the United States, and found unobjectionable by most nations. His tenure had hardly displayed dynamism; he was the personification of the bland, almost colorless individual who can please virtually all constituencies. Waldheim’s years as secretary-general were notable for a gradual decline in the reputation of the United Nations. The leader of the world organization was perceived as a vain man who hated criticism and found decisions more easy to defer than to make. He undoubtedly enjoyed the pomp and prestige of the office he held. The state of Israel had originally opposed his election and scorned his personal style. When Waldheim visited the Holocaust memorial at Vad

Vasham he neglected to wear a ceremonial yarmulke, he criticized the daring commando raid that had freed the Entebbe hostages, and he had shown no dismay when the General Assembly passed a resolution that equated Zionism with racism (1975). Yet Waldheim’s vaguely pro-Arab sentiments were in tune with the assembly majority. Boasting a decade of experience and vast familiarity with UN procedures, Waldheim hoped to serve a third term as secretary-general in 1981.

Reelection was denied Waldheim largely because of the opposition of the People’s Republic of China. The PRC insisted that a new secretary-general be selected from developing nations, and used its veto sixteen times to prevent his reelection. Waldheim returned to Austria in honorable retirement, but before leaving New York he was awarded the Peace Medal by Pérez de Cuéllar, his successor (January 27); his official portrait was unveiled with appropriate ceremony on March 3. Covered with honors, the former secretary-general wrote an autobiography, *In the Eye of the Storm* (1985), which in retrospect was significant not for the self-congratulatory treatment of his public career but rather because it ignored his wartime service in the German army. It was known that Waldheim had served in the Wehrmacht, but his version of the past was that after being wounded in Russia, he left the army to study law in Vienna. In reality there was a three-year gap in his resume that became an issue in 1985 when he ran for Austria’s presidency.

Early in March 1986 investigators for the World Jewish Congress charged that from 1942 to 1945 Lieutenant Waldheim had not been in Vienna, but was on active service as an intelligence officer in the Balkans. They alleged that he had been complicit in the deaths of thousands of Jews and resistance fighters and that for over forty years he had lied to the world about his Nazi past and his military career. On March 16 Waldheim denied he had ever served in the Balkans, but quickly amended that statement to concede that he had served as an “interpreter” (April 12). He finally admitted to a *Times* reporter that he had indeed been in the Balkans, was aware of atrocities, but had never been personally involved.<sup>11</sup> The pattern of evasion he established in the first days of the scandal continued when further revelations emerged. Every discovery was at first denied, then qualified, and then reluctantly accepted with additional explanations. At every stage, Waldheim admitted only what could be proved, yet gradually a record of complicitous behavior surfaced. Regarding a two-hundred-page report compiled by the United States Justice Department, an official concluded, “the more we dug, the stronger the case got.” The pattern of documentation was “startlingly similar to those of dozens of Nazi criminals that the Justice Department has prosecuted” and would have been cause for deportation, had Waldheim been an American citizen. At the United Nations, an embarrassed Pérez de Cuéllar ordered personnel to ignore

questions regarding Waldheim, a prohibition that continued in force even after a protester defaced his portrait. After reviewing all available evidence, President Rudolf Kirchschlager of Austria told his countrymen that the charges were significant but not yet worthy of war-crime status. Each voter would have to make independent decisions regarding Waldheim's presidential candidacy.

On June 8, 1986, after an election featuring undertones of anti-Semitic posturing, Waldheim was elected president of Austria. Israel withdrew its ambassador to Vienna, the sitting chancellor resigned, and the ruling coalition was discredited. More significantly, European states agreed to boycott Austria's suspect leader. By now every aspect of his career was under investigation, although a *New York Times* analysis did conclude that his UN decisions "do not appear to show a clear pattern favoring either East or West."<sup>12</sup> Incontrovertible evidence soon proved that Waldheim had joined Nazi youth organizations in 1938, and that he had been one of only three Germans to receive a medal for Bosnian service (July 22, 1942). As the third-highest intelligence officer of Army Group E in Greece, his responsibility for "special tasks" included the treatment of POWs and partisans. At Arsakli, his units carried out Operation Viper, which deported forty thousand Jews to their eventual death. According to Waldheim's account he had been in Vienna while all these events occurred.

Equally disturbing was the emerging proof that Waldheim's military past was no surprise to the UN establishment. Yugoslav documents from 1945 declared that his extradition as a war criminal was "mandatory"; only fifteen hundred members of Army Group E were so cited. Although Marshal Tito certainly informed the Soviet Union of Yugoslav suspicions, no hint of this stigma had ever surfaced during his consideration for UN leadership. The United Nations War Crime Commission, before disbanding in 1948, placed Waldheim's name on its A-list of suspects. French archives also held documents relative to Waldheim's career, evidence that never surfaced even as he gradually rose in the Austrian foreign ministry and later at the UN. The United States embassy in Vienna had fully endorsed his candidacy as secretary-general in 1971, and it was suspected that he had served as an American "asset" earlier in his career. In 1972, a CIA investigation of Waldheim inexplicably ignored information within the German Army Archives and provided him with what critics called a fourteen-year alibi.<sup>13</sup> One historian goes so far as to affirm that Waldheim was "protected by the United States, provided information in return for that protection, and profited from willingness to obliterate his wartime service."<sup>14</sup> There was increasing suspicion that all major powers had been aware of Waldheim's past and simply did not care. But the sensibilities of 1986 were different from those of past decades, and the relationship of a prominent international leader to the Holocaust could not be ignored.

In April 1987, after a year's investigation, the United States placed Waldheim on its "watch list," the first time a head of state was barred from entering the country. It alleged that Waldheim had "participated in activities amounting to persecution" of Jews and others in the Balkans and in Greece. Waldheim, by now Austria's president, addressed his nation to denounce the incomprehensible decision, and authorized his state prosecutor to file a slander suit against Edgar Bronfman of the World Jewish Congress. But Queen Beatrix of the Netherlands "disinvited" Waldheim from an official Dutch ceremony and showed her personal outrage by refusing to vacation in Austria during Waldheim's term. Belgium's King Baudouin said he would not be present at a cultural opening if Waldheim attended. Austria's president was ostracized by every European leader except Pope John Paul II, who received Waldheim at a Vatican reception in June 1987.

Clearly Waldheim had lied about his military career, but was he a war criminal, as many assumed? A commission of historians concluded that he was a ranking officer, had been close to persons who did commit atrocities, and "regularly assisted" and "facilitated" executions (February 1988). If he had not personally committed crimes or issued orders for executions, he had done nothing to prevent them. A mock war-crime tribunal convened in London, considered the charges, and citing lack of evidence, acquitted the defendant in absentia (June 1988). He was then accused of personal involvement in the execution of British prisoners, but an official investigation cleared him of that charge (October 1989). Shunned by his European peers, Waldheim was elated when Czech President Vaclav Havel agreed to attend the Salzburg Festival in August 1990. His humiliations was thus intensified when Havel's speech dealt primarily with the value of confession. Only in 1992, as Waldheim's term ended, did German Chancellor Helmut Kohl enter Austria; his visit was denounced for "moral insensitivity" by the World Jewish Congress. Global opinion found Waldheim morally guilty, even if his actions fell short of actual crimes.

Although eligible for reelection as president, Waldheim chose to retire in 1992 shortly after completing a trip to Iran in which he was hailed as a "victim of Zionism." He remained on the United States watch list, and the 204-page text of the Justice Department investigation was released to the public in 1994. Waldheim's autobiographical volume, *The Answer* (1996), alleges that he was barred from the United States because of a conspiracy led by American Jews. Although the former secretary-general insists that his service to the international community was exemplary and his wartime conduct blameless, the Waldheim affair remains the most embarrassing of all UN scandals.

# The Office of the Secretary-General as a Leader of Reform: 1981-2006

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Javier Pérez de Cuéllar became secretary-general of the UN on January 1, 1981, at a time when the Organization was, in the words of Edward Newman, "at its nadir," its performance widely evaluated as poor "by almost any standard."<sup>1</sup> His two immediate predecessors—U Thant and Kurt Waldheim—were considered much less successful than the first two "founding" secretaries-general, Lie and Hammarskjöld. Pérez de Cuéllar and his two successors—Boutros-Ghali and Annan—all entered office convinced that the organization needed to be reconstituted. These were the first SGs to attempt leadership of major UN reform efforts, and all three met with disappointment in this sphere.

## PÉREZ DE CUÉLLAR AS SECRETARY-GENERAL

In contrast to the humble beginnings of his immediate predecessors, Pérez de Cuéllar was the descendant of Spanish nobility. He earned a law degree from Catholic University in Lima, began working at the Foreign Ministry when he was twenty, and entered the Peruvian diplomatic service at the age of twenty-four. He wrote two widely used law textbooks and had forty-one years of foreign affairs experience by the time he was appointed secretary-general at the age of sixty-one. Pérez de Cuéllar had already served as a Peruvian diplomat in Paris, Bolivia, Brazil, and Switzerland, and as ambassador to the USSR, Venezuela, and the United Nations when

<sup>1</sup> Este artículo fue publicado en el 2006 en el libro *The United Nations in the Twenty-first Century. Management and Reform Processes in a Troubled Organization* por Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group.



he came to office. In the two years before he became secretary-general, he was appointed UN under-secretary-general of special political affairs, served as Waldheim's point-person on the Cyprus crisis, and was sent by Waldheim as a special troubleshooter to Afghanistan. Perhaps most important, Pérez de Cuéllar was a moving force in the creation and development of the Group of 77, the principal suborganization within the UN representing the LDCs.

The growth of organizational influence of the newly independent, poorer, and less powerful member countries was the principal dynamic affecting the UN in the 1960s and 1970s, and the Group of 77 was the primary organization providing global leadership for those countries. Founded in 1964 at the inaugural meeting of UNCTAD, the Group was initially designed to represent the common economic and trade problems of the developing world at UNCTAD meetings, as well as in the GA and at other meetings of organizations and committees within the UN system. The G-77 eventually expanded to more than 140 members and has been one of the most effective groups within the UN because of its number and its pragmatic approach to organizational issues. There is no G-77 secretariat, but member representatives meet regularly in regional subgroups drawn from African, Asian, and Latin American nations. The absence of secretariat gives the G-77 leadership greater leeway and influence in shaping agendas than is the case for other UN groups. As chairman of the G-77 in the late 1970s, Pérez de Cuéllar used his considerable diplomatic skills and knowledge of the UN to move it to positions of unprecedented accomplishment. Much of this success was the result of a strategy in which the G-77 kept its obvious voting strength—more than that possessed by any other UN group—in reserve, using it rarely and only when effectiveness was assured or probable, preferring instead to negotiate interest-based solutions to conflict.

Pérez de Cuéllar was elected secretary-general by the Security Council in 1981 after sixteen exhausting ballots. He was the oldest of the first five SGs (the others were all around fifty years old when they assumed office, Pérez de Cuéllar was sixty-two), and he had far more experience at the UN when he took office than had any of his predecessors. He had a reputation as an accomplished diplomat of unquestioned integrity, with superb language skills (he is said to be as witty in Spanish and French as he is in English). The character traits that are often said to be most appealing about him are his retiring, self-effacing nature; his ability to remain calm-during crises; and his patience. The press reported about him at the time of his selection that he was liked by Western and Soviet leaders because “he could never be accused of possessing charisma,” “lacked strong political views,” was “everybody's last choice,” and won because he could “fall off a boat without making waves.”<sup>2</sup>

In his very first pronouncements about intentions for his administration, Pérez de Cuéllar talked about reducing the number of UN personnel.<sup>3</sup> Under the tenure of the first four SGs, the size of the UN bureaucracy continued to grow at an everincreasing pace—from three thousand employees during the first six months of the UN's existence in 1946 to more than eighteen thousand at the end of Hammarskjöld's life fifteen years later, and to more than thirty-five thousand at the end of Waldheim's term twenty years after Hammarskjöld's death. Pérez de Cuéllar described the growth of the Secretariat as “excessive both in numbers and rank” and agreed with the findings of an eighteen-member committee that recommended a 15 percent cut in total UN staff in 1986.<sup>4</sup> At the end of his term, however, the total number of UN employees had grown by more than a third, from an estimated thirty-eight thousand in 1981 to fifty-one thousand in 1991.<sup>5</sup>

By the time Pérez de Cuéllar was installed as secretary-general, the UN core budget had mushroomed from \$19 million in 1946 to over \$1 billion. The original hopes that the UN could be run by a selfless and dedicated international civil service had been dashed by the insistence of the member-states that there be “geographical parity” in hiring employees, and that the member-states have a considerable say in who is hired from each of their countries. Pérez de Cuéllar ran up against the UN patronage system very early in his first term when he insisted that he would improve the caliber of the Secretariat's higher ranks by appointing and promoting on the basis of merit, “not yielding to pressure from governments or to pleas from ambassadors eager to place their friends and relatives.”<sup>6</sup> This goal was dashed within a year of his assuming office when the UN's African members united against him, charging bias against Africa in his choice of personnel. In early 1983, Guinea threatened to call a press conference to denounce the secretary-general but was dissuaded by the setting up of a committee, led by Africans, “to monitor African representation in the secretariat.”<sup>7</sup> From that point on, Pérez de Cuéllar offered little resistance to the continuance of the UN's political patronage system.

The UN's personnel and hiring problems, like many other difficulties that began to arise in the 1970s and 1980s, were in large part a function of the disjunction between the costs and benefits of participating in the UN for wealthy and poorer nations. During Pérez de Cuéllar's first year in office (1982), for example, there were 157 member-nations, of which more than half (82), *taken together*, paid less than 1 percent of the UN's basic budget and two-thirds (108 countries) produced a total of only 2<sup>1/2</sup> percent of the budget. Seven members—the United States, USSR, Japan, West Germany, France, Britain, and Canada (in that order)—contributed 70 percent of the core budget, and a middle group of forty-two nations accounted for 27.5 percent (an average of two-thirds of 1 percent each).

Disproportions in the *total* UN budget (including peacekeeping and other special operations and voluntary contributions to specialized and other agencies) were (and continue to be) even greater.<sup>8</sup>

So long as the countries providing most of the funds to the UN were satisfied that the money was being spent wisely, or at least in ways conducive to their or the world's interests—as was generally the case in the 1950s and even into the 1960s—it was possible to put together budgets that enabled the Organization to continue to expand. By the time Pérez de Cuéllar left office at the end of 1991, however, 95 countries were in arrears in paying their dues to the United Nations, with unpaid dues and unpaid promised contributions amounting to \$988 million. The majority of the member-states, many of them in arrears themselves, were insisting that the UN continue to add programs, take on additional peacekeeping operations, and spend more money, while the handful of nations contributing more than three-quarters of the funds were pleading for a more realistic sense of managerial responsibility and accountability.

The ballooning of the UN deficit during the decade of the 1980s was initially due to American insistence under President Reagan and a recalcitrant U.S. Congress that the United States could not continue to fund one-third to one-half of the UN's expenses so long as expenditures of funds were not subject to normal accounting procedures and the UN political patronage system continued to expand. But the United States was joined by an increasing number of countries reluctant to contribute during each of the years of Pérez de Cuéllar's tenure in office.<sup>9</sup> Veteran UN observers suggested that a major reason for Pérez de Cuéllar's failure to staunch the bleeding in UN financial matters was the death of his top aide, Emilio Olivares, who was considered "a sort of wizard of paper-work."<sup>10</sup> At the end of his first term, a leading scholar of UN administrative matters argued that the UN's "bleak present" could be "change[d] into a fairer future" only if "reform becomes a determined and progressive effort on the part of governments and secretariats."<sup>11</sup>

Early in his two terms in office, in 1983, Pérez de Cuéllar established a high-level advisory group on administrative reform charged with identifying issues and areas of UN activity where change might be both "necessary and possible." The intention was to build a staff incentive program, initiate new procedures to control official travel, and bring in improved electronic data processing systems for personnel and accounting operations.<sup>12</sup> But these initiatives were not assiduously pursued during Pérez de Cuéllar's ten years in office, and he does not discuss administrative reform in any detail in his 518-page memoir of his UN years.<sup>13</sup> Pérez de Cuéllar concludes, in his discussion of administrative problems, that their solution depended more on diplomatic relationships with the United States than on internal reform. "To a significant extent," Pérez de Cuéllar wrote,

the effectiveness of the Organization depends on American leadership and support. For this reason, the critical attitude of the U.S. government and a portion of the U.S. media toward the United Nations during the first years of my tenure was profoundly disturbing. ... [T]he United Nations [was] portrayed by neo-conservatives with considerable influence during the Reagan Administration as an institution inherently inimical to American interests and as a profligate organization, badly administered, whose budget was decided by a majority that contributed very little to cover it. I came reluctantly to the conclusion that these forces were aiming at U.S. withdrawal from the United Nations and that there were some within the government who shared this objective. ... Given the pivotal U.S. role in the Organization, I considered it of the highest importance to counter this attitude and to maintain a positive and constructive relationship with the United States government.<sup>14</sup>

### *Pérez de Cuéllar and UN Diplomacy*

In his last report to the General Assembly, Pérez de Cuéllar suggested that his legacy would be the development of a "remarkable coordination" between the Secretariat and the Security Council, although that coordination turned out not to last for even a few years into the term of Pérez de Cuéllar's successor. The diplomatic success of Pérez de Cuéllar during his second term was largely the result of a coming together of the superpowers to end the Cold War, the predisposition of Mikhail Gorbachev to abandon the Soviets' hostility to the world body, and the cooperative attitude of George H. W. Bush, whose experience as U.S. ambassador to the UN was extremely helpful to U.S.-UN relations after his election to the U.S. presidency in 1988.<sup>15</sup> The combination of these factors made it possible for the UN to help accomplish some things that had been impossible previously, but the SG and his office were more often secondary players than initiators and conclusers of accomplishments. Pérez de Cuéllar did play a significant role in ending the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988 and in overturning the General Assembly's 1975 Resolution 3379, which had asserted that "Zionism is a form of racism." To the extent the SG could be given a role in these and other matters, it was the result of his diplomatic skill over the years in building cooperation between the United States, the Soviet Union, and the Group of 77, an effort that was bolstered during his second term by a number of fortuitous circumstances.

In December 1988—less than a month before George H. W. Bush became president—the UN "blue helmets" were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, primarily for their role in the cease-fires that brought an end to the wars between Iran and Iraq and against the Soviets in Afghanistan, in which Pérez de Cuéllar's diplomacy had been instrumental. The Bush

administration then began to encourage expanded UN peacekeeping operations, including overseeing the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola and the transition to independence in Namibia in 1989 as well as the two major UN-led multilateral “operations” against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq after its invasion of Kuwait (Operation Desert Shield in August 1990 and Operation Desert Storm in January 1991). Stephen Burgess has summarized this new U.S. predisposition as follows:

[Bush] expressed the determination to utilize the UN as much as possible in the maintenance of peace and security...[and] envisaged the UN as a major vehicle for defending international law and order and democratic regimes and for mounting humanitarian operations to alleviate suffering from man-made and natural disasters. ...The Bush administration began to deploy U.S. forces in UN missions well beyond their traditional role. ...U.S. contingents were deployed to help start UN operations in Western Sahara and in the former Yugoslavia (including the preventive deployment operation in... Macedonia). Most significant was the employment of U.S. air power and troops for humanitarian missions. The first was Operation Provide Comfort to rescue and relieve Kurdish refugees in April-June 1991 in the wake of the Gulf War. The operation produced dramatic results, with relatively little cost in men and materiel. Air power and troops were also involved in flood relief for Bangladesh and the rescue of Filipinos from a volcanic eruption. The U.S. military mounted Operation Provide Hope, which airlifted needed food supplies to the newly independent Russian Federation in the volatile winter of 1992.<sup>16</sup>

The elder Bush’s enthusiasm for foreign involvement, and for the UN, was ultimately an issue in the 1992 election campaign that contributed to his defeat and Bill Clinton’s victory, but for Pérez de Cuéllar the Bush I years were a key factor in allowing him to leave office with perhaps the highest marks of any secretary-general. With regard to reform in the diplomatic arena, Pérez de Cuéllar’s major recommendation appeared in his last Annual Report (1991)—too late for him to do anything about it— in which he called for the building of an “early warning” capability that might provide a reliable and independently acquired database that could be used by future SGs to engage in diplomacy aimed at preventing violent conflicts.<sup>17</sup> The difficulty faced by reformers who have picked up on this idea is that those nations that have acquired various degrees of “early warning capacity”—including databases, surveillance technology; and field representation—have been unwilling to spend additional funds to provide the UN Secretariat with duplicate or overlapping capability. So long as the UN is conceived by the wealthier nation-states as an organization that can be directed to act in their interests, it is unlikely that Pérez de Cuéllar’s proposed early warning system reform will be fully implemented.<sup>18</sup>

Pérez de Cuéllar ended his UN career with a flourish when he spent New Year’s Eve on his last night in office putting the finishing touches on a peace agreement between rebel and government leaders concluding El Salvador’s twelve-year guerrilla war. Martin Walker describes the dramatic final negotiations as follows:

As midnight approached, Mr. Perez de Cuellar’s wife waited outside in a limousine that was to take them to the airport for a holiday in the Bahamas. They had already missed their 5pm flight, and, as the negotiations threatened to stall yet again, Mr. Perez de Cuellar made it clear that his resignation at midnight was the deadline. [The announcement of the final agreement] was an emotional moment; as midnight and the new year came to the UN corridors, exhausted negotiators from government and the guerrillas hugged their colleagues, and after 10 years in office, Mr. Perez de Cuellar finally left the international institution he had steered to a new stature.<sup>19</sup>

Seasoned diplomats at the time praised Pérez de Cuéllar for his diplomatic skills but warned of the danger of unrealizable expectations for the future. U.S. Ambassador Thomas Pickering, for example, concluded that “His [Pérez de Cuéllar’s] has been a remarkable record, in many ways breathtaking, compared to what the UN did in other aspects of its 45-year existence. [He] was aware of the limitations of the organization and of his job, but he was able, in what I’d say was a non-pushy way, to exploit the edges of the envelope of his capacities.”<sup>20</sup> Britain’s UN ambassador, Sir David Hannay, echoed Pickering’s comments when he mused that Pérez de Cuéllar, when he came to office in 1982, “was thought to be taking over an organization which was at the very fringe of world diplomacy [while] Boutros-Ghali is taking over at a time when expectations are perhaps too high, when there’s a feeling the UN can solve almost everything.”<sup>21</sup>

## NOTES

1. Edward Newman, *The UN Secretary from the Cold War to the New Era: A Global Peace and Security Mandate?* (London: Macmillan Press, 1998), 64.
2. See, for example, Mark Whitaker with Patricia J. Sethi, “United Nations: The New Secretary-General,” *Newsweek*, December 21, 1981, 45; and Deborah Scroggins, “In the Twilight of a Modest Career, Pérez de Cuéllar Casts a Tall Shadow,” *Atlanta Journal and Constitution*, November 19, 1991, B1.
3. George J. Lankevich, *The United Nations under Javier Perez de Cuellar, 1982-1991* (Lanham, Md: The Scarecrow Press, 2001), 2-6. The reforms that Perez de Cuellar tried to institute during his first term are outlined in Thomas E. Boudreau, *Sheathing the Sword: The U.N. Secretary-General and the Prevention of International Conflict* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), see especially 89 and the whole of Part II, titled “Reform and Renewal,” 103-72.

# Religion, Ethics, and Reality

## A Study of Javier Perez de Cuellar

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*The Secretary-General is supposed to be a kind of a conscience of the international community, he has to be honest enough to say what he really believes without being moved by such considerations as whether member countries will like or dislike his report.*

Javier Perez de Cuellar<sup>1</sup>

**T**his chapter analyzes the personal values of Javier Perez de Cuellar and the extent to which his ethical framework influenced him during his tenure as UN secretary-general between 1982 and 1991. The research question at the heart of this chapter inquires whether, during these ten years as secretary-general, Perez de Cuellar's personal values shaped his initiatives and decisions to any great extent. Or, conversely, does the office, shaped as 'it is by legal and political factors, leave little room for exercising influence based on personal values?

<sup>1</sup> Este artículo fue publicado en el 2007 en el libro *The UN Secretary-General and Moral Authority. Ethics and Religion in International Leadership*, edited by Kent J. Kille por Georgetown University Press.

4. Figures quoted in *Economist* (London), "United Nations: Good News from the Wasteland," October 11, 1986, 44.
5. Phillip McCarthy, "Perez de Cuellar Long-Shot Candidate for Top UN Job," *Sydney Morning Herald*, July 6, 1991, 17.
6. Quoted in *Economist* (London), "United Nations: Bias or Betterment?," June 4, 1983, 51
7. *Economist*, "United Nations: Bias or Betterment?," 51.
8. Figures are provided in *Economist* (London), "The UN Wastes Money; To Stop it, Mr. Perez de Cuellar Will Have to Break a Patronage Racket in His Secretariat," December 4, 1982, 16.
9. In December 1982, at the end of Perez de Cuellar's first year in office, *the Economist* described the frustration of the UN's "big contributors," including the United States and many other countries, with "sinecures [maintained through the system of national quotas which the member governments have imposed on the UN secretariat. When Mr. Perez de Cuellar took office in January he said he would try to demolish this system, but it is defying him as it defied each previous secretary-general." See *Economist* (London), "The UN Wastes Money," 16.
10. Rodolfo A. Windhausen, "Perez de Cuellar's Legacy at the UN," *Christian Science Monitor*, January 7, 1992, 19.
11. Yves Beigbeder, *Management Problems in United Nations Organizations: Reform or Decline?* (London: Frances Pinter Publishers, 1987), 163.
12. These initiatives are described in some detail in Beigbeder, *Management Problems*, 162 ff.
13. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, *Pilgrimage for Peace: A Secretary-General's Memoir* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997).
14. Pérez de Cuéllar, *Pilgrimage for Peace*, 8-9.
15. Bush described Pérez de Cuéllar as "a friend of long standing" and "repeatedly urged" that he accept a third term as secretary-general. See Pérez de Cuéllar, *Pilgrimage for Peace*, 12, 29.
16. Stephen F. Burgess, *The United Nations under Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 1992-1997* (Lanham, Md: Scarecrow Press, 2001), 6-7.
17. For a discussion of the proposed reform see K. P. Saksena, *Reforming the United Nations: The Challenge of Relevance* (London: Sage Publications, 1993), 193 ff.
18. For an analysis of the issue from many different perspectives see the fifteen essays in *Commercial Satellite Imagery and United Nations Peacekeeping*, ed. James F. Keeley and Rob Huebert (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishers, 2004).
19. Martin Walker, "El Salvador Peace Crowns Perez de Cuellar's Term," *Guardian* (London), January 2, 1992, 1.
20. Walker, "El Salvador Peace," 1.
21. Walker, "El Salvador Peace," 1.



Much of the relevant literature suggests that the personal qualities or inner code of the secretary-general can sometimes count in the exercise of influence.<sup>2</sup> Of course, how successful secretaries-general are in their initiatives is an entirely different matter. Still, it is a formidable challenge to try to separate the legal and political factors that affect the office from, the moral and religious values of the person who tries to perform “the most impossible job in the world.”

In the case of Perez de Cuellar, we first note some of the early influences on his thought (Catholicism) and the personal values he eventually developed (an ethic of liberalism). Each of these influences contributed to an ethical framework that stressed the equal and autonomous worth of individuals, especially those in need, as well as a concern for peace and justice. These values also overlap with the norms of the UN charter, especially its human rights provisions.

Perez de Cuellar’s public statements often accorded greater weight to the UN charter than to Catholicism or liberalism. A secretary-general may not be expected to build support or deflect criticism by stressing an inner code of right and wrong, but rather by stressing the duties of the office under public norms. One’s ethical framework and public law, however, can be inextricably intertwined. For example, Perez de Cuellar’s bold policies in Central America were the result of the political space provided by powerful states, as well as the norms of the UN charter; but what he did there also reflected his personal values. Dynamism in pursuit of public norms, in the context of political space provided by others, may be a product of personal values.

Despite Perez de Cuellar’s personal views or the principles of the charter, however, political reality often limited his course of action. International relations and power politics being what they are, the wishes of powerful states in this Westphalian system often trumped the initiatives, not to mention the personal values, of Perez de Cuellar. Fundamentally, if the permanent members of the Security Council or the parties in a conflict are unwilling to compromise or negotiate or support the secretary-general, none of the secretary-general’s initiatives, motivated by religious beliefs or otherwise, make a difference. Thus the secretary-general can do only as much as more powerful actors allow him to do.<sup>3</sup> As one of his colleagues said, “There is no point diving into an empty swimming pool.”<sup>4</sup>

Given Perez de Cuellar’s recognition of the weakness of his office, given his own reluctance to use the secretary-general’s office for personal crusades—a function of his innate modesty—and given his fear of what he called “moral hubris,” it is not surprising that his inner code was not overwhelmingly influential during this tenure.<sup>5</sup> He knew that there were

pragmatic limits to what the secretary-general and the United Nations could achieve in international politics. Moreover, he believed that the position of the secretary-general depended upon a reputation for impartiality that necessarily limited any personal crusade.<sup>6</sup>

In this study we argue that the tenure of Perez de Cuellar demonstrates that his ethical orientation, more than his religious values, was part of the man who occupied the office of secretary-general. Of course, formal religious upbringing may indirectly affect personal ethics. Despite his personal values, which came into play to varying degrees, what was primary in the exercise of influence for that position was the political context—mainly the power of states to affect the desires and priorities of the secretary-general. These conclusions are drawn from the written and oral statements by Perez de Cuellar both during and after his tenure as secretary-general, as well as from interviews with him and his colleagues at the United Nations.<sup>7</sup>

We begin by examining the ethical framework of Perez de Cuellar. This includes his religious background—notably Catholicism and his ethic of liberalism. We look next at the organizational and normative framework within which any secretary-general operates—namely, UN norms and international law more broadly. The following section examines the political constraints—power politics in international relations—and their impact on the UN secretary-general. The next section then discusses some of the activities of Perez de Cuellar and how political realities, more than his personal beliefs, dictated his actions. In conclusion we reflect on the limits of social science in trying to distinguish the religious, ethical, legal, and political factors in personalized public policy.

### Personal Values: A Preliminary View

Javier Perez de Cuellar was born on January 19, 1920, in Lima, Peru. He describes growing up in his relatives’ house as a traditional Catholic home. He received a traditional Catholic education in Roman Catholic schools in Lima. After attending law school and studying international law, Perez de Cuellar spent much of his adult life as a diplomat in various foreign cities and at the United Nations. He joined the Peruvian delegation to the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations in 1945.<sup>8</sup> Perez de Cuellar was Peru’s ambassador to Switzerland, Poland, Venezuela, and the Soviet Union. He also represented Peru at the United Nations as ambassador in the early 1970s. After serving as secretary-general, Perez de Cuellar again represented Peru, this time as ambassador to France.

## ***Catholicism***

Catholicism, like most other major religions, is a complex body of beliefs encompassing various tenets.<sup>9</sup> The central aspect of Catholicism is the belief in Jesus of Nazareth as the Messiah or anointed one, who sacrificed his life to provide salvation to those who believed in him. Jesus' teachings, as recorded by his followers in the decades after his death, form the foundation of Catholicism. We discuss a few tenets of Catholicism that are most relevant to the basic norms of the UN charter, while avoiding most theological debates and complexities.

### **EQUAL HUMAN DIGNITY**

Jesus preached that we should love one another and treat one another with respect. This principle, partially reflected in “the Golden Rule”—do unto others as you would have others do unto you—can be said to inform the UN charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which encompass the notion that all individuals have dignity and deserve respect.

### **OBLIGATIONS TO THE POOR**

One recurring theme throughout the New Testament is Jesus' teachings on the obligations to the poor. In addition to forgiveness (turning the other cheek), an important element of the Catholic faith is the obligation to take care of others. Assisting the poor and needy through charity, to raise them to an equitable if not equal standing, is also a central aspect of this faith (which appears in a more secular form in various UN activities). Some scholars have gone as far as to say that the Catholic preaching of love and charity to the poor was the most important aspect of Jesus' teachings.<sup>10</sup> Jesus taught his followers to “sell what you own, and give the money to the poor, and you will have the treasure in heaven.”<sup>11</sup> This moral lesson is repeated throughout the New Testament, as the rich were invited into the faith and encouraged to minister to the needs of the poor.<sup>12</sup> This increased the appeal of Catholicism by helping the homeless, impoverished, orphans and widows, and those who had fallen prey to natural disasters such as earthquakes or fires.<sup>13</sup> Taking care of the less fortunate and those in need is an aspect of UN work through the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), UN Development Fund (UNDP), UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and so forth. And this message was repeated by Perez de Cuellar during his tenure as secretary-general.

Given that many Catholic principles fit with UN norms and principles and general activities, we searched for a clear connection (in interviews; speeches, and the literature) between Catholicism and Perez de Cuellar's diplomatic record. While we believe that Perez de Cuellar's Catholic

heritage may have influenced his ethical framework, we are unable to demonstrate this with certainty. The overlap between Catholic tenets and UN principles and values is clearer than the connection between Catholicism and the secretary-general's actions.

By all accounts, the adult Perez de Cuellar was a European Catholic.<sup>14</sup> In terms of lifestyle he was a Francophone, fluent almost without accent in French, and very much taken with the French way of life. After his public service he retired to Paris, not Lima. Like many French, or many modern Italians for that matter, his Catholicism was almost nominal, more a matter of culture and tradition than of active church commitment. He saw himself as an ecumenical Christian, not one to emphasize the finer points of Catholic theology. Like many French and Italian Catholics, he believed in the importance of family planning, thus disregarding the church's teachings on this issue. In later years he showed some tolerance for gay people, again bucking the church's position. Unlike Kurt Waldheim, he did not attend Mass regularly or partake systematically of other Catholic rituals. No colleague we interviewed could recall a situation or event in which Perez de Cuellar reflected on his Catholic upbringing or talked about the importance of religion for his public role. He thought that public officials should put their personal religion in the freezer while serving in office. At one point he insisted that a word in a UN report be removed, because in certain languages it had a religious connotation.<sup>15</sup> He was more likely to read French poetry after a stressful day than selections from the New Testament.

To the extent that Perez de Cuellar can be said to be Catholic in matters of faith, it seemed to be a traditional, mainstream form of Catholicism, European style. There is no evidence that he was much affected by the “liberation theology” that was influential in parts of Latin America during his lifetime and that emphasized a more radical form of Catholicism focusing on the plight of the poor. Whereas parts of the Catholic Church in Latin America (and elsewhere for that matter) were aligned with, and defensive of, the aristocratic and other upper classes, liberation theology concentrated on the liberation of the poor and marginalized, not only in theological terms of salvation for the next life but also in terms of political and economic liberation in the here and now. As secretary-general, Perez de Cuellar sometimes spoke of the importance of development and the eradication of poverty. One of his major regrets was that he was unable as secretary-general to do more about underdevelopment in the world. But he spoke equally of the importance of state sovereignty and recognized governments, especially before his second term as secretary-general. Over time he may have identified more and more with the poor and downtrodden and victimized, but we found no evidence that this evolution stemmed from his Catholic heritage, much less from the Latin American

version of liberation theology—the latter gaining some prominence only after the formative years of his youth.

It seems to have been the case that Perez de Cuellar was irritated that the Vatican would not officially recognize his second marriage, the first having ended in divorce.<sup>16</sup> Be that as it may, Perez de Cuellar did visit the Vatican on several occasions. He seemed to place great importance on such visits, but this was primarily for political reasons. He viewed these visits in the context of securing Vatican support for UN policies. At these meetings in Rome, religion was not discussed.

We do not deny that Perez de Cuellar's personal liberalism may have been a by-product of his Catholic upbringing. It is not uncommon for people who were raised in the Christian faith to become secular liberals, secular humanists, or secular champions of human rights and human dignity. It is likely in at least some cases that a Catholic heritage focusing on the worth of the individual in God's sight contributed to the secular liberal values that eventually characterized the adult viewpoint. But in the case of Perez de Cuellar, we could establish no definitive link between his religion and his inner code. There seems to be no major Catholic priest or educator who was instrumental in the development of his personal ethics. All we can say is that his personal ethics ran parallel to a moderately liberal but not radical interpretation of Catholicism. It might be fair to think of Perez de Cuellar as a South American version of a French Catholic who had a sense of noblesse oblige to those of misfortune or lesser rank.

One can note in passing that Perez de Cuellar's concern over the nuclear arms race and the destructive capabilities of nuclear weapons was similar to that voiced by the Catholic Church and the Pope. On numerous occasions various representatives of the church condemned the buildup of conventional and nuclear weapons in the United States and the Soviet Union. Pope John Paul II urged the nations of the world to embrace disarmament. In a message to the General Assembly session on disarmament in 1982, the pope announced that the Catholic Church would continue to promote peace and "will not rest until there is a general, verifiable disarmament and the human race is committed to those choices that guarantee a lasting peace."<sup>17</sup> The pope saw the arms race as an ethical crisis, especially given that resources spent on nuclear and conventional weapons could be used to improve the situation of poor nations instead. While the secretary-general also saw the arms race as a moral issue, we found no evidence that either papal statements or other church pronouncements affected Perez de Cuellar. Again we see parallel value structures, but no cause-and-effect relationship.

One can likewise note the similarities between the secretary-general's call for debt relief and aid to the Third World and comments made by Pope John Paul II. The pope repeatedly requested that wealthy nations provide more economic aid to the world's poor. In his *Centesimus annus* (May 1, 1991), John Paul II argued that the West was not upholding its duties to the poor throughout the world.<sup>18</sup> The pope was concerned that Third World debt was taking an economic, social, and human toll and in the process bringing some nations to the brink of disaster.<sup>19</sup> But again, we find no definitive evidence that the secretary-general's comments about development, poverty, debt relief, and the like had a religious foundation.

In general, we find that if Perez de Cuellar's Catholicism had any important impact on his public role, it was mainly through the development of his personal—essentially secular—ethics. But any such linkage remains conjecture.

### ***Liberalism: Respect for the Individual***

Perez de Cuellar's philosophical orientation eventually came to be liberal.<sup>20</sup> Liberalism focuses on individuals, their dignity, and their inherent freedoms. Many liberals, although not all, have made autonomy the foundation of their political philosophy. Liberals argue that all persons are free and autonomous creatures simply because they are persons, irrespective of race, gender, or social status. This freedom entails the ability to choose and to act on one's own conception of the good life. As Will Kymlicka puts it, "The defining feature of liberalism is that it ascribes certain fundamental freedoms to each individual. In particular, it grants people a very wide freedom of choice in terms of how they lead their lives. It allows people to choose a conception of the good life, and then allows them to reconsider that decision, and adopt a new and hopefully better life plan."<sup>21</sup> Liberals strongly endorse human rights, especially the right to freedom of speech, conscience, religion, and association. This list, although not exhaustive, constitutes a sphere of personal autonomy.<sup>22</sup>

The underlying foundation of individual freedom is the assumption that all members of society possess dignity. Respecting individual dignity enhances individual well-being and provides for human potentiality.<sup>23</sup> By protecting and promoting individual freedom and tolerating this diversity, societies uphold and reinforce the dignity of human beings. In order to further human potential, society needs to treat individuals as autonomous beings and therefore respect the choices they make.<sup>24</sup> This is accomplished through a constitutional framework and through the rule of law.

Without doubt, Perez de Cuellar's personal ethics, his inner code of right and wrong, was centered on human dignity, human freedom, human

rights—certainly this was the case by the time of his second term. Of course, these values are embedded in the UN charter. But eventually his interest in, and commitment to, such values was not just legalistic and pro forma but became internalized.

This was not always the case. As a Peruvian diplomat, and then in his first term as secretary-general, Perez de Cuellar was known more for his traditional respect for state sovereignty, his traditional diplomatic practice and discretion, and his going with the flow rather than rocking the boat in the name of human rights and other liberal causes. This was a major reason why he was chosen by the five permanent members of the Security Council as secretary-general; he seemed a safe choice. As undersecretary-general for political affairs during the Waldheim era, he had compiled a report on prison conditions in Uruguay that seemed to be a whitewash by comparison to a leaked report from the International Committee of the Red Cross.<sup>25</sup> Also, he decided not to renew the contract of the dynamic (and undiplomatically outspoken) UN director of human rights, Theo van Boven of the Netherlands, and replaced him with the much less activist and much more discrete Kurt Herndl of Austria.<sup>26</sup> As of the early 1980s, Perez de Cuellar was anything but a determined and committed liberal.

As will be shown below, however, he took great strides for, even great risks for, human rights in places like Central America. True, his initiatives there were well founded in charter principles. True, they were seen as necessary means to the end of peace and security. But by all accounts he was personally committed to achieving a better deal for individuals, including those who had been marginalized and exploited under previous political arrangements.

Likewise in the Iran–Iraq war, as we will show, he took initiatives regarding the use of chemical weapons, not only because such means and methods of armed conflict violated international law but because he was personally opposed to such developments on the basis of his personal sense of right and wrong. Later, when his office issued a report on that part of the world, Perez de Cuellar insisted on using the word “genocidal” to describe certain Iraqi policies toward Iraqi Kurds. His personal sense of outrage about what had been done to individuals affected this particular decision, even if it was only a matter of semantics in a UN publication.

Then there was his sense of impartiality. Some of the people who worked with the secretary-general commented repeatedly on his sense of fairness when dealing with various interlocutors. It seems to have been the case that Perez de Cuellar did not admire or respect a number of political figures with whom he dealt. But his colleagues were consistent in saying

that he always gave political representatives a fair hearing. Insofar as his personal code stressed equal treatment of individuals, it can be said to be part of his liberal personal ethics.

Likewise, there was his commitment to the rule of law, another liberal value. This part of his personal code could be intertwined with his sense of fairness. For example, having worked diligently for the withdrawal of the Republic of South Africa from Namibia, on the eve of that area’s independence the secretary-general found himself confronted by dear violations of the key agreement by the Southwest Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO). And despite his efforts for black independence, with SWAPO as the leading organization for national liberation, the secretary-general was scathing in his criticism of SWAPO’s violations of the accord. One can understand Perez de Cuellar in this episode as being committed to international law and diplomatic agreements. But one can also read him as committed to evenhanded treatment of all violators of international agreements, whether they were black nationalists or white supremacists. In this case the dividing line between commitment to the rule of law, required by his office, and commitment to basic fairness as a product of personal ethics is difficult to establish.

In summary, to this point, Perez de Cuellar’s diplomatic track record reflected a strong sense of equity, fairness, and impartiality, which at times took the form of equality under law. Especially in his second term he showed great respect for human dignity and human rights, not just as a matter of legal or organizational obligation but as a matter of personal ethics. In the same way, he treated his colleagues in the Secretariat with great personal respect and great personal concern. He did indeed eventually manifest a personal ethics of liberalism centered on human dignity. His early missteps regarding Uruguay and van Boven have obscured this point for numerous observers.

Other parts of his inner code do not fit so neatly with liberalism. We are not suggesting that values like modesty contradict liberalism, only that they do not fit dearly within the definition of liberalism. In any event by all accounts Perez de Cuellar was characterized by an absence of the kind of pride and arrogance and hauteur in his public life that was associated with his successor, Boutros Boutros-Ghali. Now it may be that in his personal life he manifested a certain pride and vanity.<sup>27</sup> Be that as it may, in his public role Perez de Cuellar thought of his office as a place for team effort, team responsibility, and team credit. His view of the office of the secretary-general emphasized duty, service, and commitment not personal achievement. When some of his colleagues told him that it was unfortunate he did not garner more recognition for his efforts in places like Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Central America, he replied with appa-



rently genuine modesty that such things were unimportant—that what counted was recognition for the organization, not for himself.<sup>28</sup> In the 1990s, when the prospect of a UN ceremony in New York, to which all living former secretaries-general were to be invited, raised the prospect of embarrassment for Waldheim, then on the nonentry list of the United States because of events stemming from his involvement in World War II, Perez de Cuellar let it be known that the secretaries-general should not be invited. This was done to save Waldheim embarrassment and further, controversy.

### Institutional Norms

Many liberal values are inherent in the UN charter and especially in the International Bill of Rights. According to one source, Woodrow Wilson's liberalism in international relations, which was the foundation not only for the League of Nations but also for the United Nations, means a commitment to peace and arms control, to human rights and democracy, and to private property and free trade.<sup>29</sup> It is well known that the liberal values of the charter were heavily influenced by Western thought, through the primary role of the United States.<sup>30</sup>

The International Bill of Rights, which is a diplomatic rather than a legal term and a composite of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, recognizes many individual freedoms.<sup>31</sup> It also recognizes the duty of states to provide for minimal socioeconomic goods and services when individual freedom and competition fail to provide them.

Whatever the liberalism required by UN norms, in the charter the foremost function of the organization is the maintenance of international peace and security. The United Nations as an institution was designed to promote peace, particularly between states. Like other secretaries-general before him, Perez de Cuellar therefore sought to develop in the international community the confidence to use the United Nations as a "brokering agency to achieve peace."<sup>32</sup> As expected, Perez de Cuellar stressed this role continually, but with room for morality: "But peace as envisaged by the UN Charter is a just peace: take that moral dimension away and we are back to the disorder and the injustice of power politics."<sup>33</sup>

Perez de Cuellar saw the charter as a moral statement:

The expression may be somewhat old fashioned, but it is a matter of international morality. The philosophy of the Charter of the UN is perfect. We could change articles but I don't think we need to change the spirit of the Charter which means a kind of religion for

the international community. The Charter contains principles which should be adhered to by all countries[,] and every transgression of the rules should be treated as immorality. It is the moral approach to all international problems that we need.<sup>34</sup>

Here we see the secretary-general transforming international legal norms concerning security into a moral code—almost a secular religion, if you will. In a 2002 interview, Perez de Cuellar referred to the charter as his philosophy: "I used to say that the UN Charter is my credo. I believe in the Charter."<sup>35</sup> Thus Perez de Cuellar did not rigidly distinguish the charter as part of international law from ethics, morality, philosophy, or indeed maybe from an informal religion. It was dear to him that the charter was not just a matter of technical, specialized legal language, but of values, justice, ethics, morality. So it is often fruitless to ask whether his motivation was ethical or legal. It was both at once. It seems that the longer he served as secretary-general, the more the liberalism inherent in the charter became a genuine inner liberalism for the man himself. If so, we have the merger of Perez de Cuellar's personal values with his formal external code in the form of charter principles.

### Policy Choices

Perez de Cuellar was selected to be secretary-general primarily because he was "the least objectionable candidate," especially to the permanent members of the Security Council.<sup>36</sup> Waldheim had sought a third term as secretary-general, but China was opposed. That Waldheim up to that point had proved acceptable to the other P-5 members indicated that they preferred a docile and nonintrusive secretary-general, even if he manifested various character flaws and was far from dynamic. Another candidate, Salim Salim of Tanzania, had supported efforts to develop a New International Economic Order (unlike Perez de Cuellar), and had openly rejoiced at the admission of Communist China to the United Nations, and so drew the veto of the United States.

Initially the international community could not agree on a new candidate. Ultimately the P-5 thought that Perez de Cuellar was unlikely to make international waves as head of the United Nations. He seemed safe. This perception stemmed partially from his quiet personality and his modesty and humility as a public official. As one official said, "If Perez de Cuellar had to choose between going to a museum and being invited to a meeting of the G-7, he would choose the museum every time."<sup>37</sup> However proud and even vainglorious he might have been in private social circles, his public persona was otherwise. The widespread perception of him as a humble man fit with his track record as a traditional but reliable Peruvian

diplomat. No one expected him to be a dynamic leader who would seek profound changes at the United Nations or in international relations.<sup>38</sup> He remained modest, but in his second term he also proved to be creative and dynamic in an understated way.

### ***Constraints of the Office***

The secretary-general is “both [the] symbol and guardian of the original vision of the organization.”<sup>39</sup> The office is embedded with constraints. Perez de Cuellar understood the confines of his office. He continually stressed that “fidelity to the aims of the Charter” must always be paramount to any secretary-general.<sup>40</sup> He warned that the secretary-general could not boldly venture too far from the charter, or attempt too little:

Anyone who has the honor to be cast as Secretary-General has to avoid the two extremes in playing his or her role. On one side is the Scylla of trying to inflate the role through too liberal a reading of the text: of succumbing, that is, to vanity and wishful thinking. On the other is the Charybdis of trying to limit the role to only those responsibilities which are explicitly conferred by the Charter and are impossible to escape: that is, succumbing to modesty, to the instinct of self-effacement, and to the desire to avoid controversy.<sup>41</sup>

Undertaking too much without the support of the Security Council is likely to hamper the effectiveness of the secretary-general and lead to a loss of respect for the institution and the office, thus making achievement of charter goals more difficult. Doing too little can also leave the organization impotent in areas in which it might otherwise accomplish much. Perez de Cuellar cautioned against assuming that the secretary-general was an omnipotent individual capable of single-handedly securing world peace, and he warned against succumbing to personal bias in efforts to achieve peace: “Moral concern must not become moral hubris. The Secretary-General must not allow himself to be influenced by his own judgment of the moral worth of either party’s position or, for that matter, by what the leaders or media of one country glibly say about the position of the other. Subjective attitudes must not be allowed to hinder progress towards mutual understanding between the parties.”<sup>42</sup> The conviction that it is better to be an honest broker than a moral or legal judge deeply influenced his conduct.<sup>43</sup>

In addition, a secretary-general is limited in the initiatives he can undertake. The restraints imposed by the charter are set out in articles 98 and 99.<sup>44</sup> Besides handling issues sent to him by the various organs of the organization and making annual reports, the secretary-general’s political initiative lies mainly in article 99’s provision to bring threats to

international peace and security to the attention of the Security Council. A secretary-general must be cautious when invoking article 99, however. If a situation is brought to the attention of the Security Council and then ignored by the permanent members, it will have little chance of being addressed. And the reputation of the organization and the office of the secretary-general will suffer. Thus a secretary-general must use careful political judgment when invoking article 99.<sup>45</sup>

### ***The Political Reality of International Relations***

Perez de Cuellar was not a starry-eyed liberal idealist by any means. He understood that “one’s expectations have to be realistic and yet not divorced from the ideals embodied in the Charter of the UN. The international environment, fraught with tensions and acute differences, will inevitably be reflected in the debates in the UN.”<sup>46</sup>

Throughout most of his tenure as secretary-general, Perez de Cuellar had to deal with the many conflicts arising from the Cold War. The USSR and the United States often used the United Nations to disseminate propaganda points and to prevent certain initiatives that might benefit “the enemy” Neither adhered consistently to charter principles or always honored the intentions of the UN founders. An ideological “higher law,” of either anticapitalism or anticommunism, trumped respect for positivistic international law found in the UN charter. To complicate matters, many of the developing countries occasionally elevated a “higher law-of anticolonialism” over charter provisions. When the new secretary-general, began his first term, on January 1, 1982, he did not believe that “either superpower displayed sufficient respect for an organization both found useful as a listening post, diplomatic venue, and propaganda arena.”<sup>47</sup>

The superpowers and the five permanent members of the Security Council could thwart or ignore Perez de Cuellar’s initiatives. The Falkland Islands /Islas Malvinas War was a good example of his failure to impact a situation. Perez de Cuellar realized early in April 1982 that the United Nations might be called on to address this conflict. He believed that the charter gave him a moral imperative to try to prevent the conflict between the United Kingdom and Argentina from escalating into war.<sup>48</sup> After U.S. secretary of state Alexander Haig was unsuccessful in his attempts to settle the dispute, the responsibility fell to the United Nations. Haig’s efforts failed primarily because of the disparate positions of both countries.<sup>49</sup> Ultimately, Perez de Cuellar’s labors in May 1982 also failed to resolve the issue, despite agreement on roughly 75 percent of the issues by the two belligerents.<sup>50</sup>

Events like these led the secretary-general, in his 1982 annual report, to conclude that “time after time we have seen the Organization set aside

or rebuffed, for this reason or that, in situations in which it should, and could, have played an important and constructive role.”<sup>51</sup> In general, when the superpowers or the P-5 did not want the United Nations or its secretary-general meddling in their affairs, they could ensure that Perez de Cuellar remained a spectator in the international arena. Perez de Cuellar understood this very well, commenting, “there is not much I can do if the international atmosphere of mistrust [between the superpowers] does not improve.”<sup>52</sup>

### ***Great Power Politics***

Without doubt, the most significant event of Perez de Cuellar’s tenure was the internal transformation of the Soviet Union. In March 1985, after a series of leadership changes in the USSR, Mikhail Gorbachev came to power. Perez de Cuellar recognized, during an early encounter with Gorbachev at the funeral of President Chernenko in 1985, that the United Nations had an opportunity to take a more active role in global issues. During this meeting Gorbachev expressed his support for the United Nations: “I think that the Soviet Union, from now on, will be very supportive of the UN, because we think that in the future all problems should be solved through your organization. You can rely on me.”<sup>53</sup> Perez de Cuellar realized that Gorbachev was someone he could work with—the new Soviet leader was the “real McCoy.”<sup>54</sup>

Gorbachev understood the weakness inherent in the Soviet political and economic system and sought to use the United Nations and multilateral cooperation as a new framework for global security. In two articles published in *Pravda* and *Izvestia* in September 1987, he argued that the United Nations was a vital institution necessary to achieve a comprehensive system of international peace and security.<sup>55</sup> This new attitude on the Soviet side, which prompted changes on the U.S. side as well, allowed the United Nations and the secretary-general to be more active and assertive. Either the two superpowers were to be in agreement on some issues, or they felt secure enough on other issues to allow the secretary-general room to maneuver in search of a policy not controlled by either party. The critical point remains that it was the changes in the Soviet Union and consequently the changes in the international environment that allowed the secretary-general to be more proactive and successful on some international fronts. These changes, however, did not originate from Perez de Cuellar’s religious beliefs.

### ***Policy Choice: Peace and Security***

Global disarmament was a constant priority for Perez de Cuellar. Given the anarchic and insecure state of international relations, most nations

are reluctant to disarm and thus forfeit any strategic advantage they might achieve through the buildup of weapons. Perez de Cuellar had two related motivations for disarmament. First, disarmament was implicit in the UN charter.<sup>56</sup> Just as important was the devastating impact on civilians around the world of expensive arms races and violent dashes. Early in his tenure as secretary-general Perez de Cuellar explained the importance of the issue:

At the present stage in international affairs, there is a compelling need to make a credible and substantial advance towards arms limitation and disarmament . . . The world cannot wait for the dawn of ideal conditions before undertaking concrete measures of disarmament. I would very much hope that the forthcoming special session will help restore the momentum of progress in this field. It will be closely followed by a growing world audience increasingly alarmed by the prospects of a nuclear holocaust. We all share a heavy responsibility to ensure its success.<sup>57</sup>

Perez de Cuellar felt that he and the United Nations had “the responsibility of assuring the survival of humanity and of organized society on this earth,” which was imperiled by the deadly impasse of the superpowers and the potential for mutually assured destruction (MAD).<sup>58</sup> Yet, given the weakness of his office, Perez de Cuellar found that he could make little progress on issues of disarmament and arms control. The progress that was made occurred because of decisions made in Moscow and Washington.

### **CENTRAL AMERICA**

Perez de Cuellar’s concern over the situation in Latin America was not surprising, given his own national origins. While Latin America was hardly his only concern, as his work in Namibia, Afghanistan, and elsewhere demonstrates, he was especially vocal in his concern for his home continent.<sup>59</sup> In addition to his personal views, however, Central America became a Cold War battleground, so there were also political reasons to give great attention to the region.

According to Perez de Cuellar, the roots of all of the conflicts in Central America lay in the social and economic inequality throughout those societies. The unequal distribution of resources, which allowed a small segment of the population to enjoy vast wealth while the majority suffered in poverty, played a central role in the conflicts in Chile, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Peru, to name but a few examples.<sup>60</sup> These economic disparities, which were enforced by the “structural violence” of the governments that benefited from them, including government-sponsored death squads, had led to armed rebellions. This situation, in turn, had led to external involvement.

A number of initiatives were undertaken to deal with these violent conflicts. The Contadora peace plan originated in January 1983 when the foreign ministers of Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela developed a strategy to encourage peace and limit foreign interference in the conflicts in Central America. The Security Council expressed its support for this initiative in Resolution 530 and requested that the secretary-general keep the council informed of developments there. Perez de Cuellar believed that he had “a moral responsibility to act in the interest of peace if there appears to be any chance of success.”<sup>61</sup> In the early years of his first term, he simply offered UN assistance to the Organization of American States (OAS) and to the Contadora group, if they desired. He would become more involved toward the end of his term as secretary-general, as the Cold War drew to a close.

Perez de Cuellar faced a number of constraints when dealing with the conflict in Central America. For one thing, he had no mandate to act in the early 1980s from the Security Council, and Washington clearly wanted to limit UN involvement in its “backyard.” In addition, the states that began the Contadora process wanted to protect their turf. They did not want another body to intervene and steal some of their thunder.<sup>62</sup> The OAS also wanted to keep the United Nations out of what it regarded as its diplomatic territory. Thus Perez de Cuellar had to walk a very fine diplomatic line. Initially the Contadora process failed to bring peace to Nicaragua or El Salvador, the two Central American states most wracked by violence. This was most probably a direct result of the failure of Contadora to include guerilla factions in the peace process.<sup>63</sup> The Arias Plan, named after President Arias of Costa Rica, was a follow-up initiative designed to end the turmoil in Central America in February and March 1987. It improved upon the earlier efforts by providing specific conditions for ceasefires, amnesties, dialogue with opposition groups, and a verification commission.<sup>64</sup>

Both plans probably would have failed had two events not occurred that changed American foreign policy. The first was a scandal in the United States and the second was a change in executive leadership. These provided the opening for what proved to be a critical element in the attainment of peace: the involvement of the secretary-general and the United Nations in the peace plan.

The context for these changes was the improved relationship between the USSR and the United States at the end of the Reagan era, circa 1987-88. The long Cold War was finally coming to an end, and Gorbachev’s Soviet Union was expressing much less interest in Central America. This in turn diminished the extent to which Castro’s Cuba could support the Sandinistas in Nicaragua or oppose the government in El Salvador.

In this context, the scandal in the United States proved optimal for the situation in Central America. The Iran-Contra affair involved Oliver North’s operation to sell arms to Iran and to use the proceeds to support the Contras, who were trying to violently bring down the leftist-Sandinista government of Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua. This scandal, which came to light in November 1986, tarnished the Reagan administration and limited Reagan’s ability to flex American muscle in Central America after 1986.<sup>65</sup> Reagan had kept the United Nations at arm’s length when it came to this region, but after the Iran-Contra affair became public, he was unable to decisively influence events in the region. Given a weakened executive, the Congress, controlled by the opposition party and long opposed to Reagan’s foreign policy in Central America, was able to block many of the administration’s policies.

George H. Bush, elected U.S. president in 1988, was considerably more moderate in his views toward Central America and also viewed the United Nations more favorably, having been the US. representative there in the past. These changes in the United States, coupled with the changes in Soviet foreign policy under Gorbachev, paved the way for the active involvement of Perez de Cuellar and the United Nations.

## NICARAGUA

In early 1989 the Arias Plan began to gain momentum. The government of Nicaragua scheduled elections for February of the following year. These elections would be open to all parties and would be monitored by international observers. To ensure a free and fair process, Nicaragua invited the United Nations to verify the elections. The Security Council authorized Perez de Cuellar to assist in these endeavors in Resolution 637 (July 27, 1989). In response, the secretary-general sent a team of officials to Nicaragua, with Elliot Richardson as the head of the UN Observer Mission to Verify the Election Process in Nicaragua (ONUVEN) to assist the OAS in the monitoring of elections (August 25). Thus, in ONUVEN, for the first time in cooperation with OAS, the United Nations took part in the domestic elections of a member state. This was a seminal moment in contemporary peacekeeping. The election ultimately resulted in the defeat of the Sandinista government.<sup>66</sup> Also crucial to the success of the electoral process was the Bush administration’s unqualified support for the outcome.<sup>67</sup>

The United Nations’ contribution to democracy in Nicaragua went beyond the electoral process. After the election the United Nations was asked to collect weapons from the rebels. The UN Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA) was established by Resolution 644 (November 7, 1989) and enlarged by Resolution 650 (March 27, 1990) to verify the voluntary demobilization of the Nicaraguan resistance. Although there



were some difficulties, the United Nations, through its collection of rebel weapons, had set a precedent that could be built upon in the future.

On April 19, 1990, the Nicaraguan government and the Contras signed a ceasefire agreement.<sup>68</sup> By June 1990 the United Nations had successfully completed its mission. The results were quite dramatic, especially with respect to small-scale peacekeeping. A genuinely free and fair election had taken place, and the democratic results had ushered in a new government. The secretary-general was essential in this development, but the crucial factor here was that the international environment had changed.

### EL SALVADOR

The United Nations also played a pivotal role in helping to end the civil war in El Salvador. The conflict, which began in 1979, had reached a stalemate by the late 1980s. This, along with the end of the Reagan administration, encouraged the government of El Salvador and the rebels to consider negotiating. Perez de Cuellar embraced the opportunity as an obligation of the secretary-general and sent Alvaro de Soto as his special representative to negotiate an end to the conflict between the Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion Nacional (FMLN) and the elected government of Alfredo Felix Cristiani.<sup>69</sup> De Soto's efforts led to an agreement, signed in the summer of 1990, between the two parties to respect human rights by avoiding all activities "that threaten the life, integrity, security or liberty of individuals."<sup>70</sup> Ultimately the UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) was established to monitor the human rights situation in El Salvador. Despite this progress, a ceasefire remained elusive, and the fighting continued.

Perez de Cuellar was eventually able to bridge the gap between the government and the FMLN in eleventh-hour negotiations in New York. With the end of his tenure as secretary-general looming (December 1991), Perez de Cuellar approached the task with a sense of urgency inviting both parties to New York for negotiations. Just before midnight on December 31, 1991, the two sides agreed to a ceasefire. As in the case of Nicaragua, Gorbachev's lack of interest in the situation and U.S. pressure for a peace agreement provided Perez de Cuellar with an opening.

The policies in both El Salvador and Nicaragua allowed a critical development in international relations—second-generation or complex peacekeeping, featuring UN field missions with broad mandates that covered a variety of human rights issues.<sup>71</sup> Perez de Cuellar had been bold and creative in his efforts to foster both human rights and security; the first fed into the second. It was not merely a matter of human rights or

security any more than it was a matter of charter provisions versus an ethical framework or the reality of power politics. The record of the UN secretary-general in Central America was the result of all three factors at once: attention to UN norms, to liberal principles of rights and dignity, and to the acknowledged self-interest of various states and nonstate actors.

### THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR

The war between Iran and Iraq (1980-88) began when Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein attacked Iran in pursuit of territorial gains and the glory and wealth that come with them. The Iranians defended their territory as part of a religious struggle. While Iraq had superior weapons, and within the first few weeks occupied some seven thousand square kilometers of Iranian territory Iran managed to repel the attacks.<sup>72</sup> Iraq's military advantage led many policymakers in Europe and the United States to expect a quick Iraqi victory. In addition, the Iranian mullahs had almost no experience with domestic or international politics.<sup>73</sup> For these reasons, the survival of the Islamic Republic was rather unexpected. Iran's greater population, and Iranians' willingness to fight and die for their nation, if not for religion, was Iran's advantage over Iraq. But neither Iraq's military superiority nor Iran's greater will achieved victory by either side, and so the war dragged on.

For the first four years of his term, both the Soviet Union and the United States wanted Perez de Cuellar to remain on the sidelines of the conflict. From the American perspective, consistent with its double-containment strategy, it was advantageous for Iraq and Iran to fight with each other because both would be weakened. It was only after Iran had scored a number of military successes that the United States decided that the international community should become involved. The Reagan administration feared that either Iraq would end up another Islamic republic or that the flow of oil would be interrupted. It was in this context that the United States provided Iraq with certain intelligence, and also delivered to it certain materials useful in the making of chemical and biological weapons.

Although the UN Security Council was silent on the use of chemical weapons, Perez de Cuellar undertook a number of diplomatic missions to address the issue. He was horrified by the use of chemical weapons, but his personal views were largely ignored by the conflicting parties and by the Security Council.<sup>74</sup> Still he persisted in making humanitarian efforts to stop the "war of the cities" and the bombing of civilian areas. Although neither side exercised restraint for very long, the secretary-general's efforts spared a number of lives.

Eventually Perez de Cuellar was able to broker a peace agreement between the parties, because each side despaired of military victory, the permanent members of the Security Council had encouraged him to “do what you think is right,” and the secretary-general was viewed as an impartial player.<sup>75</sup> On his own initiative, Perez de Cuellar rewrote Resolution 598 in a way that eventually gained Iranian acquiescence. So the Iranians came to rely on the secretary-general, even though they believed that Iraqi aggression had not been properly condemned by the Security Council. Hostilities ultimately ended on August 20, 1988, after the secretary-general held final discussions between the foreign ministers of both countries. Perez de Cuellar took a great sense of satisfaction in this. That he had been able to bring an end to the conflict was a diplomatic surprise that helped the image of the United Nations.<sup>76</sup>

Yet it remained true that in the early stages of the war, the personal views and attempted diplomacy of the UN secretary-general had made little difference in the course of events. It was only after both parties recognized that they faced an endless stalemate, and the United States encouraged Iraq to be flexible, that political space opened for mediation by Perez de Cuellar.

#### **AFGHANISTAN**

Fighting between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan began when the Soviet Union invaded that country in November 1979; the war lasted for nine years. The Soviets, in spite of their superior weapons, were unable to vanquish the various Afghan coalitions. The Americans were supplying the indigenous Afghan forces with stinger missiles.<sup>77</sup> As in the early stages of the Iran-Iraq war, neither superpower initially wanted the United Nations to resolve the situation in Afghanistan.

Perez de Cuellar’s initial involvement with the Afghan crisis began when he was appointed by Secretary-General Waldheim to be his personal representative for Afghanistan. He accepted the assignment because the fighting “had raised tensions dangerously in an already volatile region and profoundly disrupted the lives of the Afghan people.” By the time Perez de Cuellar became secretary-general, more than 6 million people, about one-third of the country, had fled Afghanistan to neighboring countries.<sup>78</sup>

For a number of years, however, neither Perez de Cuellar’s efforts nor the initiatives of others were particularly effective, as the two sides and their backers tried to control the situation through violence. The fundamentals of the situation were therefore similar to the early years of the Iran-Iraq war.

Ultimately, after years of negotiations by Perez de Cuellar, and later by Diego Cordovez, the new special representative, the United Nations was able to negotiate a settlement.<sup>79</sup> The Geneva Accords signed on April 14, 1988, mandated the voluntary return of refugees, the withdrawal of foreign troops, nonintervention by the two superpowers, and international guarantees by the Soviets and the Americans.<sup>80</sup> The United Nations was able to provide humanitarian assistance to the Afghan people through Operation Salam.<sup>81</sup>

As with the situation in Central America, this diplomatic success had its origins in the changes in the Soviet Union under Gorbachev. The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan was the result of Gorbachev’s view that the USSR was overextended and was living beyond its means in foreign policy. There was also the factor of domestic fatigue in the Soviet Union especially concerning the increasing number of body bags returning from Afghanistan. Gorbachev viewed the war as a “bleeding wound.”<sup>82</sup> On April 3, 1986, he announced that the Soviets would leave Afghanistan and by the end of 1988 he had fulfilled his commitment. Perez de Cuellar credits the changing climate between the superpowers for the ultimate resolution of the Afghan problem: “We therefore decided to wait until the parties expressed the desire for the resumption of UN efforts before taking further action. Fortunately, there was a very significant change Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in Moscow.”<sup>83</sup> Thus Perez de Cuellar credits environmental forces for the changes in Afghanistan:

It was not the negotiating skill of the United Nations that persuaded the Soviet Union to withdraw its armed forces from Afghanistan. This was the result of the invincible resistance of the Mujahideen, the effective arms they received from the United States and the support for their struggle extended by Pakistan, Iran and Saudi Arabia. The timing of the withdrawal of the Soviet troops was settled between the American and the Soviets as was the belated agreement to cut off arms deliveries to the combatants.<sup>84</sup>

The UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP) was a UN victory but in this case the United Nations and its secretary-general merely facilitated what the Soviets were committed to doing. The success in ending the violence in Afghanistan during 1979-88 meant no final victory for Afghanistan as a nation, for it continued to experience the ravages of domestic violence and, eventually, another round of international war starting in late 2001.

#### ***Population Control and Family Planning***

Population control was an issue that some observers predicted would put Perez de Cuellar and his Catholicism at odds with his role as secretary-

general. Controlling the birth rate is a central issue in many third world countries because these nations lack the economic resources to provide for millions of citizens, and in some cases a billion or more people, within their borders. For many countries, especially a large country such as China, keeping the birth rate down by decreasing pregnancies is one key to long-term development. Various methods of family planning, including access to abortions and contraception, aid in limiting the birth rate.

These methods contradict traditional Catholic dogma, which stresses that life begins at conception and that all life is valuable. The Catholic Church “rejects contraception, sterilization, and abortion as solutions to the population problem.”<sup>85</sup> In a letter to the secretary-general, Pope John Paul II explained the church’s view:

The children of the world cry out for greater respect for their inalienable individual dignity and for their right to life from the first moment of conception, even in the face of difficult circumstances or personal handicap. Every individual, no matter how small or how seemingly unimportant in utilitarian terms, bears the imprint of the Creator’s image and likeness (Gen 1:26). Policies and actions which do not recognize that unique condition of innate dignity cannot lead to a more just and humane world, for they go against the very values which determine objective moral categories and which form the basis of rational moral judgments and right actions.<sup>86</sup>

The resistance to abortion was evident at the International Conference on Population held in Mexico City on August 6-14, 1984, at which the Vatican, with the help of the United States, sought to advance a resolution that rejected promoting abortion as a method of family planning.<sup>87</sup> The Reagan administration, which was often at odds with the Vatican on policy issues, including aid to the third world and disarmament, supported the Vatican completely on this issue. An antiabortion stance fit nicely with Reagan supporters of the religious right in the United States.

The Reagan administration thus withheld funds from the UN Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA). On July 12, 1984, the United States announced that no American funds would flow to agencies that supported population control. On September 25, 1985, the United States withheld \$10 million from the UNFPA, claiming that money was going to China; which forced sterilization and abortions on women.<sup>88</sup>

On this issue Perez de Cuellar dearly broke with part of his Catholic heritage. Most individuals who worked with the secretary-general suggested that his religious beliefs did not influence most of his public policies, and this is most evident in this instance.<sup>89</sup> “I am a Catholic, of course,

but I am not in agreement with the position of my church as far as birth control is concerned,” he said. “I am very much against abortion, but at the same time I am very much for birth control.”<sup>90</sup> He understood the need for population control through family planning, and he vigorously defended UNFPA from criticism from whatever quarter.<sup>91</sup>

UNFPA did not actively promote abortion, however, as part of its family-planning counseling. Moreover, in places like China, where there was considerable controversy about abortion, UNFPA had never advocated abortion as a means of population control. The Reagan administration’s association of abortion with the UNFPA was never based firmly on fact, but it was a useful way of placating Reagan’s political base in the United States. The same scenario was to play out in the George W Bush administration two decades later: U.S. monies were withheld, even though the family-planning policies of this agency actually reduced the demand for abortions. While Perez de Cuellar believed firmly in population control through contraception, in this respect he was not different from many Catholics.

### *Administration and Budget*

As secretary-general Perez de Cuellar faced additional problems besides the Cold War rivalry. He spent much of his time focused on the financial problems of the United Nations, especially member states’ financial obligations.<sup>92</sup> One especially challenging issue was the payment of UN dues, in which the United States was seriously in arrears. After spasmodic congressional withholding, the United States under Reagan began a systematic reduction of its contributions to the United Nations. This was due in part to the anti-UN attitude of many in the Reagan administration. In his 1985 annual report Perez de Cuellar noted his “deep concern at the practice of certain member states selectively withholding their duly assessed contributions. This can only have a most detrimental effect on the future viability of our Organization.”<sup>93</sup> Unfortunately, Perez de Cuellar was never able to resolve this problem fully. Later secretaries-general had to face it as well.

Certainly there were legal dimensions to this controversy.<sup>94</sup> But one can also ask whether U.S. policies were really moral, in that they risked the destruction of the United Nations and its agenda of peace, human rights, and development. There were no religious aspects to the matter.

One additional administrative aspect of Perez de Cuellar’s tenure as secretary-general was the trust he put in his delegates. Although not connected to his religious views, Perez de Cuellar often delegated responsibility to those around him. Everyone we interviewed who worked closely

with him mentioned the confidence he placed in them to carry out the objectives of the organization. As suggested earlier, such respect for his colleagues as individuals can be seen as part of his personal and secular ethics.

### The Ethics of Policy Choice

The office of secretary-general involves an endless series of difficult choices, and the moral authority and record of the secretary-general take their shape from how these choices are made. Evaluating these choices is clearly a complex process: While the personal values of the secretary-general are real, if often elusive, his moral authority is subjective, amounting to different things in the eyes of different actors.

In judging whether a decision is moral or immoral, one can focus on outcomes (did a given decision have positive consequences?), or on the means used to arrive at the decision (e.g., should one pay off terrorists to secure the release of hostages?). The method one uses to analyze a specific situation will influence one's conclusion. The complexity only increases when one takes into account whether the final outcome was bad for some individuals but good for others, or whether the principles used to decide how to respond to a situation were ethical or not.

Take the fundamental tension between state sovereignty and human rights. Is it moral for the secretary-general to challenge a state assertively over human rights issues if this will lead that state to resist UN involvement while providing no further protection for individuals? Was it really moral in the long run for van Boven or Mary Robinson to speak out so strongly on human rights, if their public diplomacy caused states to retrench in defense of sovereign repression? Perez de Cuellar understood this dilemma very well.

It is not an easy task, because there is a contradiction between the United Nations' role as a monitor of human rights and its role as an organization of governments. There are many instances when we cannot monitor the implementation of the declaration [1948 Universal Declaration] as well as we would like because many countries say we are interfering in their internal affairs. The border between interference in internal affairs and monitoring human rights is a very difficult one.<sup>95</sup>

Despite his belief in the importance of human rights, Perez de Cuellar often deferred to state sovereignty.<sup>96</sup> The Chinese government's massacre of civilians in Tiananmen Square in 1989 brought forth no bold criticism, only implied and indirect criticism, from Perez de Cuellar—primarily,

because it could be seen as within the domestic jurisdiction of a sovereign state. He explained:

That [the declaration of martial law by the People's Republic of China] is a typical case of a government exerting its legitimate authority: It is an internal problem in which the United Nations has no right to interfere, because all governments have the right to apply martial law. The issue is the way in which martial law is applied. It is one thing to preserve order, and quite another to misuse the right to apply martial law. It is possible to preserve order while at the same time maintaining respect for human rights. The Chinese government has the right to apply martial law, provided it is exerted in a legal manner with full respect for the Chinese people's human rights.<sup>97</sup>

To take another example, should the secretary-general speak out publicly and criticize a violation of the UN charter, or remain silent and pursue quiet diplomacy instead? Perez de Cuellar also undertook what he referred to as "discretion diplomacy" When he went abroad he would sometimes quietly discuss the situation of a few political prisoners. For example, while meeting with President Najibullah of Afghanistan in September 1990 Perez de Cuellar requested and won the release of a French national working for a nongovernmental organization who had been taken prisoner in Afghanistan.<sup>98</sup>

Perez de Cuellar understood that this involved a difficult decision and that it was not clear which choice would yield the greatest benefit: "The Secretary-General can quite often intervene confidentially with a regime and gain the freedom, or at least an improvement in conditions, of individual political prisoners. Yet a critical public report can jeopardize his ability to perform this useful service. A balance has to be drawn as to which course can produce the greater benefit for those suffering from a deprivation of their human rights."<sup>99</sup> There is also the difficulty of placing UN personnel in harm's way in order to protect civilians in danger.<sup>100</sup> One former UN official described a conversation with Perez de Cuellar in which the secretary-general reminded him that he needed to be concerned about his safety while negotiating the release of hostages. While Perez de Cuellar ultimately left the decision up to the individual, he was concerned with the moral dilemma of whether to put individuals in the line of fire in order to help others.

Finally, every secretary-general must struggle with the decision whether to pursue a pragmatic course of action or stand up for moral or legal principles concerning nonintervention over human rights. This was especially true with regard to Central America: "As a Latin American, I hate the idea of interference, and if I don't like interference by Latin Ame-



ricans in each other's problems I dislike still more interference by powers external to the area, whether American or Soviet or even Cuban."<sup>101</sup>

We think it unwise to try to formulate sweeping generalizations about the moral authority of particular secretaries-general across a range of issues, given these types of complexities. A secretary-general who openly criticizes a Great Power may gain in "moral authority" with developing countries but at the same time lose in "moral authority" with that particular state. Thus there is no one definite perception or reality. Different actors will have different views.

### Conclusion

We have tried to show that while the personal values of the UN secretary-general do inform his public role, his ethical framework is normally quite secondary to the political factors impinging on that office. In short, the secretary-general's internal code is usually not as important as the external code, which includes not only international legal norms but also his analysis of the dominant political factors in the environment.

A clear example of this can be seen in Perez de Cuellar's evolution over the course of his tenure as UN secretary-general. The single most significant event that took place during his tenure was the internal transformation of the Soviet Union. Prior to this he felt impotent with respect to many situations throughout the world.<sup>102</sup> The critical point remains that it was the changes in the Soviet Union, and consequently the changes in the international environment, that allowed the secretary-general to be more proactive and successful on some international fronts. It was not simply that in his second term he became a more assertive and influential secretary-general, or was more driven by his religious or moral beliefs. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War gave him more room to maneuver. Likewise, no matter how deeply Perez de Cuellar may have felt about the use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war, or about the continuation of the war itself, he proved powerless to achieve beneficial change before the belligerents themselves were ready.

We have also tried to show that sometimes the internal and external codes overlap, making it impossible to say with certainty which actions derive from personal values and which from the external demands of the office and the UN charter. We have suggested that Perez de Cuellar's dynamism and willingness to take risks in places like El Salvador were the product of his personal values, his commitment to UN norms, and his astute reading of power politics. Indeed, over time his personal values may have stemmed from, and become coterminous with, charter principles. He

was, after all, the product of legal training, and he had great respect for legal principles. In this and other situations, we would do well to recall that events have multiple causes, and that internal and external codes, politics and law, morality and power politics, all can become entangled in complex ways.

While secretary-general from 1982 to 1991, Perez de Cuellar worked consistently for the maintenance and restoration of international peace and security. This goal is, of course, the primary duty of the United Nations as an organization, and it was evident in his attempts to end the conflicts in the Middle East (Afghanistan, Iran/Iraq) and Latin America (El Salvador and Nicaragua). Advancing peace is also a core tenet of both Catholicism and liberalism. Without definitive evidence as to priorities, it is impossible to completely separate internal influences and motivations from external ones.

Perez de Cuellar also demonstrated his commitment to impartiality, freedom, and promoting the well-being of the poor, disadvantaged, and vulnerable. He was especially proud of his work relating to peacekeeping and human rights: "One of the greatest successes of the United Nations is to have brought about the recognition of human rights," he told an interviewer.<sup>103</sup> Perez de Cuellar considered his efforts to help Namibians achieve independence one of his enduring accomplishments.<sup>104</sup> These values are consistent with the Catholic ethos in which he grew up, as well as with his commitment to liberalism. Humanitarian concerns, autonomy, and fair and impartial treatment of individuals are also standards enshrined in the UN charter and Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Once again we see parallel value structures, from within and without, making it impossible to clearly delineate between the two realms.

By all accounts, Perez de Cuellar manifested a personal trait that influenced his public role and stood him in good stead with his interlocutors: his strong sense of fairness. He tried to be equitable in performing the functions of his office. Impartiality was a key component in this. "If quiet diplomacy is to succeed, it needs the confidence of all parties," he wrote. "And that means that the Secretary-General must not only be impartial but must be perceived to be so. He must not let his independence of judgment be impaired or distorted by pressures from governments. He should have no part in any diplomatic deal or undertaking which ignores the principles of the Charter."<sup>105</sup> Even here, though, we see that his notions of equity, neutrality, and impartiality were linked to his respect for the norms of the charter. Perez de Cuellar might be compared to Harry Truman. Both started high office with little support and little expectation of significant accomplishment. But over time both left a record that compared well with others, certainly in historical perspective. And both

left a record of strong personal conviction, even if some of their personal hopes and aspirations were defeated by political reality

## NOTES

1. Javier Perez de Cuellar, "Interview with Perez de Cuellar," *Third World Quarterly* 6 (1984): 13-24.
2. See Leon Gordenker, *The UN Secretary-General and the Maintenance of Peace* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967); Benjamin Rivlin and Leon Gordenker, eds., *The Challenging Role of the UN Secretary-General: Making "The Most Impossible Job in the World" Possible* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1993); Arthur W Ravine, *The First Fifty Years: The Secretary-General in World Politics, 1920-1970* (Leyden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1970).
3. Courtney Smith, "More Secretary or General? Effective Leadership at the UN," *International Politics* 40 (2003): 145.
4. Interview by authors, December 2004, New York.
5. Javier Perez de Cuellar, "The Role of the UN Secretary-General," in *United Nations, Divided World: The UN's Roles in International Relations*, 2d ed., ed. Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 134.
6. Ibid.
7. We would particularly like to thank Javier Perez de Cuellar for granting an extended interview, actually a day-long discussion, in Paris during the summer of 2005.
8. Javier Perez de Cuellar, *Pilgrimage for Peace: A Secretary-General's Memoir* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1997), 20-21.
9. For some general historical works on Catholicism, see Dennis C. Duling and Norman Perrin, *The New Testament* (Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1994); Birger A. Pearson, *The Emergence of the Christian Religion* (Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 1997); and Rodney Stark, *The Rise of Christianity: A Sociologist Reconsiders History* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996).
10. Adolf Harnack, *The Mission and Expansion of Christianity*, trans. James Moffatt (New York Harper Torchbooks, 1962), 147.
11. Mark 1:16-20; 2:13-14. See further J. A. McGucicic, "The Vine the Elm Tree: The Patristic Interpretation of Jesus' Teachings on Wealth," in *The Church and Wealth*, ed. W J. Shells and Diana Wood (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1987). He ordered his apostles to take nothing for their missionary journeys except a staff; no bread, no bag, no money in their belts, but to wear sandals and not to put on two tunics. Mark 6:8-10; Matthew 10:9-11; Luke 9:3-4.
12. For a further discussion of charity in the Pauline tradition, see Shirley Jackson Case, *The Social Triumph of the Ancient Church* (New York Libraries Press, 1971), 50.
13. Stark, *Rise of Christianity*, 161.
14. This section is based on interviews conducted in New York toward the end of 2004 with several colleagues who worked closely with Perez de Cuellar.
15. Interview by authors, December 2004, New York.
16. Ibid.
17. Edward J. Gratsch, *The Holy See and the United Nations: 1945-1995* (New York Vantage Press, 1997), 186.
18. George J. Lankevich, *The United Nations Under Javier Perez de Cuellar, 1982-1991* (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2001), 290.
19. Gratsch, *Holy See*, 76-77.
20. Perez de Cuellar, *Pilgrimage for Peace*, 25. We distinguish philosophical from political liberalism. The first focuses on general views of the individual in society; based on transcendent notions such as right, good, value, and virtue. The second focuses on public policies and factional organizations in the here and now. Philosophical liberals who champion personal freedom may identify with a wide variety of policies and political factions or parties. In this sense Henry Kissinger was correct to regard Ronald Reagan as a philosophical liberal, in that Reagan believed in progress, the perfectibility of "man," and the values of democracy and human rights. Later we refer to a third form of liberalism, a liberal foreign policy à la Woodrow Wilson.
21. Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 80. Kukathas has offered a similar definition of liberalism: Liberal political theories, it is widely held, assume or argue that the good society is one not governed by particular common ends or goals but provides the framework of rights or liberties or duties within which people may pursue various ends, individually or cooperatively. It is a society governed by law and as such is regulated by right principles. These are principles of justice, which do not themselves presuppose the rightness or superiority of any particular way of life. Chandran Kukathas, "Are There Any Cultural Rights?" in *The Rights of Minority Cultures*, ed. Will Kymlicka (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 228-55.
22. *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, articles 12, 18, 19, and 20.
23. David Boaz, *Libertarianism* (New York Free Press, 1997), 96.
24. This notion of dignity is derived from Kantian "Kantian liberalism begins with the claim that we are separate, individual persons, each with our own aims, interests, and conceptions of the good life. It seeks a framework of rights that will enable us to realize our capacity as free moral agents, consistent with a similar liberty for others." Michael J. Sandel, *Democracy's Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), 11.
25. See especially Fain Guest, *Behind the Disappearances: Argentina's Dirty War Against Human Rights and the United Nations* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990).
26. Ibid. While the weaknesses of Perez de Cuellar's report on Uruguay prisons are clear, there is much about the nonrenewal of van Boven that remains unclear. In the latter case, some of the key memos remain secret. The exact views of the secretary-general at that time, and why he held them, have not been definitively established.
27. Interviews by authors, fall and winter 2004, New York and New Haven.
28. Interviews by authors, December 2004, New York.

29. Michael Mandelbaum, *The Ideas That Conquered The World: Peace, Democracy, and Free Markets in the Twenty-First Century* (New York Public Affairs Press, 2002).
30. On the founding of the United Nations, see especially Stephen C. Schlesinger, *Act of Creation: The Founding of the United Nations* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2003).
31. An interesting conflict developed when, in the summer of 1983, UNESCO voted to limit freedom of the press. Perez de Cuellar suggested that this illiberal move was "misguided" but admitted that the policies of UNESCO were independent of Secretariat control. "What I cannot accept is an arrangement which leads to censorship of the press." Perez de Cuellar, "Interview with Perez de Cuellar," 24.
32. Speech at Harvard, January 1986; Lankevich, *United Nations Under Perez de Cuellar*, 55.
33. Perez de Cuellar, "Role of the UN Secretary-General," 133.
34. Quoted in Altaf Gauhar, "Breaking the Big Stick of the Superpower". *South* (October 1983): 37-39.
35. Interview with Javier Perez de Cuellar, April 4, 2002, Paris, UN Intellectual History Project (forthcoming, read by permission).
36. Lankevich, *United Nations Under Perez de Cuellar*, 2.
37. Interview by authors, December 2004, New York.
38. Kent J. Kille and Roger Scully, "Executive Heads and the Role of Intergovernmental Organizations: Expansionist Leadership in the United Nations and the European Union," *Political Psychology* 24 (2003): 175-98.
39. Brian Urquhart, "Selecting the World's CEO: Remembering the Secretaries-General," *Foreign Affairs* 74 (1995): 21-26.
40. Perez de Cuellar, "Role of the UN Secretary-General," 126. He also said, "They [member states] must honor the Charter of the UN which offers a new, philosophical and moral approach to global problems." Perez de Cuellar, "Interview with Perez de Cuellar," 19.
41. Perez de Cuellar, "Role of the UN Secretary-General," 126.
42. *Ibid.*, 134.
43. This is a view held by other organizations that lack hard power and must rely mostly on moral authority to generate influence. It is the view, for example, of the International Committee of the Red Cross, which, in its efforts to develop and apply international humanitarian law, mostly seeks to avoid public criticism while trying to build pragmatic cooperation on the principles of independence, neutrality; and impartiality. See David P. Forsythe, *The Humanitarians: The International Committee of the Red Cross* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
44. Article 98 states, "The Secretary-General shall act in that capacity in all meetings of the General Assembly, of the Security Council, of the Economic and Social Council, and of the Trusteeship Council, and shall perform such other functions as are entrusted to him by these organs. The Secretary-General shall make an annual report to the General Assembly on the work of the Organization." Article 99 reads, "The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security."
45. Perez de Cuellar, "Role of the UN Secretary-General," 131.
46. Javier Perez de Cuellar, "To Transcend All Divisions," *Review of International Affairs* 33 (1982): 5-6.
47. "I have not got sufficient indication that governments are really interested in using the UN mechanism for solving international problems." Perez de Cuellar, "Interview with Perez de Cuellar," 15; Giandomenico Picco, *Man Without a Gun: One Diplomat's Secret Struggle to Free Hostages, Fight Terrorism, and End a War* (New York: Times Books, 1999), 28.
48. Interview by authors, December 2004, New York.
49. Perez de Cuellar, *Pilgrimage for Peace*, 362. Perez de Cuellar's own initiatives for peace were largely ignored. In this book he describes how his memoranda were sometimes met with silence from one of the parties.
50. It was also reported that Haig resented the secretary-general's efforts. If Haig was unable to mediate the situation, how could someone else do so? Perez de Cuellar was frustrated by the inability of the United Nations to fulfill its obligations and broker peace around the world. This he expressed at the Institute for East-West Security Studies on April 21, 1982, when he said that "the UN, rarely asked to arbitrate between the great powers, was dearly able and willing to assist in the settlement of regional disputes." Quoted in Lankevich, *United Nations Under Perez de Cuellar*, 8. Perez de Cuellar's faith in his ability and the organization's ability to prevent conflict might be inflated. One wonders, given the dynamics involved in the Falkland Islands War, whether any organization or individual could have prevented the conflict.
51. Javier Perez de Cuellar, *Anarchy or Order: Annual Reports, 1982-1991* (New York: United Nations Publishers, 1991), 17.
52. Perez de Cuellar, "Interview with Perez de Cuellar," 15.
53. Interview with Perez de Cuellar, April 4, 2002, Paris, UN Intellectual History Project.
54. Perez de Cuellar was very dear about the debt he owed to Gorbachev, as was made dear in our interviews in New York and Paris, December 2004 and May 2005. See also the views of Perez de Cuellar on this subject in Thomas G. Weiss, Tatiana Carayannis, Louis Emmerij, and Richard Jolly, eds., *UN Voices: The Struggle for Development and Social Justice* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005), especially 272-73.
55. Lankevich, *United Nations Under Perez de Cuellar*, 71.
56. Articles 11.1 and 26.
57. Perez de Cuellar, "To Transcend All Divisions," 6. At a press conference on December 12, 1984, Perez de Cuellar expressed his frustration: "the ideological confrontation of the superpowers and their nuclear weapons jeopardize the future of humanity" Quoted in James Peron, "UN Chief Warns Nuclear Powers," *New York Times*, December 13, 1984.
58. Perez de Cuellar, "Role of the UN Secretary-General," 139.
59. During Perez de Cuellar's first interaction with the media after being selected as secretary-general, the Peruvian noted that his selection was "an act of justice to Latin America and the entire Third World." Quoted in Lankevich, *United Nations Under Perez de Cuellar*, 2.

60. Gauhar, "Breaking the Big Stick," 39. This concern for the poor and negative consequences that can arise from the neglect of the poor coincides with the tenants of Catholicism discussed earlier.
61. Perez de Cuellar, *Pilgrimage for Peace*, 396, 399.
62. *Ibid.*, 399.
63. Perez de Cuellar considered using article 99 in conjunction with the conflicts in Central America. He ultimately decided against doing so because the Reagan administration did not support UN involvement in its backyard. Perez de Cuellar, *Pilgrimage for Peace*, 398. This again suggests the limited space in which the secretary-general must operate.
64. *Ibid.*, 402.
65. Thomas M. Magstradt, *An Empire If You Can Keep It: Power and Principle in American Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 2004), 118-19.
66. Perez de Cuellar agreed, despite his personal commitment to the principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of states. Perez de Cuellar, *Pilgrimage for Peace*, 412. On March 16, 1990, Perez de Cuellar asked the Security Council to authorize the use of UN forces to oversee Contra demobilization.
67. David P. Forsythe, "The United Nations, Democracy; and the Americas," in *Beyond Sovereignty: Collectively Defending Democracy in the Americas*, ed. Tom Farer (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 134.
68. Lankevich, *United Nations Under Perez de Cuellar*, 268.
69. Forsythe, "United Nations," 119.
70. Perez de Cuellar, *Pilgrimage for Peace*, 421-22. Perez de Cuellar also indicates that the United States pressured him to drop de Soto because he was viewed as sympathetic to Salvadoran rebels, but the secretary-general refused.
71. See David P. Forsythe, "Human Rights and International Security: United Nations Field Operations Redux," in *The Role of the Nation-State in the 21st Century*, ed. Monique Castermans et al. (The Hague: Kluwer, 1998), 265-76.
72. Robin Wright, *In the Name of God* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), 25; A. Taheri, *The Spirit of Allah: Khomeini and the Islamic Revolution* (London: Hutchinson Publishers, 1985), 272.
73. Wright, *In the Name of God*, 24. Iran's population was three times bigger than Iraq's.
74. Former Secretariat official, interview by authors, September 28, 2004.
75. Perez de Cuellar, *Pilgrimage for Peace*, 131; Picco, *Man Without a Gun*, 79.
76. On August 15, 1990, Iraq agreed to a final peace with Iran-a return to original borders and the exchange of prisoners-because Hussein wanted regional support regarding Kuwait and Gulf War. Lankevich, *United Nations Under Perez de Cuellar*, 108.
77. Picco, *Man Without a Gun*, 33.
78. Perez de Cuellar, *Pilgrimage for Peace*, 184, 210.
79. Cordovez, the special representative appointed by Perez de Cuellar, proved to be something of a headache for the secretary-general. He was critical of Perez de Cuellar's leadership, especially with regard to Afghanistan. Although Cordovez was replaced in 1990, the secretary-general did not publicly express any hard feelings. One could argue that this was due to the "turn-the-other-cheek" attitude taught to him as a boy in Catholic school. Perez de Cuellar himself suggested, "I tolerated him despite his apparent disloyalty because I thought this was in the best interest of an Afghan settlement." Perez de Cuellar, *Pilgrimage for Peace*, 187.
80. *Ibid.*, 196.
81. Lankevich, *United Nations Under Perez de Cuellar*, 88.
82. Picco, *Man Without a Gun*, 33.
83. Perez de Cuellar, *Pilgrimage for Peace*, 192.
84. *Ibid.*, 212.
85. Gratsch, *Holy See*, 252.
86. Message of Pope John Paul II to Javier Perez de Cuellar, September 22, 1990, documented in Carl J. Mauricci, ed., *Serving the Human Family: The Holy See at the Major UN Conferences* (New York: Path to Peace Foundation, 1997).
87. Lankevich, *United Nations Under Perez de Cuellar*, 160.
88. *Ibid.*, 159.
89. Former Secretariat officials, interviews by authors, December 2004.
90. Interview with Perez de Cuellar, April 4, 2002, Paris, UN Intellectual History Project.
91. Perez de Cuellar, *Pilgrimage for Peace*, 13.
92. Tapio Kanninen, *Leadership and Reform: The Secretary-General and the UN Financial Crisis of the Late 1980s* (Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1995).
93. Perez de Cuellar, *Anarchy or Order*, 91.
94. See further David P. Forsythe, *The Politics of International Law* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1990).
95. "An Interview with the Honorable Javier Perez de Cuellar, Secretary-General of the United Nations," *Fletcher Forum of World Affairs* 14 (1990): 89.
96. "If you summarize what human rights means, it is the right to live in peace. Peace is not only the absence of war, but well-being and economic and social justice. That is why I feel that, apart from the Charter of the United Nations, the Declaration of Human Rights is the greatest success of the organization." *Ibid.*, 88-89.
97. *Ibid.*, 89.



98. Perez de Cuellar, *Pilgrimage for Peace*, 206.
99. *Ibid.*, 407.
100. "We should give them the assurance that if they [the peacekeeping force] are brushed aside they will be protected, and appropriate action will be imposed. Perez de Cuellar, "Interview with Perez de Cuellar," 16. "However, the suffering of the Afghan people required a response . . . I urged UNICEF and the UN Development Program not to evacuate their personnel." Perez de Cuellar, *Pilgrimage for Peace*, 211.
101. Perez de Cuellar, "Interview with Perez de Cuellar," 21.
102. "My first five year term I did not have a sense of accomplishment. Quoted in Lankevich, *United Nations Under Perez de Cuellar*, 11.
103. "Interview with the Honorable Perez de Cuellar," 88.
104. Perez de Cuellar, *Pilgrimage for Peace*, chapter 11.
105. Perez de Cuellar, "Role of the UN Secretary-General," 133.

## Propuestas de pacificación en Centroamérica: un testimonio personal

### Harry Belevan-McBride

Como escritor tiene en su haber una docena de libros en los géneros de la novela, el cuento, el teatro y el ensayo, varios de los cuales traducidos a otros idiomas. Ha sido profesor en la Universidad Católica y en la San Ignacio de Lima; *Visiting Professor* en la George Washington University de Estados Unidos; y *Guest professor* en la Universidad de Viena. Es Doctor honoris causa de la Universidad de Le Havre, Francia. En el ejercicio de la carrera diplomática ha cumplido diversos cargos de responsabilidad en la Cancillería, en el exterior y, en dos ocasiones, en la OEA. Actualmente se desempeña como Rector de la Academia Diplomática del Perú Javier Pérez de Cuéllar.

A Joao Clemente Baena Soares, con afecto y gratitud.

### Aggiornamento

**E**ste ensayo está fechado octubre de 1988. No responde, sin embargo, esa data a ningún acontecimiento particular en lo que se llamó la crisis centroamericana. Apenas trivial, se trata del plazo límite que, con gran rigor pero escasa seriedad, me fue fijado por una fundación que me propuso escribir este trabajo precisamente por encontrarme envuelto en aquel proceso, con la intención de publicarlo de inmediato a modo de contribución al análisis de la situación en América Central que era entonces, a no dudarlo, uno de los focos de tensión en el mundo. El proyecto nunca se materializó y éste y otros esfuerzos quedaron inéditos.

Acepté, entusiasta, el desafío de condensar muchas reflexiones en pocas páginas, y el riesgo aún mayor de expresar algunos juicios políticos sobre aquello en lo que estaba profesionalmente involucrado en esos momentos. Pero al releer ahora esta monografía siento que, lamentablemente, el tiempo transcurrido la ha desprovisto de esa "vivencialidad" con que pretendí impregnarla. Queda, sin embargo, un cúmulo de anécdotas que registran ciertos pormenores e intersticios de todo ese intrincado proceso,

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por lo que estimo que siguen cumpliendo su cometido como notas acaso sólo marginales al servicio de quien, entre tanto follaje impreso sobre la llamada crisis centroamericana, escriba alguna vez el libro riguroso y desapasionado que esa crisis exige. Porque es un hecho indiscutible que aquella constituye un conflicto regional paradigmático para el estudio de las relaciones internacionales, al contener todos los ingredientes de la guerra de baja intensidad y otros elementos afines, con el histórico aditivo de haber sido, tal vez, el último enfrentamiento “por procuración” de la Guerra Fría, antes que se esfumara una de las dos superpotencias. ¡Ojala y los vertiginosos cambios operados en el mundo en este último año, por ser cualitativamente más trascendentes, no releguen a lejanas calendas ese libro tan necesario sobre lo que fue y no fue, o pudo ser o acabó siendo, “la crisis centroamericana”, un libro que constituya un análisis en profundidad de todas las situaciones puntuales que, aisladamente estudiadas, conformen un levantamiento topográfico político de América Latina en su integridad, en este inicio balbuceante del supuesto nuevo orden mundial del que tanto se habla ahora cuando, en verdad, apenas debiera hablarse de la extinción del viejo orden!...

En octubre de 1988 concluí este ensayo. Dos meses antes, sin embargo, entre la aceptación del encargo y el plazo marcial de entrega, había renunciado a mi función de Asesor Político Principal del Secretario General de la OEA para el que fui convidado personalmente por ese gran caballero y diplomático brasileño a quien dedico estas páginas. Renuncié al aceptar una generosa invitación de reincorporarme a Torre Tagle que me extendiera otro amigo, el entonces nuevo canciller peruano, para desempeñarme como Subsecretario de Política Bilateral, un cargo de alta responsabilidad que (ingenua y equivocadamente) creí poder acometer como una posibilidad generacional... Por motivos que no guardan ni interés ni relación con este ensayo, lamenté muchas veces aquella decisión de interrumpir mi trabajo en la OEA; aunque ahora que, por primera vez, miro serenamente hacia atrás, me percató que las frustraciones y desilusiones que tuve en mis nuevas funciones, no habrían sido muy distintas de haber continuado trabajando en el organismo hemisférico...

Sería igualmente una innecesaria digresión explayarme sobre esta insinuación, pues tampoco tiene relevancia en el contexto de esta obra. Baste decir que lo ocurrido en América Central en los tres años desde que concluí este trabajo, abona varias de las tesis aquí expuestas, aunque muchas de las soluciones encontradas prescindieron del aporte de la OEA. Entre las tesis que el tiempo ha convalidado está la idea central que “la crisis” nunca fue *principalmente* un problema ideológico (marxismo vs. democracia) sino fundamentalmente un drama político-social. Y es así cómo, curiosamente, se puede observar que, luego de la derrota electoral de los sandinistas, la “crisis centroamericana” acabó como por arte de

prestidigitación; contrario sensu, ella se circunscribía a la “anomalía” sandinista en Nicaragua, al menos para quienes acuñaron la definición universal de esa crisis.

Estimo que el tiempo ha corroborado estas sugerencias ya que es un hecho –insisto– que nadie habla, hoy, de la crisis centroamericana y ello sencillamente porque, según la perspectiva de quienes imaginaron el sesgo ideológico de esa crisis, acabó el “peligro desestabilizador” sandinista en toda la sub-región aún cuando, a mi entender, sigan plenamente vigentes muchas de las realidades históricas que aconsejarían seguir hablando de la tan mentada crisis, si por ella no se entendiera lo que se quiso entender entre 1979 y 1990 y si se entendiera una crisis de desarrollo y desigualdades. Nada más significativo, creo, que el comunicado de prensa emitido al término de la cumbre, el 3 de diciembre pasado, de los presidentes de los países del Grupo de Río cuando, al referirse a Centroamérica, señalan: “Expresaron su satisfacción por el significado aliento que, para la paz y la estabilidad de América Central, representa la avanzada etapa de negociaciones entre el Gobierno del Salvador y el FMLN, y la importancia que reviste la tregua en vigor, para la pronta concertación de un cese al fuego (sic) como parte de un arreglo total y satisfactorio (...) Mencionaron igualmente el significado alentador que revisten las negociaciones en curso entre el Gobierno de Guatemala y la guerrilla guatemalteca, y expresaron el deseo que culminen en una paz negociada, justa y duradera”.

En el pasado ningún escrito, comunicado o información sobre América Central habría omitido el mágico sésamo de “crisis”; ahora, los propios jefes de Estado de la mayoría de países latinoamericanos no sólo no usaron aquella palabreja sino que, además, circunscribieron su atención y aliento a Guatemala y El Salvador, claro síntoma de la mudanza definitiva de perspectiva respecto a la situación en el istmo.

Mal podría pretender aquí hacer un balance, siquiera sucinto, sobre la situación actual en América Central. Y puesto que, como última referencia autorizada sobre la sub-región, tenemos apenas los nombres de Guatemala y El Salvador, registremos brevemente la situación actual en esos dos países.

Guatemala: El sorprendente triunfo de Jorge Serrano en las elecciones de enero de 1991, llevó al poder al Movimiento de Acción Solidaria cuyo programa electoral ha sido la pacificación del país que sufre, hace más de tres décadas, de una suerte de guerra civil no declarada. Lo que el gobierno anterior de Vinicio Cerezo no logró –aunque me consta personalmente que lo intentó varias veces, con sinceridad y coraje–, Serrano lo obtuvo en los primeros meses de su gestión: entablar negociaciones con la UNRG abandonando, al parecer, la tradicional e inconducente política de confrontación

para alcanzar la reconciliación nacional. Además de esto, el gobierno de Serrano está procurando los mecanismos adecuados para constituir una mayor conciencia de respeto por los derechos humanos, sobre todo en el ejército, espina dorsal de cualquier evolución política guatemalteca; está creando un clima económico más propicio para las inversiones extranjeras y, en fin, trazando una política de combate al narcotráfico que concilie los legítimos intereses guatemaltecos con aquellos de Washington, de cuya órbita no podría pretender extraerse ningún gobernante guatemalteco. Hay que reconocer, sin embargo, que subsiste en ese país una profunda crisis política que, aún con estos pasos, no se enrumba hacia una solución final. (Algo semejante acontece en Nicaragua: desde las elecciones del 25 de febrero de 1990 en que la coalición de 14 partidos conocida como Unión Nacional Opositora ganó limpiamente las elecciones, han muerto centenares de personas –entre éstas, el coronel Enrique Bermúdez el 16 de febrero del año pasado–, reactivando así a los antiguos “contras” ahora rebautizados como “recontras”, lo que indudablemente constituye una ironía en un país gobernado por los antisandinistas y en donde se han desmovilizado más de 20 mil miembros de la antigua resistencia y se ha reducido drásticamente los efectivos del ejército, de 90 mil a menos de 30 mil según fuente oficial).

**El Salvador:** El caso centroamericano tal vez más dramático junto con Nicaragua fue, todos estos años, el del Salvador. Hoy, sin embargo, puede decirse que es también un caso arquetipo de la pacificación de un país latinoamericano a través de la negociación política-diplomática. Para el Perú, el caso de El Salvador es, además, un caso muy singular porque, de una u otra forma, nuestro país estuvo ligado a la pacificación salvadoreña en dos de los momentos más críticos de la historia de esta pequeña nación. En 1980, bajo la égida del doctor José Luis Bustamante y Rivero, se firmó la paz entre Honduras y El Salvador. Ahora, en el último minuto del año 1991, gobierno e insurgencia armada acordaron la paz definitiva en lo que constituyó un largo y delicado proceso dirigido, fundamentalmente, por dos ilustres peruanos de distintas y distantes generaciones de Torre Tagle: los embajadores **Javier Pérez de Cuéllar** y Alvaro de Soto Polar. Y aunque sólo estos motivos serían suficientes para interesarnos, como peruanos, en el proceso de pacificación de El Salvador, las razones son aún mayores toda vez que, como ya lo dije líneas arriba, bien puede afirmarse que la paz salvadoreña es emblemática de la teoría y práctica de la negociación para la solución de los conflictos. Y aunque sea la menos importante, hay finalmente una razón personal de interés en la cuestión salvadoreña que me exige detenerme unos instantes en esta crisis.

A lo largo de esta monografía, destaco una verdad incontrovertible que es, en parte, el motivo por el cual la escribí, esto es, la estrecha coordinación que se estableció durante los momentos más candentes de la llamada crisis

centroamericana, entre los dos organismos internacionales, el mundial y el hemisférico. Las tesis que expongo en el presente trabajo demuestran, a mi entender, cuán fructífera fue la colaboración del tándem ONU-OEA para la consolidación de un esfuerzo común de los grupos de Contadora y de Apoyo, que se plasmaría en la Comisión Internacional de Verificación y Seguimiento (CIVS). Poco o nada se sabe, sin embargo, que para la crisis interna salvadoreña existió igualmente la intención inicial de una colaboración entre la ONU y la OEA.

Con fecha de 28 de setiembre de 1989, es decir, más de un año desde mi alejamiento de la OEA, su Secretario General me envió la siguiente comunicación:

*“De conformidad con las conversaciones que recientemente tuviéramos en Washington, y de acuerdo con la comunicación que he cursado al Excelentísimo señor Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores del Perú, me es grato con la presente formalizarle la solicitud para que sea usted mi enviado especial y representante personal en las conversaciones que han acordado llevar a cabo el Gobierno de la República de El Salvador y el Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional, con la finalidad de terminar el conflicto armado en ese país centro-americano, impulsar la democratización y reunificar a la sociedad salvadoreña, tal como lo indican los propósitos trazados por ambas partes en el reciente Acuerdo de México.*

*Su actuación y compromiso con el suscrito, en mi condición de Secretario General de la Organización de los Estados Americanos, se ceñirán a lo acordado en las conversaciones mantenidas sobre el particular, no dependiendo usted para estos fines específicos de otra autoridad o entidad ajena al suscrito”.*

Con la correspondiente autorización del canciller de entonces, acepté tan honrosa designación que la entendí, sobre todo, como una singular deferencia del Secretario General de la OEA al servicio exterior peruano, a través de mi persona. Seguidamente, el Secretario General procedió a formalizar mi designación ante las nuevas autoridades gubernamentales salvadoreñas y la Comandancia General del FMLN. Entiendo que la cúpula insurgente la aceptó de inmediato; el gobierno del Presidente Cristiani, más tarde, también lo hizo. Sin embargo, pocas semanas después éste se retractó sin dar mayores explicaciones que, si bien no correspondían por tratarse de una decisión soberana, habría sido no obstante un gesto elemental de cortesía con el Secretario General de la OEA, empeñado en dar su apoyo al proceso de pacificación salvadoreño... Se interrumpió así, algo bruscamente, un mecanismo de coordinación entre la ONU y la OEA que, tal vez, si hubiera cuajado, habría podido asentar definitivamente

las bases sólidas de una estrecha articulación, en materias sustanciales, entre ambos organismos.

Con la firma de las Actas de Nueva York I y II, el 31 de diciembre de 1991 y el 13 de enero de 1992 respectivamente, y del Acuerdo de Paz en México el 16 de enero, el gobierno de El Salvador y el FMLN acabaron definitivamente con una guerra civil que, durante 11 años, cobró unas 75 mil víctimas. Desde aquel lejano 10 de octubre de 1979 en que dos partidos políticos y 3 movimientos insurgentes decidieron conformar el FMLN (apenas 5 días antes de la caída del general Carlos Humberto Romero y 5 meses antes del asesinato de monseñor Oscar Romero), hasta las rúbricas que sellaron la paz en el Alcázar del Castillo de Chapultepec, la historia de este país estuvo jalonada por marchas y contramarchas que, en verdad, sólo se encaminaron en forma decidida a partir del 4 de abril de 1990, fecha de la primera reunión en Ginebra en la cual, con la mediación de Alvaro de Soto en representación personal del Secretario General de la ONU, se convinieron el formato, la mecánica y el ritmo del lento proceso orientado a lograr el fin definitivo del conflicto armado salvadoreño.

El calendario de implementación del acuerdo de México debe cumplirse hasta el 30 de noviembre del presente año, fecha límite para la eliminación del último batallón de infantería del ejército nacional. Antes de esa fecha, se habrá depurado las fuerzas armadas cuyo número de efectivos se reducirá a la mitad; habrán desaparecido la Dirección General de Inteligencia, la Guardia Nacional y la Policía de Hacienda, siendo sustituidas por la Policía Nacional; y se habrá legalizado el FMLN como partido político, cuya desmovilización total y reincorporación a la vida civil quedará consolidada hasta el 31 de octubre. De lograrse plenamente, es decir, sin tropiezo alguno el cumplimiento de todo este complejo calendario, no sólo se habrá comprobado la solidez de toda esta ardua negociación sino que, a mí entender –y tal como lo demostró el resultado de las elecciones libres y limpias en Nicaragua–, quedará para siempre demostrado también que, durante una década, se tuvo una equívoca visión ideologizada de toda la situación centroamericana, lo que constituyó una grave y trágica tergiversación de la historia por haber sido un enfoque reduccionista de los inconmensurables problemas del istmo, que sólo acarreó desesperanza y más miseria, en una palabra, muerte.

Tal es el eje central, el hilo conductor de este ensayo que, cuando acabé de escribirlo en 1988, lo hice sobre todo –ya lo he dicho– para contribuir a la desideologización que hasta el propio término “crisis centroamericana” exhalaba. Mis planteamientos eran, sin embargo, meras hipótesis que sólo el tiempo y los hechos podían confirmar. Más de tres años después, con la autoridad que le da ser un centroamericano y ser el presidente de un país que vivió y sufrió demasiado eso que he denominado el enfoque

reduccionista de las cosas, el Presidente Alfredo Cristiani declaró el pasado 16 de enero, en ocasión del acto solemne de la firma del Acuerdo de Paz, lo siguiente: “ ...La crisis en que se vió envuelta la nación salvadoreña en el último decenio no surgió de la nada ni fue producto de voluntades aisladas. Esa crisis tan dolorosa y trágica tiene antiguas y profundas raíces sociales, políticas, económicas y culturales”. Siento estas palabras como una convalidación autorizada de las tesis que a continuación expongo.

Lisboa, febrero de 1992.

## I.- Términos de Referencia

Mucho –acaso demasiado– es lo que se ha dicho y escrito hasta hoy sobre la sedicente “crisis centroamericana”. No deseo entonces contribuir a la inflación sobre la materia. Por lo mismo, me propongo que el hilo conductor de este relato sea más bien el testimonio basado en una determinada experiencia personal, en un afán tal vez demasiado pretencioso por reinterpretar ciertos acontecimientos a través del prisma de esa experiencia personal; (de paso, queda así resuelta la arrogancia de conjugar en primera persona: no he descubierto aún la asepsia de testimoniar desde un mirador, puesto que dar fe de algún hecho es inmiscuirse personalmente en él...)

Parto de ciertas premisas que creo necesario sentar aunque sea arbitrariamente, la primera de las cuales es que el lector conoce el contexto de la llamada crisis centroamericana y los hitos y los nombres y las fechas que la jalonan. No menos importante es aquella otra según la cual ese mismo lector, que tal vez ya tenga una opinión formada sobre culpabilidades e inocencias en todo ese drama inacabable de la América Central, no debe buscar en estas reflexiones harina para su costal pues apenas encontrará el polvo de una molienda casera. La tercera y última premisa es más bien una confesión de parte, impuesta por una natural deformación profesional: he cuidado en este testimonio que la experiencia personal a la que aludo en el primer párrafo, no esté sojuzgada por mis opiniones que, de cualquier forma, no tendrían cabida en la interpretación de situaciones aún inconclusas, es más, momentáneamente estancadas como son las condiciones que siguen dándose en el istmo centroamericano.

Formuladas todas estas salvedades, confío en la benévola comprensión del lector por tantas cortapisas y salvedades previas que le impongo. A cambio, repito, le ofrezco determinadas reflexiones y testimonios, frutos ambos de algunos años en que he estado involucrado en el drama centroamericano como asesor político del Secretario General de la OEA y, a



menudo, como su Enviado Especial a diversas reuniones entre los propios centroamericanos.

Los linderos de la extensión acordada a este ejercicio no me permiten consignar en él un testimonio sobre las conversaciones de Sapoá entre el Gobierno y la Resistencia nicaragüenses. Lo lamento a la vez que lo agradezco: lo primero, puesto que Sapoá significó –lo sigue siendo– un singular esfuerzo a la vez original, audaz y sincero por alcanzar la reconciliación de una familia dividida y resolver el drama dentro de los cánones fijados por el acuerdo de paz de Esquipulas II. Fui testigo excepcional de todos los encuentros de Sapoá y allí vi el rostro del dolor pero también la cara de la esperanza fraterna que inspira a todos los nicaragüenses por igual, sin distinción de credo político ni raza ideológica. Agradezco, sin embargo, la limitación impuesta a la extensión de estas reflexiones, puesto que ella me permite evitar la tentación de escribir acerca de hechos y circunstancias sobre los que resulta acaso más prudente no pronunciarse aún, ya que guardo la esperanza de que el diálogo entre nicaragüenses se reanude lo antes posible, para beneficio exclusivo de ese pueblo que tanto he llegado a apreciar.

Debe entenderse, sin embargo, que las propuestas de pacificación en Centroamérica no están destinadas exclusivamente a Nicaragua. El drama centroamericano es una obra escenificada por cinco actores principales en la que participan también artistas secundarios (es un decir), en una suerte de ejercicio pirandelliano en el que los personajes aún buscan entre ellos al autor que ponga fin a eso que he llamado el drama inacabable y agotador de la América Central. Si logro tan solamente insinuar la veracidad de esta metáfora habré cumplido con mi cometido.

**Acotación final:** he preferido por una vez, la fluidez del relato testimonial a la circunspección del informe oficial o la sesudez del documento académico, de donde la indiferencia total por fichas, pies de página, índices o bibliografía. Quien busque alguno de estos cuatro elementos, que se ahorre el aburrimiento de leer las páginas siguientes.

## II.- La Crisis Centroamericana

He llamado sedicente a eso que desde hace años se tilda de “crisis centroamericana”. Sedicente o entrecorrido, el término o la tipificación de “crisis” nos viene, como en tantas otras circunstancias, de los Estados Unidos. Por ello, creo que cabe formularse una pregunta que tal vez por sencilla rara vez la oigo: ¿cuándo comenzó la crisis centroamericana?

Es indudable que en la subregión centroamericana existe una crisis que no es únicamente social, cultural y política –porque entonces no cabría singularizar al istmo del resto de la América Latina– sino que, siendo todo aquello, es *también* una crisis cuyo envolvente es la constante amenaza de conflictos bélicos entre los cinco países de la América Central o, cuando menos, entre algunos de ellos.

Esta situación de amenaza se inicia cuando en uno de esos países se instaura un régimen declaradamente de izquierda que acarrea inmediatas desconfianzas *mutuas*. Porque, si bien es cierto que para los vecinos de Nicaragua el crecimiento acelerado de su poder bélico con el advenimiento del Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional constituye un desbalance estratégico, también es cierto que el gobierno que surge en Managua en julio de 1979 se siente amenazado por esas mismas sospechas que sus vecinos abrigan respecto a él, con el consecuente crecimiento de su poderío militar. A este desbalance contribuyen, claro está, la Unión Soviética y los Estados Unidos, obviamente que por motivos contrapuestos, aunque no vale la pena incidir en esto por lo mucho que ya se ha escrito y especulado sobre los factores exógenos de la crisis.

Como puede apreciarse entonces, según ciertos criterios, antes del advenimiento del FSLN en Nicaragua no habría existido una crisis en el istmo; *sequitur*, la crisis nace con la llegada al poder de los sandinistas. Por esto, cabe hacerse una segunda pregunta, tan sencilla como la primera e igualmente importante: ¿es lícito el sesgo histórico que se hace para ubicar temporalmente el inicio de la llamada crisis centroamericana? La respuesta debe también evitar teñirse ideológicamente.

Es un hecho irrefutable que en 1979 nace en América Latina el segundo gobierno en nuestra historia contemporánea producto de una insurgencia popular; es decir, mediante métodos distintos a los dos procedimientos conocidos y practicados de advenimiento al poder: las elecciones y el pronunciamiento castrense (eufemismo éste para referirse al cuartelazo que algunos también llaman “revolución”, con gran irrespeto al lenguaje y a la historia de las ideas políticas...).

Exactamente a los 20 años de la revolución cubana, el FSLN nicaragüense conquista el poder con indudable apoyo popular. No puede históricamente negarse que la revolución sandinista es una revolución del pueblo nicaragüense, entendiendo por pueblo no ya la referencia hoy harto demagógica restringida al proletariado y al campesinado sino también a la llamada clase media, los empresarios y hasta los más opulentos de la sociedad nica. También es cierto que los sucesos posteriores balcanizan dramáticamente a la sociedad nicaragüense, pero esta fractura es *consecuencia* o resultante de concepciones contrapuestas sobre el rumbo a

seguir por la revolución, mas no fundamento o premisa de la revolución misma.

Si alguna validez tienen estos planteamientos, entonces se hace necesario enjuiciar el aludido sesgo histórico cotejándolo con la realidad centroamericana, incluyendo la realidad nicaragüense hasta 1979 cuando supuestamente nace la llamada crisis.

Sin pretender hacer un recuento histórico que no me corresponde ni para el cual estoy calificado, es menester recordar que la partida de nacimiento de América Central se escribe con la misma violencia con que nacen las dos otras partes de este hemisferio que el istmo unifica geográficamente. En un par de décadas desde su llegada desde el norte y el sur, los españoles acaban prácticamente con la población indígena centro-americana completando su conquista en Costa Rica en 1561.

Sin embargo, cuando la subregión se independiza de la corona española en 1821, pasa brevemente bajo control de México. Y el experimento político de las Provincias Unidas de América Central iniciado en 1823 no logra sus propósitos porque, en menos de 15 años, comienzan las revueltas desde Guatemala hasta Costa Rica, cuya mayor consecuencia es la fragmentación de esa unidad geográfica en cinco naciones supuestamente independientes.

A las luchas intestinas entre liberales y conservadores se suma la introducción del café como una suerte de destino agroexportador impuesto sobre aquellos países, expandiéndose luego con la explotación bananera, todo lo cual atrae el interés de comerciantes extranjeros a cuyas ganancias contribuye el vacío que acarrea la inestabilidad política fomentada por las oligarquías nacionales.

El espíritu expansionista norteamericano del “destino manifiesto” hace que, del aislacionismo forzado por la guerra civil entre el norte y el sur, se pase a la construcción de un aparato industrial que se expande rápidamente más allá de sus propias fronteras. La lógica y facilidad de la geografía inducen la atención del creciente capitalismo estadounidense sobre aquellos países más a su alcance. Y es así como en prácticamente dos décadas –fines del siglo XIX hasta 1920–, el gobierno norteamericano, como legítima respuesta a los intereses del poder industrial que contribuye al engrandecimiento del país, intervendrá militarmente unas veinte veces en América Central y el Caribe.

Toda esta inestabilidad es caldo de cultivo natural para las dictaduras al servicio de intereses específicos y en cuatro de cinco países centroame-

ricanos, con la excepción de Costa Rica, se instauran dictadores más o menos sanguinarios como Hernández Martínez en El Salvador, Anastasio Somoza en Nicaragua o Jorge Ubico en Guatemala quien, luego de un respiro democrático de diez años, será sucedido por Castillo Armas en reemplazo del destronado Jacobo Arbenz cuyo mayor pecado de gobernante había sido aplicar la reforma agraria en tierras de la United Fruit Company, uno de cuyos abogados era John Foster Dulles, el Secretario de Estado norteamericano que dictaminó la “orientación comunista” del régimen de Arbenz.

Todos estos antecedentes, que no pretenden ser ni siquiera una apretada síntesis histórica sino apenas un recuerdo escolar de algunos pocos hitos que jalonan la azarosa evolución de los países centroamericanos, hacen pensar que, en todo caso, la llamada crisis centroamericana no es la resultante de ninguna supuesta subversión marxista: es una crisis engendrada mucho antes de los años setenta, casi congénita a las realidades históricas locales que han impedido hasta ahora a los sufridos pueblos de América Central diseñar sus propios perfiles de desarrollo y progreso. Ciertamente entonces, esa crisis no es consecuencia del advenimiento de la revolución sandinista ni de las aprehensiones de sus vecinos. Y el proceso de Esquipulas será el primer esfuerzo colectivo centroamericano por concebirse soberanamente en esa doble condición tan propia a esos países: como unidades políticas independientes pero también como naciones cuya única fuerza para impulsar su desarrollo radica en la más urgente recuperación de aquella integración efectiva de la que gozaran en los albores de su independencia.

### ***III.- Primera Contribución Regional: Contadora***

En los devaneos amorosos, dice la moraleja, sólo los resultados cuentan. Si este adagio popular tiene alguna validez, la tiene sobre todo en política. Así, sin ser un fracaso puede decirse que el Proceso de Contadora no logró sus cometidos ni aún cuando sus miembros originales –Colombia, México, Panamá y Venezuela– recibieron el oxígeno necesario que significó la valiosa creación del Grupo de Lima de apoyo a Contadora, con la incorporación de la Argentina, Brasil, Uruguay y el Perú, país éste que tuvo la encomiable iniciativa de constituir esta retaguardia negociadora.

Analizado con la perspectiva histórica que permiten los años transcurridos y el actual estancamiento del proceso de pacificación centroamericano, la constitución del Grupo de Contadora reviste, sin embargo, una importancia histórica no sólo para Centroamérica y para América Latina sino para el estudio de las relaciones internacionales.

Efectivamente, Contadora representa el primer esfuerzo articulado en la historia reciente de la diplomacia por regionalizar la búsqueda e, idealmente, el encuentro de soluciones a esos conflictos “locales” denominados de mediana intensidad.

La convocatoria que el gobierno de Panamá formula a los cancilleres de Colombia, México y Venezuela para reunirse en la Isla de Contadora tiene como objetivo primordial analizar las formas de intensificar el diálogo y la negociación en el área centroamericana, a fin de reducir las tensiones y establecer las bases para un clima permanente de convivencia pacífica y respeto mutuo entre los cinco países del istmo. El resultado de las deliberaciones de esos cuatro cancilleres es la “Declaración de Contadora” emitida el 9 de enero de 1983, seguida de una primera reunión conjunta de cancilleres del Grupo de Contadora y de los Cinco efectuada en Panamá los días 20 y 21 de abril posteriores, con el fin de iniciar un diálogo constructivo, establecer una comunicación eficaz entre todos para reducir las tensiones y sentar las bases “de una paz estable y duradera en la región”.

La resolución 530 del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas encomia los esfuerzos del grupo de Contadora el mismo día, 19 de mayo, en que los cancilleres de Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala y Honduras formulan por primera vez algunas observaciones al procedimiento y la metodología del programa propuesto por el Grupo de Contadora. Sin embargo, esto no es obstáculo para que el impulso inicial siga evolucionando hasta culminar, en apenas 7 meses desde su creación, en una reunión cumbre celebrada en Cancún el 17 de julio entre los presidentes de Colombia, México, Panamá y Venezuela quienes suscriben la “Declaración de Cancún sobre la Paz en Centroamérica”.

Los primeros siete meses fueron, pues, para el Grupo de Contadora tiempos de acción que no hacían prever en verdad las dificultades que paulatinamente irían interponiéndose. Las declaraciones de Contadora y de Cancún fueron seguidas por el “Documento de Objetivos” que consagraba 21 compromisos fundamentales para la paz, la democracia, la seguridad, la estabilidad y la cooperación para el desarrollo económico y social (Panamá, 9 de setiembre de 1983); y unas “Normas para la ejecución de los compromisos asumidos en el Documento de Objetivos”, que contenían pautas de ejecución inmediata en asuntos políticos, de seguridad y económicos-sociales y se establecía un grupo técnico, tres comisiones de trabajo para las tres áreas mencionadas y propuestas de verificación y control de las medidas acordadas (8 de enero de 1984).

El 9 de junio de 1984, los cancilleres de Contadora entregan a los cinco jefes de Estado centroamericanos un proyecto de “Acta para la Paz y la cooperación en Centroamérica”, seguido de un “Acta Revisada” que el 7

de setiembre siguiente esos mismos cancilleres entregan a sus homólogos centroamericanos y en la que se recogen los comentarios y observaciones formulados por los Cinco al proyecto original del 9 de junio. Las dificultades, sin embargo, se acumulan y es así como puede decirse que lo más importante para el Grupo de Contadora que acontece en el curso de todo el año de 1985 es la creación, el 29 de julio, del llamado Grupo de Apoyo a sus esfuerzos pacificadores en la región centroamericana. Poco tiempo después, en el curso de la octava reunión conjunta de cancilleres de Contadora y de los Cinco, aquellos harán entrega del proyecto final del “Acta de Contadora para la Paz y la Cooperación en Centroamérica”.

En enero de 1986 se reúnen por primera vez los cancilleres de Contadora y Apoyo y emiten el “Mensaje de Caraballeda” con el propósito de recrear el deteriorado clima de confianza, y para asegurar la voluntad política de los Cinco de firmar el Acta de Contadora; esto acontece el 12 de enero. Dos días después, con motivo de la toma de posesión del Presidente Vinicio Cerezo en Guatemala, los cancilleres de los Cinco celebran una primera reunión con sus Ocho homólogos de la cual emana la “Declaración de Guatemala”, que constituye un respaldo y una adhesión a los propósitos formulados en el “Mensaje de Caraballeda”.

Luego del encuentro de Punta del Este, en febrero del mismo año, convocado para evaluar la situación centroamericana y en cierto modo el estancamiento de sus propias gestiones, los cancilleres de los Ocho se reúnen en abril nuevamente con los Cinco, ocasión en que todos suscriben el llamado “Compromiso de Panamá”, lugar del encuentro, que contempla la convocatoria de los cinco gobiernos centroamericanos el 6 de junio siguiente para suscribir formalmente el “Acta de Contadora para la Paz y la Cooperación en Centroamérica”.

#### ***IV.- Segunda Contribución Regional: La OEA y la Cuestión Centroamericana***

Esta decisión que asumen los Cinco en Panamá y que aceptan llamarla justamente un “compromiso”, enfrenta a todas luces un constreñimiento temporal que no puede soslayarse. Por ese motivo, le sugiero al Secretario General de la OEA que ha llegado el momento en que, de algún modo siquiera declarativo, se involucre en el proceso exhortando a los cinco presidentes centroamericanos a que acepten el desafío que ellos mismos se han impuesto y que asuman plenamente, con sus firmas, el compromiso de encaminarse hacia la solución de sus desavenencias.

El Secretario General abriga al comienzo legítimas dudas pues, en ocasión de nuestra presencia en las ceremonias de toma de posesión del

Presidente Cerezo, tanto los jefes de Estado centroamericanos cuanto los ocho cancilleres de Contadora y Apoyo ostensiblemente no han manifestado ningún interés particular por ver a la Organización de los Estados Americanos involucrada en el proceso de pacificación centroamericano.

Finalmente, con esa sagacidad política que lo caracteriza, Baena Soares decide dirigir una exhortación a los cinco presidentes centroamericanos, informando al mismo tiempo de esta gestión a los cancilleres de los Ocho.

Nos enteraríamos posteriormente que la reacción al mensaje del Secretario General de la OEA había sido de agrado en varias capitales, incluyendo las cinco centroamericanas, de sorpresa en algunas otras y de franco desagrado en una restante. Lo importante, sin embargo, era que los presidentes de Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras y Nicaragua habían reaccionado positivamente y agradecían la preocupación del Secretario General por la situación en la subregión.

La primera reacción tangible es que el Presidente Cerezo le cursa una invitación al Embajador Baena Soares para que concurra a la primera cita cumbre de presidentes centroamericanos a realizarse en la capital religiosa de Centroamérica, la ciudad guatemalteca de Esquipulas. El encuentro presidencial se lleva a cabo los días 24 y 25 de mayo y es ésta, en verdad, la primera ocasión que tenemos con el Secretario General para explicar a los centroamericanos la necesidad de rescatar a la OEA de la postración en que se ha sumido desde su incalificable inoperancia en el conflicto de las Malvinas.

Arias y Cerezo –en verdad, Costa Rica y Guatemala– siempre creyeron en el foro regional, considerando su pasividad actual como una situación transitoria que era y es necesario superar. Duarte y Azcona nos parecieron no tanto opuestos a la OEA cuanto demasiado envueltos en la situación interna de sus respectivos países –por motivos muy distintos cada cual– como para coadyuvar en un esfuerzo mancomunado de los centroamericanos destinado a rescatar al organismo hemisférico. Ortega abrigaba las sospechas naturales frente a un organismo tradicionalmente manejado por la potencia dominante de la región, aún cuando había sido en el marco de la OEA en el que, años antes, se legitimizara internacionalmente el triunfo de la revolución sandinista. Esos breves días en Esquipulas los usamos, el Secretario General y su asesor político, para catequizar principalmente a los nicaragüenses, primero a su canciller Miguel d’Escoto y luego, con mayor ahínco, al Vice-Ministro Víctor Hugo Tinoco. No fue tarea difícil convencerlos de que, privilegiando el foro mundial en detrimento de la instancia regional no servía, en verdad, ningún propósito y más bien podría resultarles contraproducente al estar desaprovechando un organismo como la OEA en donde ocho de sus principales miembros –los países de

Contadora y Apoyo– bien podían defender la causa de la paz a través de iniciativas principistas que no serían opuestas por ningún país miembro, incluyendo sus enemigos circunstanciales. Digo que la tarea no fue difícil porque d’Escoto y Tinoco son profesionales talentosos que, catapultados a la diplomacia al triunfo de la revolución, descubrieron muy pronto que la negociación es un arma más efectiva que la intransigencia.

La presencia de Baena Soares en Esquipulas –es decir, la participación de uno de los órganos de la OEA, la Secretaría General, contemplados en el Artículo 51 de la Carta de Bogotá– fue el resquicio que anhelábamos para involucrar al organismo en el proceso pacificador de América Central.

Paso inmediato concomitante, pensé, debía ser ahora aprovechar la coyuntura verdaderamente histórica de que al frente del organismo mundial en donde se ventilaba la cuestión centroamericana, se encontrara otro diplomático latinoamericano, más aún, un peruano; (pasarán en verdad muchas décadas para que una situación semejante vuelva a repetirse; dos destacados representantes de la diplomacia latinoamericana como **Javier Pérez de Cuéllar** y Joao Baena Soares, pertenecientes a dos de las cancillerías más profesionales de las Américas como Torre Tagle e Itamaratí, cuyos servicios exteriores ambos jefaturaron antes de asumir las responsabilidades internacionales que ahora ejercen, no podían ser desaprovechados, como no puede desaprovechárseles tampoco en los próximos años para cualquier otra situación apremiante en el hemisferio).

Al nivel de mis responsabilidades como Asesor Político del Secretario General de la OEA la coincidencia era aún mayor. Como Asistente Especial del **Embajador Pérez de Cuéllar** se encontraba entonces, como lo sigue estando, un colega del servicio diplomático y un compañero de generación en Torre Tagle, Alvaro de Soto, sin lugar a dudas el diplomático peruano con mayor experiencia multilateral en el servicio exterior de la república.

En nuestros periódicos contactos personales y casi diarias conversaciones telefónicas entre Washington y Nueva York, Alvaro de Soto y yo fuimos descubriendo que los dos países claves –intencional o involuntariamente– en el drama centroamericano, los Estados Unidos y Nicaragua, estaban usando el foro regional y el foro mundial para ventilar sus discrepancias en forma tal que, con el transcurrir del tiempo, podrían llevar a la OEA y a la ONU a situaciones irreconciliables sobre aquello por lo que ambos organismos justamente debían trabajar: la paz en América Central. A espaldas de nuestros dos secretarios generales, urdimos diversas fórmulas que pudieran encausar a ambos en un proyecto común que, sin recurrir a un mandato de los países miembros, pudiera permitirles a **Pérez de Cuéllar** y a Baena Soares involucrarse directa y conjuntamente en la búsqueda de la superación de las dificultades que, por esos meses, hasta



los grupos de Contadora y de Lima enfrentaban al no haber firmado los presidentes centroamericanos, el 6 de junio, el Acta de Contadora contraviniendo el compromiso original de hacerlo.

La dificultad mayor la enfrentaba yo, puesto que Alvaro de Soto no tenía ningún tropiezo con que su jefe actuara, ya que al Secretario General de las Naciones Unidas lo respaldaba un doble mandato del Consejo de Seguridad y de la Asamblea General que le permitía en cierto modo involucrarse en la situación centroamericana. En cambio, Baena Soares no contaba con ningún pronunciamiento de los cuerpos políticos de la OEA que le permitiera siquiera asomarse al problema, y ni su exhortación de abril a los presidentes centroamericanos ni su presencia en mayo en la cita cumbre de Esquipulas eran asideros políticos o jurídicos suficientes como para lograr el objetivo.

Decidimos entonces proponer a nuestros dos secretarios generales la emisión de un documento que tendría la aséptica categoría diplomática de un “aide mémoire”, en el cual **Pérez de Cuéllar** y Baena Soares *recordarían* a los cinco gobiernos centroamericanos –países miembros todos ellos de ambos organismos– algunos de los servicios que, de consuno o separadamente, la ONU y la OEA podrían brindar como contribución a la búsqueda de soluciones tangibles al llamado conflicto centroamericano.

Consultamos la propuesta con ambos secretarios generales recibiendo de inmediato su aceptación de principio, además de ciertas precisiones y alcances que indudablemente perfeccionaban la ayuda memoria enmarcándolo en su justo contexto. Para la decisión final, sin embargo, se hacía necesario el encuentro personal entre ambos a fin de que, luego de una última revisión conjunta, fijaran de común acuerdo la oportunidad de emitir el documento.

Aún cuando en la sede de las Naciones Unidas, y con mayor razón durante los meses más agitados de la Asamblea General entre setiembre y diciembre de cada año, resulta innecesario buscar el anonimato porque éste se obtiene sin ningún esfuerzo, fuimos celosos en cuidar que el encuentro entre **Pérez de Cuéllar** y Baena Soares se diera dentro de la mayor discreción. Así, la reunión entre los cuatro se fijó un día de octubre en la residencia del Secretario General de la ONU en Sutton Place, oportunidad en que se acordó la redacción final de la ayuda memoria pero se comprobó, al mismo tiempo, que el Secretario General de la OEA debía esperar una oportunidad propicia que le permitiera dar este pase sin correrse el probable riesgo de ser cuestionado por algún país miembro. Se vislumbraba entonces que la Asamblea General de la OEA, en su XVI Período Ordinario de Sesiones que se celebraría en noviembre en

Guatemala, aprobaría una resolución de apoyo a las gestiones del Grupo de Contadora, lo que en efecto aconteció el 14 de ese mes cuando, con el respaldo de todos los Estados miembros, el máximo órgano deliberante del foro regional reconoció los “encomiables esfuerzos” de Contadora e instó a todos los Estados para que continuasen apoyando ese proceso de mediación política.

Aprobada la resolución, esa misma noche salí de Guatemala con destino directo a Nueva York llevando instrucciones precisas del Secretario General para que ambos convocaran en los días siguientes, primero a los embajadores representantes permanentes de los Cinco en Naciones Unidas y, seguidamente, a los de los Ocho, a una reunión en el despacho del Secretario General en el piso 38 de la sede de la ONU.

La Asamblea General de la OEA concluyó sus deliberaciones el día 16 de noviembre y, ese fin de semana, Baena Soares viajó directamente a Nueva York. El día 18, “en una iniciativa conjunta sin precedentes” como lo registraron las agencias noticiosas, los secretarios generales de las Naciones Unidas y de la Organización de los Estados Americanos presentaron a los embajadores centroamericanos y a los de Contadora y Apoyo acreditados en Nueva York, el ayuda memoria mediante el cual ambas organizaciones recordaban los servicios y recursos que estaban a su alcance para coadyuvar en los esfuerzos de paz en América Central.

Concluidos los dos encuentros a puertas cerradas durante los cuales sólo uno de los trece embajadores cuestionó la potestad de Baena Soares de embarcarse en semejante iniciativa, en evidente contraste con la aceptación y agradecimiento a los dos secretarios generales por parte de los doce otros representantes, Pérez de Cuéllar convocó a los embajadores de los Estados Unidos y de Cuba –lo que había sido acordado en el encuentro de octubre entre los dos secretarios generales–, para revestir la gestión mancomunada ONU-OEA de la mayor transparencia, al reconocer que Washington y La Habana tenían intereses y propósitos particulares en la subregión centroamericana.

Regresamos de inmediato con Baena Soares a Washington y esa misma tarde se convocó al Representante Permanente estadounidense en la OEA para informarle también de la iniciativa que, horas antes, se había tomado en Nueva York. La reacción del Embajador Richard McCormack fue una de desagrado y sorpresa no tanto –lo sabríamos más tarde– por el contenido mismo de la ayuda memoria cuanto por no haber siquiera sospechado de que ambos secretarios generales habían estado gestando semejante paso que ponía fin al distanciamiento entre las Naciones Unidas y la OEA en la cuestión centroamericana.

Juzgada con la perspectiva y la decantación que permite el tiempo transcurrido, la iniciativa conjunta de los secretarios generales tuvo el mérito de lograr tres propósitos concretos. El primero y más inmediato fue el de acabar con un cierto distanciamiento entre ambos organismos para el tratamiento de la cuestión centroamericana. Un segundo logro fue el de involucrar definitivamente a esos dos organismos internacionales en una búsqueda complementaria de la paz en Centroamérica. Pero tal vez el mayor de los aciertos –reconocido en pasillos por más de un canciller centroamericano y de los grupos de Contadora y Apoyo– fue el de oxigenar a estos grupos en su gestión mediadora, ya que Contadora y Apoyo se encontraban, a fines del año ‘86, desprovistos de las herramientas necesarias para retomar todo el proceso negociador e insuflarle nueva vida a una situación que estaba estancada luego del fracasado encuentro del 6 de junio anterior cuando los Cinco debieron haber firmado el Acta de Contadora; (el canciller uruguayo Enrique Iglesias, con su característica franqueza, llegó a decirme que los secretarios generales le habían lanzado un salvavidas a Contadora y Apoyo en el preciso momento en que todos estaban ahogándose en la marejada del vacío político-diplomático...). De algún modo, la gestión ONU-OEA sirvió para que el gobierno cubano iniciara la reconsideración de sus legítimas aprehensiones frente al organismo regional. A partir de entonces, mantuve discretos y periódicos contactos con representantes cubanos tanto en Washington cuanto en Nueva York; (debían ser discretos pues no queríamos con Baena Soares que algún país miembro de la OEA usara el pretexto de la forma para atacar el fondo ya que, desde esa perspectiva, mal podía un funcionario de la Secretaría General y menos aún el Asesor Político y Jefe de Gabinete, mantener relaciones con representantes de un gobierno “alejado” del organismo, sin que mediara una instrucción precisa de algunos de los cuerpos políticos de la OEA. El gobierno cubano ha dado claras señas de que considera que la gestión de Baena Soares al frente del organismo hemisférico está marcada por un gran profesionalismo. Hay aún mucho trecho por recorrer antes de que Cuba –que sigue siendo país miembro de la OEA– se reincorpore, pero ello no tiene cabida en este testimonio).

De estos tres propósitos se derivó una positiva consecuencia que perdura en cierto modo hasta el día de hoy, y que atañe a lo que he denominado los dos enemigos circunstanciales en el drama centro-americano, los Estados Unidos y Nicaragua.

Obteniendo el máximo provecho del estancamiento y la apatía que habían caracterizado a la OEA desde su dramática inoperancia en el conflicto de las Malvinas –inoperancia dramática la llamo por cuanto allí se extendió, a mi juicio, la partida de defunción del TIAR, en una interrupción abortiva que ha truncado las reformas de San José al Tratado de Río aprobadas en 1975, pero ello es también ajeno a estas reflexiones

testimoniales–, sacándole el mayor provecho a esta situación, digo, los Estados Unidos preferían que la cuestión centroamericana “se tratara sin tratarse” en el foro regional que –pensaba– le sería más fácil controlar y manejar como casi siempre lo había hecho. Y precisamente por esos motivos es que Nicaragua abrigaba tremendos celos vis-à-vis la OEA, privilegiando así la acción en Naciones Unidas. Política y diplomáticamente, la racional de Washington y Managua era correcta, pero ambos venían omitiendo en semejante raciocinio los vientos de cambio que soplaban dentro de la propia OEA con el nuevo Secretario General. Elemento adicional que avalaba las tesis de Washington y Managua respecto a la OEA, irónicamente coincidentes en su objetivo, es que en la OEA sólo tenían que preocuparse por posibles iniciativas en los dos únicos foros políticos deliberantes, la Asamblea General y el Consejo Permanente, ya que en el organismo regional no corrían el “riesgo” de que otro órgano del sistema como la Secretaría General pudiera tomar alguna iniciativa. Esto es así ya que, a diferencia de las facultades que el Artículo 99 de la Carta de San Francisco concede al Secretario General de la ONU para “llamar la atención... hacia cualquier asunto que en su opinión pueda poner en peligro el mantenimiento de la paz y la seguridad internacionales”, en la Carta de Bogotá no se consigna nada semejante y sólo cuando entre en vigencia el protocolo modificatorio de Cartagena esa facultad le será finalmente reconocida al Secretario General de la OEA.

La iniciativa ONU-OEA del 18 de noviembre tuvo la virtud de neutralizar este antagonismo que se les imponía desde afuera a ambas organizaciones, demostrando así elocuentemente la posibilidad de complementación en sus esfuerzos de paz. No detuvo, por cierto, los encuentros armados en el istmo –no podría haberlo hecho pues se trataba de un recordatorio de servicios– que radicalizaron en pocas semanas la situación conflictiva, siendo lo más grave un incidente fronterizo protagonizado por los ejércitos regulares de Honduras y Nicaragua los días 5 y 6 de diciembre, agudizado por un notable incremento de la actividad de las fuerzas irregulares precisamente en esa frontera.

Ante el incremento de las tensiones, los cancilleres de Contadora y Apoyo deciden renovar su esfuerzo de pacificación, ayudados ahora por el “salvavidas” lanzado por los secretarios generales de la ONU y de la OEA. En su reunión de Río de Janeiro los días 17 y 18 de diciembre (fecha de nacimiento, dicho al paso, del mecanismo de concertación política conocido como el Grupo de los Ocho), los ministros de Relaciones Exteriores de ambos grupos deciden realizar una gestión urgente en Centroamérica consistente en una visita personal a las cinco capitales, y sumando a la gira a los secretarios generales de las Naciones Unidas y de la Organización de los Estados Americanos.

Nuevamente, Baena Soares se encuentra ante el dilema de participar o no en esa gira, toda vez que no tiene hasta entonces ningún mandato ni menos aún algún margen de iniciativa que podría emanar de la Carta de la Organización. El problema se agrava puesto que se encuentra de vacaciones fuera de la sede luego de la Asamblea General y de la gestión en Nueva York. La proximidad de las Fiestas Navideñas y de Año Nuevo no hacen sino contribuir a las dificultades. Telefónicamente me instruye que ausculte la posibilidad de que el Consejo Permanente se reúna para autorizarlo a participar en la gira. Me es más fácil percibir, desde la sede, los riesgos de semejante gestión. Por ello le informo que, dadas las fechas, la mayoría de representantes se encuentra fuera de Washington y que sus alternos sólo podrían actuar con instrucciones precisas, todo lo cual constituiría una dilatoria que sería aprovechada diplomáticamente al máximo por quienes se opondrían a su gira. Acordamos entonces invertir la figura. Consulto así telefónicamente a los cancilleres de Costa Rica, Guatemala y Nicaragua y a los viceministros de Relaciones Exteriores de El Salvador y Honduras, si sus gobiernos objetarían el viaje del Embajador Baena Soares por la región, en compañía de los cancilleres de Contadora y Apoyo y del Secretario General de la ONU, que ya había aceptado. El planteamiento insinúa la respuesta: prohibir al Secretario General de la OEA a que se sume a esa gira exploratoria por América Central sería un gesto de hostigamiento gratuito e inconducente, por lo que la respuesta es positiva y hasta entusiasta. Así las cosas, Baena decide aceptar la invitación que le formulan los Ocho para que los acompañe en su gira centroamericana, con la anuencia expresa de los cancilleres de los Cinco. Se ha dado un importante paso adicional hacia el involucramiento de la OEA en la cuestión centroamericana. No transcurre, claro está, desapercibido y de inmediato se hace sentir, con todo su peso, la reacción negativa del gobierno estadounidense: Washington cuestiona la presencia del Secretario General de la OEA en esa próxima gira y convoca al Consejo Permanente para que el Secretario General le dé explicaciones sobre su procedimiento, particularmente sobre las bases y el mandato en el que se sustenta su iniciativa, considerada por el Embajador McCormack como “inconsulta” y extralimitada.

Tarde en reaccionar, sin embargo, el día 22 de diciembre, la representación norteamericana ante la OEA se tropieza con esa informalidad latino-caribeña –exasperante en algunas situaciones pero ventajosa en otras como ésta– que no le permite obtener el quorum suficiente como para convocar al Consejo: ¡Ni los alternos se encuentran en Washington y sólo comenzarán las delegaciones a regresar a la sede pasadas las fiestas de Año Nuevo!

La ostentosa publicidad que el Departamento de Estado le imprime a esta gestión da la medida exacta de la sanción que quiere aplicar. Tres

de los principales diarios estadounidenses recogen la noticia de esta acción que, según coinciden en destacar, es una instrucción directa del Sr. Elliott Abrams, Subsecretario Adjunto de Estado para Asuntos Latinoamericanos, con el fin de aplicar una censura al Secretario General de la OEA que trasluzca ejemplarmente la oposición de los Estados Unidos a verle involucrado en la cuestión centroamericana, y sin importarle que esa nueva estrategia contradiga la posición anterior de su gobierno según la cual un conflicto regional como el de Centroamérica debe ventilarse en el foro regional...

El Consejo Permanente se reúne en sesión extraordinaria en los primeros días de enero de 1987 para pronunciarse sobre un pliego de preguntas de la Representación Permanente de los Estados Unidos de América al Secretario General de la OEA, destinadas todas ellas a destacar la intromisión de éste en asuntos políticos del hemisferio que atañen sólo a los Estados partes. Con la única excepción del Embajador Rafael García Velasco del Ecuador (que, 48 horas más tarde, será designado canciller de su país sin que ello tenga aparentemente una relación directa con su actuación en la OEA), las tres cuartas partes de los miembros del Consejo respaldan al Secretario General en forma tan elocuente que, curiosamente, hasta induce el agradecimiento del Embajador McCormack por las informaciones proporcionadas por Baena Soares en respuesta a sus consultas.

Inesperadamente, el Secretario General salía fortalecido de la reunión pues, si bien barajamos con él hasta horas antes de la sesión la posibilidad de que los países miembros evitasen pronunciarse sobre el fondo del cuestionamiento norteamericano, respaldando sólo inductivamente con su silencio al Secretario General, nunca pensamos que ésa sería la sesión de la cual emanaría una suerte de mandato, pues en ella los países miembros solicitaron al Secretario General que mantuviera informado al Consejo de todas sus gestiones en América Central. (Jamás se supo hasta ahora que lo cuento que esa mañana de enero, el Secretario General me aceptó la sugerencia que le había planteado días antes en el sentido que, de producirse una censura en el Consejo, él renunciara no tanto como gesto de desagrado cuanto para remover a la organización desde sus cimientos por su indecisión e indiferencia ante la situación conflictiva más grave que enfrenta el hemisferio. Por mi lado, aprovechando esa libertad de acción, digna del mayor encomio, que existe en Washington y que permite a los diplomáticos extranjeros moverse en todos los niveles decisorios del diversificado mecanismo de toma de decisiones norteamericano, yo había iniciado tiempo antes contactos periódicos con los asesores para asuntos latinoamericanos de los congresistas republicanos y demócratas, así como con los encargados de las cuestiones hemisféricas en el Consejo Nacional de Seguridad. Apenas el Secretario General me comunicó su decisión de renunciar al cargo si se le censuraba como consecuencia del

cuestionamiento del representante estadounidense, informé de ello personal o telefónicamente a mis contactos en el Congreso y en el C.N.S. Acaso hayan servido, ciertamente no mis gestiones sino las de ellos, para que el Embajador McCormack llegara a la sesión del Consejo con una serenidad contrastante con la belicosidad que había demostrado el día anterior en una conferencia de prensa convocada especialmente para informar a los medios de difusión sobre las objeciones de su gobierno a las “intromisiones” del Secretario General de la OEA en cuestiones políticas...).

### **V.- El Escenario Ampliado: Contadora, Apoyo, ONU, OEA**

Los días 19 y 20 de enero viajaron los secretarios generales de la ONU y la OEA y los cancilleres de los Ocho acompañados cada uno de varios asesores, con la sola excepción de Baena Soares y su único asesor político. Por viajar en un avión particular del Secretario General de la ONU distinto al de los cancilleres y de sus consejeros, los secretarios generales y sus asesores sólo pudimos comprobar el día 21 en México, en una larga sesión de evaluación general de la gira, que todos coincidíamos en una misma conclusión: que el respaldo a la gestión de Contadora-Apoyo, si bien había sido reiterado por los cinco presidentes centroamericanos y sus cancilleres, carecía de la necesaria voluntad política que acompasara la implementación de negociaciones concretas entre los propios centroamericanos.

La divulgación, en conferencia de prensa realizada en la cancillería mexicana, de este sentimiento unánime fue en verdad un incentivo para los propios gobernantes de América Central, pues he aquí que se les criticaba frontalmente por carecer de una voluntad firme para resolver sus problemas. No habrá sido esa la única razón pero sí, ciertamente, un estímulo vivificador para que, menos de un mes después, los presidentes de Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala y Honduras se reunieran en San José para emitir esa declaración mundialmente conocida como “una hora para la paz”, como respaldo a una nueva propuesta pacificadora ideada por el presidente Oscar Arias de Costa Rica.

El llamado “Plan Arias” del 15 de febrero de 1987 no se presentó inicialmente como una sustitución, elegante pero definitiva, al “Acta de paz” de Contadora sino como un complemento a los esfuerzos de los Ocho. Acordaron además los cuatro mandatarios reunirse dentro de los dos meses siguientes, nuevamente en Esquipulas y junto con su homólogo nicaragüense; (como se sabe, la reunión se postergaría hasta agosto cuando, en Ciudad de Guatemala, se firmaría el plan de paz conocido como Esquipulas II).

Las expectativas y el moderado optimismo que inspiraron el Plan Arias y la futura cumbre presidencial centroamericana no evitaron sin embargo un cierto estancamiento de todo el proceso, con las consiguientes angustias y riesgos que acarrea todo vacío político-diplomático en la relación entre Estados.

En mayo, el Secretario General emprende una visita oficial a Europa. En Lisboa, primera de las dos etapas, coincidimos en el mismo hotel con el Presidente Arias. El mandatario costarricense se encuentra desde el 9 de mayo en una gira por siete países europeo-occidentales. Nos entrevistamos con él a puertas cerradas. Y allí escuchamos, con la franca sencillez que lo caracteriza, lo que sospechábamos desde siempre: su plan de paz para el istmo, si bien puede ser un complemento al plan de paz de Contadora, se encamina hacia una sustitución pragmática de éste. Más aún, a Arias le resiente, como centroamericano, un cierto paternalismo que trazuman los Ocho, sentimiento –nos da a entender– que comparten los restantes mandatarios centroamericanos sin excluir al propio presidente nicaragüense. Admite que Contadora y Apoyo han agujado a los centroamericanos, primero para que tomen conciencia de la magnitud del problema en el que se debaten y, luego, para que busquen una fórmula viable y propia de pacificación.

Los meses que median entre esta conversación y el encuentro presidencial de Esquipulas II son nuevamente meses angustiosos para quienes ya estamos involucrados de lleno en el proceso centroamericano. Recuérdese que el plazo de dos meses posteriores al encuentro presidencial (*sans Ortega*), en febrero pasado, no ha sido cumplido, habiéndose fijado posteriormente los días 25 y 26 de junio para dicha cumbre. Pero el 12 de junio, el Presidente Duarte solicita a sus homólogos la postergación de Esquipulas II toda vez que, a su juicio, para evitar “riesgos contraproducentes” en un encuentro presidencial, es necesario que esté precedido de varias reuniones entre sus respectivos cancilleres. Nicaragua reacciona negativamente, señalando que no acepta el cambio de fecha.

El 16 de junio en Tegucigalpa, Cerezo y Azcona –luego de consultar telefónicamente con Arias y Duarte– acuerdan proponer los días 6 y 7 de agosto como nueva fecha para la realización de la cita presidencial, precedida de tres reuniones de cancilleres. Ortega reitera su oposición al cambio de fecha. La segunda quincena de junio y la primera de julio asientan el impasse. Sin embargo, ante la decisión que parece firme de los mandatarios de Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala y Honduras comprometiéndose definitivamente a celebrar la segunda cumbre presidencial en las fechas propuestas de agosto, el presidente nica accede proponiendo, como compromiso, que la cumbre sea precedida de tan sólo un encuentro de cancilleres.



Conocido el acuerdo definitivo sobre fechas, lugares y encuentros alcanzado entre los Cinco, llamo al canciller guatemalteco Mario Quiñones Amézquita, con quien he establecido una estrecha relación y que es el organizador del encuentro presidencial que ya no se efectuará en la ciudad de Esquipulas sino en la propia capital, para sugerirle que, aún cuando no media ninguna instrucción del Secretario General (lo que es estrictamente cierto, pues confieso que esto lo hago a sus espaldas), sería acaso conveniente que se invitara al encuentro de Esquipulas II a los secretarios generales de la ONU y la OEA, teniendo en cuenta el antecedente del año anterior cuando, por iniciativa del Presidente Cerezo, el Embajador Baena Soares había concurrido a la primera cita cumbre de presidentes centroamericanos. Pocos días después, los representantes permanentes de Guatemala en Nueva York y en Washington estaban cursando invitaciones a los jefes de Naciones Unidas y de la OEA en nombre de los cinco gobiernos centroamericanos, para que participaran tanto en la reunión de cancilleres en Tegucigalpa los días 31 de julio y 1 de agosto cuanto en la cumbre presidencial de Guatemala los días 6 y 7 siguientes.

Al encuentro ministerial de Tegucigalpa entre los Cinco y Contadora, concurrí como Enviado Especial del Secretario General de la OEA; el de Naciones Unidas se hizo presente a través del representante residente del PNUD en Honduras. Al término de la reunión ministerial y sin regresar a Washington le di el encuentro a Baena Soares en Guatemala, donde presencié el acto histórico de la firma del “Procedimiento para establecer la paz firme y duradera en Centroamérica” el día 7 de agosto de 1987.

## VI.- Entre Esquipulas II y San José

La importancia que reviste el compromiso de Esquipulas II, también conocido como el Procedimiento de Guatemala, puede medirse por el significado y la validez que tiene en la historia más reciente de las relaciones internacionales. En un período marcado por acuerdos o gestiones de trascendencia histórica como son los de limitación de cierto tipo de armas nucleares entre los Estados Unidos y la Unión Soviética; el que allana el camino a la resolución del conflicto en Afganistán; y las prometedoras negociaciones de Angola/Namibia; el Sahara Occidental; Irán-Irak y Campuchea; Esquipulas II mantiene incólume su gravitación y pertinencia. No merece, por lo mismo, detenerse en él pues mucho es lo que ya se ha comentado, analizado y estudiado acerca de sus alcances. Más bien, permítaseme regresar al testimonio personal como forma de seguir contribuyendo, fuere acaso con meras anécdotas o apostillas, al esclarecimiento de ciertas interioridades, que es lo que he pretendido hacer a lo largo de estas páginas.

El procedimiento de Guatemala contempló la creación de una Comisión Internacional de Verificación y Seguimiento (más conocida por su acrónimo de CIVS), integrada por los cinco cancilleres centroamericanos, los ocho de los grupos de Contadora y de Lima y los Secretarios Generales de las Naciones Unidas y de la OEA.

Exactamente a los 15 días de firmado el compromiso de Esquipulas II, se reúnen en Caracas entre el 22 y el 24 de agosto los titulares de la CIVS para constituir formalmente la Comisión y crear, al mismo tiempo, una Comisión de Representantes Ad-Hoc que estaría compuesta por los vice-cancilleres o asesores políticos de los titulares de la CIVS.

El único que abrigó desde un comienzo ciertas dudas respecto a la viabilidad de crear una comisión ad-hoc fue el Secretario General de la OEA, a quien el tiempo le dio la razón. El temor de Baena Soares era que las responsabilidades mayores de la CIVS recayeran, *de facto*, en los representantes especiales de los cancilleres y los secretarios generales y que éstos se limitaran, en reuniones ocasionales, a sancionar, con enmiendas y precisiones menores, la labor de sus comisionados; y eso fue lo que en verdad sucedió. Cabría por ello preguntarse, sin caer en la frivolidad de pronosticar el pasado, si un impulso permanente y sin solución de continuidad por parte de los propios titulares, en un enorme esfuerzo y sacrificio de 150 días (los que mediaban entre la firma de Esquipulas II y el encuentro de Esquipulas III, de conformidad con el calendario de ejecución de compromisos consignado en el punto 11 del Procedimiento), no habría podido crear un clima de confianza más propicio entre los actores con poder decisorio, poder del cual estaban investidos los titulares mas no los asesores de la CIVS.

Para nadie pasó desapercibido el pecado original del cual adolecía la CIVS tal como fue concebida por los presidentes centroamericanos: que en ella se encontraran, en pie de igualdad y con las mismas funciones de “verificación y seguimiento” los representantes de los cinco gobiernos del istmo, era una anomalía que había que corregir lo antes posible. Los diez extra-regionales titulares de la CIVS, es decir, los secretarios generales de la ONU y de la OEA y los cancilleres de los Ocho debieron ponerse de acuerdo para ir trabajando, paciente pero tenazmente, hacia ese objetivo, en diálogo permanente con sus homólogos centroamericanos. En lugar de ello, se hizo caso omiso de ese pecado original que sólo salió a relucir en todo su dramático y contradictorio esplendor en los últimos días previos al tercer encuentro presidencial centroamericano, cuando ya era tarde para convencer a los protagonistas de la necesidad imperiosa de alterar la composición de la CIVS, desalojando de las funciones de verificar a los propios verificados...

He dicho líneas arriba que este defecto de nacimiento de la CIVS sólo afloró dramáticamente en el último encuentro de la Comisión en Panamá. Sin embargo, los indicios de las tremendas dificultades comenzaron a relucir desde el primer encuentro de la Comisión de Representantes Ad-Hoc en Managua, el 17 de setiembre y estuvieron presentes en todos los demás encuentros posteriores. Tal vez esta situación fue la que inspiró a los representantes ad-hoc, en nuestra segunda reunión en Guatemala el 9 de octubre, a proponer a los titulares la conformación de una comisión técnica ONU-OEA con el objeto de estudiar *in situ*, en cada país centroamericano, los criterios e instrumentos necesarios para realizar las labores esenciales de verificación y control por parte de la CIVS. La sugerencia fue aceptada y los secretarios generales de ambas organizaciones designaron como sus enviados especiales a esos dos diplomáticos peruanos que venían desempeñándose como sus principales asesores en el conflicto centroamericano.

Alvaro de Soto encabezó la delegación de la ONU integrada por dos asesores militares, un ghanés y un canadiense; un asesor británico para asuntos jurídicos; y dos expertos en asuntos políticos latinoamericanos, un español y otro peruano. Por parte de la OEA me cupo encabezar una delegación compuesta por un asesor militar dominicano, un asesor jurídico chileno y dos asesores para asuntos logísticos de nacionalidad ecuatoriana y argentina. Por tratarse de una misión técnica conjunta, con Alvaro de Soto decidimos alternar la presidencia de la delegación en cada país, para presentar un solo interlocutor que diera coherencia a nuestras gestiones.

Esta misión tenía por objeto coadyuvar al desempeño de las funciones de la CIVS para que ésta pudiera precisar, llegado el momento, sus propios requerimientos en materia de cese el fuego, cese del apoyo externo a las fuerzas irregulares o a los movimientos insurreccionales operando en el área y el no uso del territorio de un Estado para agredir a otros Estados; era, pues, una misión evaluatoria de materias de seguridad. Gracias al apoyo del gobierno mexicano que puso a nuestra disposición una aeronave y dos pilotos, pudimos desplazarnos entre todas las capitales centroamericanas entre los días 21 y 27 de octubre. En ellas nos entrevistamos con los cancilleres y autoridades militares, salvo en El Salvador en donde tuvimos como interlocutor al Licenciado Rodolfo Castillo Claramount, en esos momentos presidente en funciones, y en Guatemala, en donde nos entrevistamos con el Ministro de Defensa y con el Vice-Canciller, en ausencia del Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores.

El 7 de noviembre, la CIVS se reúne en Washington aprovechando la presencia de los cancilleres en la XVII Asamblea General. Renueva en esa oportunidad su petición para que la Misión Técnica Preliminar ONU-OEA profundice en el análisis de las necesidades de verificación,

aún cuando los titulares de esa misión dejamos en claro que nos resultaba difícil ir más allá de nuestro primer informe sin que mediaran decisiones precisas por parte de los gobiernos de los países centroamericanos y, en su propio ámbito, sin que los titulares de la CIVS asumieran de lleno sus responsabilidades específicas.

El mandato de la CIVS nos fijaba, sin embargo, una fecha demasiado próxima –el 20 de noviembre, es decir, menos de dos semanas– para presentar a sus titulares nuestras sugerencias sobre “las necesidades de inspección *in situ* en materia de seguridad”. Por eso decidimos con Alvaro de Soto que, en lugar de viajar nuevamente a las cinco capitales, podía resultar más expeditivo someter un cuestionario a los cancilleres centroamericanos presentes en la OEA en ocasión de la Asamblea General, solicitándoles al mismo tiempo entrevistas personales para absolverlo.

Me resulta hasta hoy extraño y paradójico que los informes que preparamos con Alvaro de Soto y nuestro personal político-militar no hayan sido reproducidos en los innumerables libros, monografías y recopilaciones que se han hecho desde entonces sobre la llamada crisis centroamericana. Descarto un hipotético desinterés porque tengo pruebas fehacientes de que esos informes alcanzaron al poco tiempo manos ajenas a las de sus destinatarios. Poco importa saber cómo llegaron a esas manos, salvo que se quiera alimentar una curiosidad anecdótica. Lo que sí importa es saber que, al reproducir ahora las conclusiones a las que llegamos en ambos informes, no estoy cometiendo infidencias sino tan sólo ordenando en la forma más objetiva posible, una cronología de actitudes sobre los asuntos de seguridad que nos fueron encomendados, que puede acaso ayudar a los estudiosos de la materia a desentrañar en un próximo futuro, determinados recelos que subsisten y que entorpecen el camino hacia la paz definitiva en América Central.

### ***Conclusiones del Primer Informe de la Misión Técnica Preliminar ONU/OEA:***

- a) La Misión Técnica se ha circunscrito a una evaluación preliminar, tal como se le solicitó. Sin embargo, se considera en condiciones de señalar ciertos denominadores comunes y determinadas tendencias que a su vez llevan a identificar algunos puntos que, de ser objeto de mayor elaboración por cada Gobierno centroamericano y por la Comisión Ejecutiva, podrían permitir una evaluación más a fondo y llevar a decisiones en la materia.
- b) Dos de los países visitados, Costa Rica y Guatemala, tienen una actitud de flexibilidad general en cuanto a los requerimientos de verificación y las modalidades de inspección *in situ*, lo que determina que estas

conclusiones sean elaboradas teniendo en cuenta sobre todo los requerimientos de los otros tres países.

- c) Todos los Gobiernos centroamericanos aceptan la necesidad de un mecanismo operativo de inspección en el terreno para que la CIVS pueda realizar satisfactoriamente sus funciones de verificación. Todos aceptan el principio de libertad de movimiento para ese mecanismo en los territorios de sus países. Dicha libertad de movimiento podría, sin embargo, estar sujeta, en el caso de un país, a determinadas restricciones. Convendría aclarar y precisar el alcance de tales restricciones.
- d) Todos los países coinciden en interpretar los compromisos en materia de no uso del territorio y cese de la ayuda a fuerzas irregulares o movimientos insurreccionales en el sentido de que los gobiernos de aquellos países centroamericanos u otros en donde existiese cualquier tipo de instalaciones o facilidades de apoyo logístico y operativo a dichas fuerzas o movimientos, tienen la responsabilidad de desmantelarlas. Interpretan asimismo que aquellos países tienen la responsabilidad de poner fin a las actividades de dichas fuerzas o movimientos, aunque en un caso se considera que tal responsabilidad no puede desligarse del progreso efectivo en el cumplimiento de los compromisos relativos a la democratización y amnistía.
- e) Tanto El Salvador cuanto Nicaragua mencionaron su disposición a que se verificase en el terreno el cese del fuego unilaterales o parciales en sus países.
- f) Debe señalarse que la ausencia de cese del fuego debidamente aceptado por todas las partes imposibilitaría la inspección *in situ* del cese de las hostilidades. Por otro lado, podría en ciertas situaciones restringir la libertad de movimiento necesaria para la verificación de los compromisos sobre no uso del territorio y cese de la ayuda a las fuerzas irregulares o movimientos insurreccionales.
- g) Aún cuando, de una u otra forma, todos los gobiernos privilegiaron el diálogo recíproco como primera instancia para resolver sus diferencias, lo que no desdice lo recogido en el punto c), la subsistencia inevitable de cierto grado de desconfianza que la misión ha podido percibir, hace imprescindible la inspección *in situ* del cumplimiento de los compromisos en materia de seguridad. Esta tarea tendría que ser realizada por personal independiente y debidamente especializado en un número reducido que actuaría con celeridad, sea por propia iniciativa o atendiendo a denuncias.

- h) Dicho personal tendría que estar en condiciones de iniciar sus tareas con la debida anticipación y ciertamente no después del cumplimiento de los 150 días contados a partir de la firma del Procedimiento. No se vislumbra oposición al criterio de que este personal debería permanecer en operaciones por un período de tiempo suficiente para asegurar que el proceso de paz fuese irreversible.
- i) En esta fase preliminar, la idea de unidades móviles que operarían a partir de las capitales parece tener acogida y merece urgente atención.
- j) No existe todavía en todos los países centroamericanos una identificación suficientemente precisa de los requerimientos de verificación en las materias que fueron objeto de la Misión, ni la necesaria concertación entre ellos para avanzar más allá de las conclusiones adelantadas en el presente informe. Hasta que no hayan decisiones respecto de la naturaleza y los alcances de las operaciones requeridas, no es posible determinar el número exacto del personal requerido ni las necesidades precisas en materia de transporte, comunicaciones y otro apoyo logístico, y en consecuencia, los costos y las modalidades para su financiamiento.

#### ***Conclusiones del Segundo Informe de la Misión Técnica Preliminar ONU/OEA:***

- a) La idea esbozada en el numeral i) de las conclusiones del primer informe de la Misión Técnica, esto es el establecimiento de unidades móviles que operarían a partir de las capitales, ha sido aceptada, en principio, por los cinco Gobiernos centroamericanos.
- b) Entre las diversas opciones consideradas acerca de su número y ubicación, la que parece tener mayores posibilidades de aceptación general es su establecimiento en las cinco capitales. Sin embargo, esta aceptación está sujeta, en algunos casos, a determinadas condiciones, algunas de carácter sustantivo.
- c) Existe consenso en cuanto a que la composición de las unidades móviles se restrinja a nacionales de países que no sean centroamericanos. No habría objeción alguna a que procediesen de países que no fuesen latinoamericanos, siempre que dichos países no hubiesen adoptado una actitud manifiestamente partidaria en favor de una u otra parte en el conflicto y sujeto, desde luego, a la consulta usual con el país sede. No parecería haber objeción a que se sumasen nacionales de países latinoamericanos o del Caribe no miembros de la CIVS sujeto a las mismas condiciones mencionadas.

- d) La idea avanzada por la Misión Técnica conforme a la cual las unidades móviles deberían emplazarse en la segunda quincena del mes de diciembre de 1987 merece apoyo en algunos casos y no es objetada en principio por ninguno de los Gobiernos centroamericanos. Sin embargo, de subsistir algunas de las condicionantes a la puesta en marcha de la inspección *in situ*, no sería realista, en términos prácticos, pensar en un futuro cercano en el envío de unidades móviles a Centroamérica con el radio de acción que garantizara su eficacia.
- e) En relación con la salvaguardia formulada por Guatemala que se recoge en el párrafo 22, la Misión desearía adelantar que, a su juicio, el emplazamiento de observadores de fuera del área centroamericana para realizar la inspección *in situ* no debería interpretarse como afectando la seguridad de los países en los cuales estos observadores operan.
- f) En las circunstancias imperantes, la Misión Técnica no se considera en condiciones de ofrecer sugerencias para crear mecanismos que sirvieran a superar las dificultades señaladas en el inciso f) del primer informe, ni de profundizar en los aspectos logísticos y financieros a que se refiere el inciso j).
- g) Como se podrá apreciar, los resultados de esta segunda rueda de consultas de la Misión Técnica en el desempeño de su mandato renovado se circunscriben de modo general a aspectos accesorios. Sin embargo, estos aspectos, descritos en los párrafos a) y d) *supra*, se encuentran sujetos a condicionantes de tal naturaleza que permanecen inoperantes. No existe la necesaria cristalización de las posiciones de todas las partes, desde el primer informe, que permitiría la profundización que los Gobiernos miembros de la CIVS solicitaron a la Misión. Este saldo, básicamente negativo, impide ofrecer sugerencias para colmar las lagunas señaladas en dicho informe. En estas circunstancias, es claro que no están dadas las condiciones para sugerir pasos concretos hacia la inspección *in situ* en las materias que están dentro del mandato de la Misión, como era la intención de hacerlo.
- h) Los problemas que aún subsisten son de naturaleza tal que no van a ser superados por la vía técnica. Se trata de problemas políticos que derivan de la esencia misma del Procedimiento de Guatemala, pues estriban en las percepciones divergentes acerca de la puesta en práctica simultánea de los compromisos contenidos en éste. La noción de la simultaneidad, ingrediente fundamental del Acuerdo, podría, sin embargo, llegar a convertirse en su talón de Aquiles. En efecto, la Misión ha podido comprobar que, pese al acuerdo reciente de la Comisión Ejecutiva, todavía no existe uniformidad de interpretación al respecto. La resolución de este problema, por la vía práctica y no sólo teórica,

es fundamental para que no resulte entorpecida la realización de la inspección *in situ*: probablemente lo sea también para el cumplimiento del Procedimiento en su conjunto. Pero cortar este nudo gordiano está fuera del mandato de una misión de carácter técnico.

- i) Desde la primera reunión de la CIVS se insistió en la necesidad de mecanismos prácticos en el terreno como condición necesaria para que esta Comisión, dado su alto nivel, pudiese adecuadamente cumplir con el cometido de verificar el cumplimiento de los acuerdos. La Misión Técnica fue solicitada con el fin de asistir en la elaboración de estos mecanismos. Sin embargo, se desprende del análisis de los problemas que todavía persisten, que no existe todavía una voluntad unánime de dar el siguiente paso conceptual y enfrentar los requerimientos prácticos de la verificación. Este problema de fondo merece ser encarado, sin demora, por la CIVS.

En el siguiente encuentro del 4 de diciembre, precedido por dos días de deliberaciones a nivel de representantes ad-hoc, la CIVS decidió poner fin a la misión técnica ONU-OEA, sustituyéndola por un viaje de todos los representantes ad-hoc por los países centroamericanos entre el 4 y el 10 de enero de 1988. En verdad, de lo que se trataba era que los alternos redactáramos el informe que la CIVS debía entregar a los presidentes centroamericanos en su reunión cumbre de San José el 15 de enero.

Me correspondió el honor de actuar como titular en esta reunión de la CIVS en Nueva York representando al Secretario General de la OEA quien, días antes, había sufrido un infarto. Señalo esto porque ello me permitió proponer, por instrucciones expresas del Embajador Baena Soares y en estrecha coordinación con el **Embajador Pérez de Cuéllar**, que los propios titulares de la CIVS se reunieran con toda antelación para trabajar ellos mismos el informe presidencial que los representantes ad-hoc prepararíamos. La gestión fue infructuosa pues lo que se decidió fue encargarle a la ONU y a la OEA la preparación de un borrador de informe que sería, luego, cotejado “con la realidad de los hechos” durante la gira de todos los representantes ad-hoc y, luego, sancionado por los titulares de la CIVS en un encuentro en Panamá el 12 de enero.

Concluimos con Álvaro de Soto el borrador de informe presidencial el 1° de enero de 1988 (difícilmente una fecha en que se piensa que la acomodada burocracia internacional pueda estar trabajando), en maratónico intercambio de ajustes de última hora por vía facsimilar y telefónica entre nuestras oficinas en Washington y Nueva York, para poder remitirlo con tiempo suficiente a las cancillerías de los trece otros representantes ad-hoc antes de que emprendieran viaje a Panamá, lugar de nuestra cita inicial de la gira.



Aparte de su finalidad última, el borrador de informe debía servirnos a todos como una suerte de guión para nuestros encuentros en cada país centroamericano, con aquellas organizaciones de derechos humanos y partidos políticos de oposición con cuyo contacto podríamos ajustar al máximo la veracidad de la situación centroamericana que debía reflejar el mencionado informe. Sin embargo, juzgando ese pasado tan reciente con la perspectiva que permiten los resultados del encuentro presidencial de San José, me inclino a pensar que esa gira de los representantes ad-hoc de la CIVS por las cinco capitales centroamericanas sirvió, sobre todo, para profundizar las suspicacias entre los istmeños y los Ocho, grupo éste al cual se nos incorporó a los representantes de la ONU y de la OEA, tal vez como gesto irreflexivo que la naturaleza de las cosas imponía en esos momentos y acaso hasta por nacionalidad...

Los días y noches interminables que siguieron fueron algunos de los más exasperantes en mi trayectoria profesional. Reunidos en Panamá el 10 de enero, al término de una gira por toda América Central en dos aviones lentos y de escasa autonomía (dos defectos no atribuibles por cierto a la fuerza aérea panameña que los puso gentilmente a nuestra entera disposición), los treinta integrantes de la misión –los representantes ad-hoc y nuestros alternos– comenzamos la ardua tarea de ajustar el borrador de informe con todos aquellos elementos que habíamos recogido durante nuestra gira, sólo para enfrentarnos a la demencial labor de negociarlo íntegramente con cada uno de los delegados centro-americanos.

La reunión de los titulares de la CIVS en Panamá el 12 de enero de 1988, en donde también representé al Secretario General de la OEA como su Enviado Especial, será igualmente un encuentro del que guardaré siempre memoria.

Se nos concentró en el Hotel Holiday Inn de Panamá Capital, lugar en donde se desarrollaría el evento a puertas cerradas y bajo estrictas medidas de seguridad. Se convocó a la reunión para las 10 de la mañana. Antes del mediodía se encontraban todos los cancilleres centroamericanos y los de Contadora y Apoyo que habían podido llegar. Notoria ausencia: el anfitrión, pues se sabía que ni el Secretario General de la OEA, convaliente, ni el Secretario General de la ONU podrían participar.

Jorge Abadía Arias, el afable y bonachón canciller panameño, está intentando contrarrestar en el exterior la campaña que llevará no tanto al 25 sino al 26 de febrero, cuando el jefe de las fuerzas de Defensa de Panamá destituirá al Presidente Delvalle al día siguiente del relevo del propio General Noriega... En lugar del Canciller Abadía actúa como dueño de casa el Vice Canciller José María Cabrera, un buen e inteligente amigo

de todos los miembros de la CIVS y un experimentado conocedor de la cuestión centroamericana.

El encuentro de la CIVS se inicia al mediodía. Se prolongará, sin solución de continuidad salvo las interrupciones higiénicas de rigor, hasta las 5:30 de la mañana siguiente del 13; (nunca antes había pasado prácticamente un día entero moviéndome sólo en una sala de reuniones, almorzando, cenando y desayunando en la misma mesa de trabajo... ingrata experiencia que compartí con casi todos los secuestrados...).

Natural consecuencia de cualquier encerrona es el ambiente enrarecido que se produce y que, en este caso, ni el aire acondicionado podía disipar pues no se trataba tanto de una irritación producida por una clausura forzada, como de una tensión que se derivaba de las crecientes discrepancias entre los Cinco y los Ocho.

El proyecto de informe de la CIVS a los mandatarios centroamericanos –concluido igualmente en tediosas y tensas sesiones iniciadas en la tarde del 10 y terminadas a las 8 de la mañana de ese mismo 12– tiene ahora que ser revisado por los titulares de la CIVS.

Su revisión integral significará, en verdad, reabrir el debate sobre todo el informe. Asuman así, ahora a nivel de los propios titulares de la CIVS, las crecientes insinuaciones sobre la supuesta parcialidad de los Ocho favorable a Nicaragua.

Los resultados de ese histórico episodio negociador entre Contadora, Apoyo y los Cinco, con la concurrencia de la ONU y la OEA, son de conocimiento público: en la cumbre de San José los días 15 y 16 de enero, los presidentes centroamericanos decidirán poner fin a la Comisión Internacional de Verificación y Seguimiento.

La comunicación de la CIVS, elaborada conforme a los mandatos del acuerdo de paz del Procedimiento de Guatemala, fue un extenso documento titulado “Informe sobre los progresos en el cumplimiento de los acuerdos del Procedimiento para alcanzar la paz firme y duradera en Centroamérica”. Al detallado informe mismo se le anexaron 11 páginas recogiendo 37 conclusiones básicas que subrayaban, esencialmente, la necesidad de contar con una permanente voluntad política para superar obstáculos en los esfuerzos pacificadores, así como la existencia de intereses “extraños a las legítimas aspiraciones” de los pueblos centroamericanos; además, recomendaban un plan de ejecución y un calendario de cumplimiento de los compromisos. La 29a. recomendación indicaba: “Cabe anotar la inquietud manifestada por varios miembros no centroamericanos de la CIVS respecto

a la modalidad de participación de los países centroamericanos, en tanto que partes en un conflicto, en la tarea de verificación. Los Presidentes podrían examinar esta materia en su próxima reunión para hacer una distinción práctica entre la participación, en lo que hace propiamente a la verificación, de los miembros no centroamericanos de la CIVS y la de los centroamericanos. Esto en rigor no requeriría alterar la letra del Procedimiento. Este tema se relaciona asimismo con otro problema que se ha podido palpar en el curso de las reuniones de la CIVS, que es el de la falta de un marco más operativo para la toma de decisiones”.

El inexorable hartazgo de tan arduas y tensas negociaciones de los últimos días nos lleva con Alvaro de Soto a la decisión de tomar, esa misma mañana del 13, un vuelo directo de regreso a Nueva York desoyendo tantas noches en vilo que nos exigen descansar en Panamá al menos un día. Habrá sido por todo ese día de viaje en que nos apartaríamos deliberadamente de cualquier noticia sobre Centroamérica, que recién el 14 nos enteraríamos de dos hechos que avizoraban el fin de la CIVS. El día de nuestra partida, el presidente costarricense le había dirigido una carta al presidente nicaragüense en la que Arias afirmaba que, en la cumbre de San José, los mandatarios centroamericanos deben “ir mucho más allá del mero análisis de los documentos” de la CIVS, con el objeto de puntualizar “hasta dónde ha faltado, en la región, voluntad para detener la guerra, y hasta dónde son influencias extrarregionales las que contribuyen a sostener el conflicto”. El otro hecho se vinculaba a una carta del Canciller Carlos López Contreras a los presidentes centroamericanos, en la cual el jefe de la diplomacia hondureña acusaba frontalmente a la CIVS de haber sido indulgente con “los sandinistas”, al tiempo que denunciaba a algunos miembros de la comisión internacional “por minimizar los testimonios de organizaciones no gubernamentales relativas a las violaciones a los derechos humanos” en su país.

La inauguración en La Garita de Alajuela, Costa Rica, de la tercera cumbre de los cinco jefes de Estado de América Central el 15 de enero de 1988, no contó con la presencia de ningún canciller del Grupo de Contadora o del Grupo de Lima ni de los representantes de los secretarios generales de la ONU y de la OEA. No habíamos sido invitados. Para los observadores de la prensa internacional destacaría, sí, la presencia de una delegación del gobierno estadounidense presidida por el Embajador Morris Busby, Enviado Especial para Centroamérica.

La “Declaración de San José” modificó un punto sustancial del Procedimiento de Guatemala: puso fin a la labor de la CIVS. Desde entonces se hablará de la “centroamericanización” del proceso cuyo mayor logro hasta el momento ha sido el de Nicaragua, con el inicio de un diálogo

directo entre el gobierno de Managua y la Resistencia Nicaragüense y el histórico Acuerdo de Sapoa.

## VII. *Penúltimas Reflexiones*

La dinámica misma de la llamada crisis centroamericana –sus estancamientos y discrepancias pero también sus impulsos y reconciliaciones– no admite reflexiones últimas que, desde una abstracción académica, pretendan extraer conclusiones finales y sentar consejos definitivos.

Los hay quienes consideran que el conflicto en América Central es un “conflicto de baja intensidad” por tratarse de una situación “regionalizada”, es decir, circunscrita con precisión y por ende controlable. La teoría según la cual los conflictos llamados regionales –Afganistán, Campuchea, Africa del Sur, Etiopía/Eritrea, Golfo Pérsico, Oriente Medio, Centroamérica– son “conflictos de baja intensidad”, me parece una aproximación arrogante que omite la perspectiva de quienes padecen tales situaciones (el drama humano en toda su descarnada dimensión).

Esa teoría puede ser válida para las grandes potencias por aquello de que los “conflictos de baja intensidad” son enfrentamientos político-militares por debajo del nivel de lo que se entiende por guerra convencional; la interpretación es, pues, la falta de globalización como elemento desjerarquizante de tales conflictos. ¡Y ese es, precisamente, el riesgo que, a mi juicio, corren los países de América Latina al acercarnos al siglo XXI!

En términos genéricos, los conflictos en el llamado Tercer Mundo coinciden con el surgimiento de éste que es, a su vez, resultante del colapso de los imperios coloniales. Esto se produce en un espacio y un tiempo históricos más o menos coincidentes con la consolidación definitiva de las dos superpotencias, al término de la segunda gran guerra.

Afortunadamente, América Latina es ajena a esta mutación que reordena en pocos años el mapa geográfico y político del mundo: todos los países de la América hispano-franco-portuguesa son independientes cuando el advenimiento y formación del llamado Tercer Mundo.

La guerra fría consolida la pugna ideológica entre los Estados Unidos y la Unión Soviética, que alcanza visos paranoicos al llegar a niveles de inminente riesgo de aniquilación nuclear del universo entero. Paulatinamente, la pugna ideológica se consolida trasladándose a lo que podríamos denominar “escenarios interpósitos”, v.g., países y regiones en los cuales las dos superpotencias se enfrentan mediante testaferros ideológicos locales.

Es difícil pensar que la alturada relación que parece perfilarse entre las dos superpotencias tenga como meta la conciliación ideológica entre ambas: los Estados Unidos y la Unión Soviética tienen concepciones del mundo tan diametralmente opuestas y antagónicas que resulta casi ingenuo inferir, de los recientes acuerdos sobre limitación de armas nucleares, que florecerá una buena vecindad permanente entre ellos.

Aquel entendimiento nuclear que se insinúa, con todos los benéficos resultados que se derivarían, bien puede tener sin embargo, como contrapartida, la sofisticada consolidación del mecanismo de la “regionalización” o focalización del conflicto Este-Oeste, como nueva modalidad para ventilar la pugna ideológica y seguir desarrollando, sin horizonte, la tecnología militar en escenarios perfectamente delimitados.

El llamado conflicto centroamericano es para América Latina una oportunidad única para invertir los términos planteados y, por el contrario, hacer de la “regionalización” un mecanismo provechoso antes que se afiance su faceta contraria: *sí*, entonces, a la regionalización como iniciativa creadora endógena para circunscribir los conflictos y negociar soluciones imaginativas usando todos los recursos humanos, políticos y diplomáticos de la propia región, con la asistencia de los organismos internacionales como único vehículo para encausar cualquier *mainmise* asistencial foránea; *no* en cambio a la regionalización entendida como acción testaférrea de intereses exógenos.

Para fortuna de aquellos cinco países que conforman el istmo de América Central, ellos cuentan con un importante instrumento propio como es el plan de paz de Esquipulas II, que les allana el camino a la reconciliación y la convivencia definitivas. Cuentan adicionalmente con el apoyo de ocho naciones de la misma estirpe humana que han demostrado –a veces con un elevado costo político para ellas mismas– su entera disposición a coadyuvar en la solución definitiva y permanente a la crisis.

Las Naciones Unidas y la Organización de los Estados Americanos también han dado pruebas de que pueden servir a la causa de la paz en América Central, mediante una variada gama de mecanismos que están a su alcance con el sólo mandato de los países miembros.

Una combinación simultánea y concomitante de estos tres elementos puede superar el actual estancamiento de la situación en Centroamérica toda vez que la involución del proceso ha demostrado, si no el fracaso cuando menos las tremendas limitaciones de una aproximación compartimentada al conflicto.

La solución definitiva de la sedicente crisis centroamericana es, pues, un imperativo no sólo para los países directamente involucrados en el sufrimiento inacabable en el que están entrampados, sino una necesidad vital para el futuro de América Latina entera concebida como región con legítimos intereses, necesidades e ideales.

Por ello es que, más allá de ese conflicto, cabe reflexionar en que la viabilidad de la definitiva inserción latinoamericana en el nuevo esquema de poder y desarrollo mundial que está moldeándose, dependería en gran medida de una nueva relación entre América Latina y los Estados Unidos. Tras más de una década de escepticismo y mutuas suspicacias, es imprescindible que tal relación cambie de signo hacia el diálogo y la cooperación política en términos de igualdad. Una nueva relación con los Estados Unidos tendría una incidencia determinante en la configuración del pensamiento y la determinación regional para recuperar su crecimiento, afianzar la democracia y, en suma, asegurar la ubicación de América Latina en el próximo siglo, con los problemas intranacionales resueltos.

En tal sentido, pues, las actividades de concertación política entre las naciones de América Latina deben tener como correlato el diálogo permanente y constructivo con terceros países (Estados Unidos como se ha dicho, pero también los comunitarios europeos y aún más el Japón y los de la Cuenca del Pacífico, ese eje de desarrollo ya comparable al Mediterráneo en la antigüedad y el Atlántico Norte de nuestros días). Una agenda de semejante diálogo vincularía orgánicamente nuevos marcos conceptuales de seguridad, democracia y desarrollo hemisféricos que coadyuvarían al entendimiento mutuo y al progreso compartido. En ausencia de semejante concertación y aquellas otras acciones que puedan darse en el futuro más cercano, por ejemplo en Centroamérica; en ausencia de una concepción nueva de la cooperación para la paz y el desarrollo que supere los criterios ideológicos del poder y de la fuerza; se consolidará este mundo actual dividido cada vez más entre una minoría económicamente poderosa y hegemónica y otra pauperizada y dependiente.

Lima, octubre de 1988.

# Hacia la seguridad internacional

Javier Pérez de Cuéllar

Con el fin de la Guerra Fría, aparecieron los primeros signos premonitorios de un nuevo equilibrio mundial. Uno de ellos ocurrió a finales de 1989. Sorprendentemente, Estados Unidos y la Unión Soviética depositaron en la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas un proyecto conjunto de resolución que se titulaba “Reforzamiento de la paz y de la seguridad internacionales en todos sus aspectos en conformidad con la Carta de las Naciones Unidas”. El texto invitaba a los Estados miembros a aplicar plenamente la Carta y a cooperar al afianzamiento de los mecanismos de seguridad previstos en ella.

Fue la primera vez desde la creación de la Organización en 1945 que se producía un acercamiento tal entre esas dos grandes potencias. Como era natural, nació de inmediato en la comunidad internacional el sentimiento de que había una posibilidad de establecer una era de paz y de seguridad duraderas, fundada en un orden mundial estable. Pero hubo al mismo tiempo conciencia de que el advenimiento de esa nueva era debía estar acompañado por una exigencia ética, es decir que la paz y la seguridad internacionales, para ser permanentes, debían edificarse en un estricto marco de justicia y de respeto de los derechos humanos.

Desde entonces fuimos complacidos testigos de la desaparición de las barreras de desconfianza y de hostilidad que separaban al Este del Oeste y del inicio de un período de transición cuyo primer signo visible fue la destrucción del espantoso arsenal de recursos de destrucción que las grandes potencias habían amasado en los últimos 50 años.

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Pero nuestro regocijo terminó pronto, pues la auspiciosa nueva era dio lugar, casi simultáneamente, a movimientos contradictorios, como la aparición de nuevos conflictos de soberanía, el despertar de viejas rivalidades nacionales, el surgimiento de violentas luchas étnicas, religiosas y sociales. Más aún, se produjeron situaciones como el derrumbe de Estados nacionales y federales y, a manera de contrapunto, la reaparición y las reivindicaciones de culturas que creíamos extinguidas.

No era la primera vez que la Organización de Naciones Unidas debía hacer frente al desafío de garantizar una paz justa y durable así como la seguridad para todos los pueblos. Pero sí era la primera vez que –gracias al fin de la confrontación Este-Oeste– se veía investida de la capacidad de acción de que había estado privada durante decenas de años.

El término de la Guerra Fría acabó con los vetos sistemáticos de la Unión Soviética en el Consejo de Seguridad y pudo éste, a pesar de la gravedad de algunas crisis –como la del Golfo Pérsico en 1990– cumplir las responsabilidades que le señala la Carta. Por lo demás, por obra de ese nuevo margen de maniobra, la Organización logró obtener, entre 1989 y 1991, el retiro soviético de Afganistán y el cubano de Angola, la independencia de Namibia, el fin de la guerra Irán-Iraq, un acuerdo en el conflicto camboyano y la solución negociada de los problemas de América Central.

A partir de 1990, la Organización comienza a desarrollar una nueva actividad: la diplomacia preventiva destinada a reducir las tensiones antes de que degeneren en conflictos. En la iniciativa y puesta en práctica pueden intervenir no sólo el Secretario General sino también el Consejo de Seguridad, (a Asamblea General, los organismos intergubernamentales regionales que cooperan con la Organización mundial o, por cierto, los propios Estados miembros.

Hay que subrayar que el éxito de este mecanismo depende en gran medida de una cooperación y coordinación perfectas entre los tres mencionados órganos de Naciones Unidas y más específicamente de la ayuda de las potencias que poseen los medios técnicos que permitan evaluar permanentemente la situación en las áreas de conflicto o de posible conflicto. Es lo que se llama el sistema de alerta rápida. La acción preventiva será, como es obvio, tanto más eficiente cuanto más pronto intervenga frente a las tensiones e incluso antes de que éstas ocurran.

En varias ocasiones Naciones Unidas envió misiones a regiones en tensión para verificar los hechos, las que por virtud de su imparcialidad y eficacia, pudieron contribuir a desactivar –por decirlo así– situaciones muy serias y evitar el surgimiento de conflictos. Estoy convencido de que, dentro del espíritu de los artículos 43 a 45 del capítulo VII de la Carta, la



Organización podría institucionalizar un sistema preventivo de intervención rápida que incluyera el envío de misiones como las que he mencionado, sean ellas civiles o militares. Ya en diciembre de 1992 se estableció un precedente, con la autorización dada por el Consejo de Seguridad al Secretario General para que destaque en Macedonia –a título preventivo y con el consentimiento del gobierno de ese país– una Fuerza de Protección de Naciones Unidas encargada de vigilar el mantenimiento de la paz y de contribuir así al reforzamiento de la seguridad en la región, no obstante que no existía una real tensión y menos aún un conflicto armado.

Una acción muy diferente, pero igualmente encaminada a preservar hasta por la fuerza la seguridad de la ex Yugoslavia, fue la intervención militar que la OTAN –bajo la égida de Naciones Unidas– efectuó en Bosnia Herzegovina en 1992. Me refiero a los ataques aéreos contra aviones de combate y posiciones terrestres en suelo serbo-bosnio que autorizó la resolución 781 del Consejo de Seguridad para “proteger las zonas de seguridad de Bosnia”. Estos dos ejemplos sustentan la conveniencia de que Naciones Unidas cuente con fuerzas propias de seguridad colectiva, destinadas a intervenir directamente y sin demora, a pedido del Consejo. Por lo demás, esta idea fue lanzada en 1948 por el primer Secretario General, Trygve Lie.

Es interesante hacer una breve referencia al Pacto de estabilidad en Europa, adoptado por la OSCE en 1995, destinado a preservar la seguridad del espacio europeo evitando nuevos conflictos en el Continente mediante el ejercicio de la diplomacia preventiva. De otro lado, la OTAN se prepara a establecer fuerzas convencionales polivalentes móviles, capaces de acciones rápidas, no sólo, como es evidente, para efectos preventivos. Sería deseable que se universalizase ese eficaz enfoque regional, pero en el marco de las Naciones Unidas.

No cabe duda alguna de que a todos los miembros de la comunidad internacionales interesa establecer un orden mundial destinado a garantizar la paz y la seguridad internacionales, y que este propósito no logrará la prioridad que merece si no es entendido por los pueblos y gobiernos como una ineludible obligación moral y si estos últimos no tienen la voluntad política de hacer de ese ideal una realidad concreta.

El orden mundial a que el mundo aspira no puede reducirse a medidas de seguridad. Debe abarcar otros dominios: la institución del Estado de derecho y la observancia de los derechos humanos, el desarrollo socioeconómico y la solidaridad, la lucha contra la explosión demográfica y la preservación del medio ambiente. Todos somos ahora conscientes de que la seguridad no es sólo un concepto exclusivamente político, militar

o geopolítico, sino que debe construirse en torno al ser humano, ya que de lo que se trata es de su seguridad individual y colectiva.

El camino hacia un orden mundial de paz y de seguridad será largo y sin atajos. Para avanzar en él, hay que convencer a los que nos gobiernan de la necesidad de no circunscribirse a acuerdos y decisiones bilaterales y de optar cada vez más por los procesos multilaterales. Hay que llegar a una gestión colectiva, a una voluntad política común de los Estados miembros de la comunidad internacional. Si la ONU no consigue hacer respetar y aplicar su Carta, es porque continúa siendo excepcional que sus miembros subordinen sus intereses de corto plazo a las más amplias perspectivas de un interés general a largo plazo que nos garantice seguridad y paz. Ojalá se rindieran algún día a la evidencia de que todo Estado, grande o pequeño, depende en alguna medida de otros Estados, sea en lo político, en lo económico o en lo tecnológico; que es un simple eslabón de una cadena de interdependencia. ¿O quieren acaso que el orden mundial sea el resultado de la decisión de uno o de unos pocos Estados?

Concibamos un nuevo orden internacional auténtico que esté basado en una alianza entre la seguridad individual y la seguridad internacional, lo cual requiere la instauración de la democracia, la participación popular, la aplicación de la ley, el cumplimiento de los acuerdos internacionales y el respeto de los derechos del hombre y de las libertades fundamentales.

# Orden o anarquía<sup>(\*)</sup>

(Informes anuales)  
1982 1991<sup>(1 y 2)</sup>

Javier Pérez de Cuéllar<sup>(\*\*)</sup>

## I 1982, 1983, 1984 y 1985

“... nos encontramos en un período en el cual se cuestiona el valor de la diplomacia multilateral y las instituciones internacionales no están funcionando como era la intención que lo hicieran”

Los informes correspondientes al período 1982-1985, se apartan de la práctica usual en este tipo de documento de revisar panorámica y casuísticamente las crisis internacionales para concentrarse en: a) la capacidad de la organización para mantener la paz y la seguridad internacionales; b) la cuestión de la validez y utilidad de la ONU como foro de negociación mundial; c) las evidentes dificultades para hacerlo; d) los conceptos de responsabilidad internacional y autoridad internacional de acuerdo con la Carta de la ONU; y e) otros temas fundamentales relacionados con el trabajo de las Naciones Unidas.

Es decir, se examinan las deficiencias subyacentes del sistema multilateral, se presenta una serie de sugerencias para el mejor funcionamiento del sistema internacional de paz y seguridad previsto en la Carta, se advierte la peligrosa proximidad de una nueva anarquía internacional y se subraya la responsabilidad internacional de los Estados que han suscrito la Carta de las Naciones Unidas de optar entre el caos, que se identifica con la proliferación de decisiones y acciones unilaterales inconsultas; y el orden, que equivale a la cooperación multilateral de todos los Estados dentro de las Naciones Unidas para promover intereses comunes vinculados a la calidad de vida en el planeta y en última instancia, vinculados también a la supervivencia de la humanidad.

(\*) Resumen elaborado por la Misión Permanente del Perú ante las Naciones Unidas, Nueva York.

(\*\*) Secretario General de las Naciones Unidas, 1982-1991.

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Durante 1982 una sucesión de crisis internacionales, estancamiento en asuntos fundamentales, divisiones generalizadas y desorden, ha trazado un curso excesivamente peligroso, cuyo síntoma es la crisis del enfoque multilateral de los asuntos internacionales y la erosión concomitante de la autoridad y status de las instituciones intergubernamentales mundiales y regionales, lo cual afecta adversamente el cumplimiento de la tarea primordial de las Naciones Unidas de mantener la paz y la seguridad internacionales. 1983 fue un año frustrante en la búsqueda de la paz, estabilidad y justicia, y de tensión entre las grandes potencias. En 1984 el supuesto básico es que todas las naciones comparten un interés vital en la paz y en un mundo ordenado y equitativo y deberían estar dispuestas y preparadas para cooperar con mira, a conseguirlo. Sin embargo, se ha producido un retroceso del internacionalismo y del multilateralismo en un momento en que paradójicamente, los acontecimientos internacionales tanto en relación con la paz como con la economía mundiales, parecerían exigir su fortalecimiento. En 1985 (el XL Aniversario de la ONU) se reconoce que las funciones de la Organización son indispensables para la supervivencia de la humanidad, pero se indica que frecuentemente existe un gran vacío de legitimidad y autoridad respetada.

No obstante, prevalece en los informes de este período una sensación de optimismo temperado y de cierta impaciencia que impregna la propuesta de un cambio racional para que la Organización pueda empezar a funcionar en la forma prevista al momento de su fundación. Algo debe hacerse, y hacerse urgentemente, para fortalecer las instituciones internacionales y para adoptar enfoques nuevos e imaginativos a fin de prevenir y solucionar los conflictos. Claramente, la Carta atribuye prioridad al tratamiento de las amenazas a la paz y la seguridad internacionales, sobre todo a la obligación del Consejo de Seguridad de asegurar que los procesos sigan cursos específicos. El primer paso en esa dirección debe ser la renovación consciente del compromiso de los gobiernos con la Carta de la ONU. El objetivo más urgente es reconstruir el concepto de acción colectiva para la paz y la seguridad previsto en la Carta. Sería útil que el Consejo de Seguridad nuevamente revise y simplifique sus prácticas y procedimientos con el fin de poder actuar rápida y decisivamente en las crisis. Para ello se necesita una visión colectiva de los mayores problemas del mundo actual, realista y políticamente efectiva.

Consecuentemente, además de controlar los conflictos, el principal objetivo del Consejo de seguridad, particularmente el de sus miembros permanentes, debería ser desarrollar un efectivo enfoque común de las amenazas potenciales a la paz y seguridad, y asistir y, si es necesario, ejercer presión sobre las partes en conflicto para que resuelvan las diferencias por medios pacíficos. De otra forma, la ONU se convertirá en periférica a los mayores asuntos mundiales. Simultáneamente, un esfuerzo continuo para ejecutar

las decisiones de las Naciones Unidas debería ser parte integral de las políticas exteriores de los Estados Miembros. Uno de los problemas mayores de las Naciones Unidas es la falta de respeto por sus decisiones. Por lo tanto, deben considerarse nuevas formas de ejercer influencia colectiva para asegurar su cumplimiento.

El artículo 99° de la Carta prevé un rol preventivo para el Secretario General, el cual debería desempeñarlo de manera más directa llevando a la atención del Consejo de Seguridad situaciones potencialmente peligrosas, para lo cual el Secretario General requiere desarrollar una mayor capacidad para el establecimiento de los hechos y mecanismos de alerta temprana sobre conflictos incipientes.

Dentro de esta visión evolutiva del sistema multilateral y del funcionamiento de las Naciones Unidas, las referencias del Secretario General a las operaciones para el mantenimiento de la paz ameritan ser destacadas. Las operaciones de paz pueden considerarse como un rasgo emblemático de la administración del Secretario General Pérez de Cuéllar, muy particularmente ONUSAL por su sentido precursor. Las operaciones de mantenimiento de la paz representan una de las exitosas innovaciones de las Naciones Unidas. Solo pueden funcionar apropiadamente con la cooperación de las partes y sobre la base de un mandato claramente definido del Consejo de Seguridad. Su fuerza principal radica en la voluntad de la comunidad internacional que ellas simbolizan. Las operaciones de paz son expresión de un consenso y voluntad política internacionales. Si éstos son débiles, inciertos, indecisos o están divididos, las operaciones se verán correspondientemente debilitadas. De ahí la recomendación enfática de estudiar urgentemente medios a través de los cuales podrían fortalecerse las operaciones de paz.

## II 1986-1987

“Deseo repetir mi llamado para una aproximación multilateral y racional a los problemas de la paz y el desarrollo”.

Aunque no puede haber sustituto para un efectivo sistema multilateral para el mantenimiento de la paz y la seguridad internacionales y el manejo cooperativo de los problemas globales, durante 1985<sup>(3)</sup>, las Naciones Unidas han continuado sumidas en una severa crisis que desafía su solvencia y viabilidad y han continuado también conflictos regionales y dificultades sociales y económicas. Sin embargo, al mismo tiempo, en esta etapa, asistimos al surgimiento de patrones de conducta más discernibles

y coherentes, basados en gobiernos básicamente pragmáticos que tienen una comprensión firme de las características económicas, sociales y tecnológicas de nuestro tiempo. Uno de los grandes méritos de las Naciones Unidas es que todas las naciones incluyendo las débiles, las oprimidas, y las víctimas de injusticia, tienen la posibilidad de ser escuchadas a pesar de las duras realidades del poder internacional. Este es un atributo esencial de la Organización. Por ello, al considerar el propósito y la necesidad del multilateralismo no debe olvidarse que si bien el interés nacional generalmente está primero en las prioridades de los gobiernos, existe un creciente sentido del interés internacional. “Creo que esto es lo que realmente desean los pueblos de las Naciones Unidas, a pesar de todas las dificultades y frustraciones que encuentran los gobiernos al tratar de hacer funcionar al sistema multilateral”.

En este período el Secretario General se refiere insistentemente al problema del medio ambiente y plantea la realización de una Cumbre Mundial para encararlo a través de la cooperación multilateral.

Además del mantenimiento de la paz y la seguridad internacionales, existen categorías de problemas que sólo pueden tratarse multilateralmente o globalmente. Problemas nuevos, frente a los cuales las acciones unilaterales tienen un efecto debilitante sobre el sistema de cooperación multilateral en su conjunto. Esos problemas constituyen otras áreas principales del trabajo de las Naciones Unidas en la medida en que tienen relación directa con la calidad de vida a la que aspiran los pueblos de las Naciones Unidas y con la seguridad. Entre éstos, el asunto más amplio y más complejo es la cuestión de los derechos humanos, es decir, su promoción y protección a nivel mundial, “a lo que pretendo dedicar como materia de alta prioridad, la atención invocada en la Carta”. El respeto de los derechos humanos y las libertades fundamentales es uno de los principios básicos de la Carta de las Naciones Unidas. “Atribuyo la más alta importancia a la cuestión de los derechos humanos y creo que es mi responsabilidad considerar los medios más efectivos para tratar casos específicos”. El problema de los derechos humanos está estrechamente vinculado con las cuestiones humanitarias de las Naciones Unidas. Es esencial que aprendamos de nuestra experiencia a enfrentar futuros problemas humanitarios de una manera coherente que tome en cuenta todos los elementos.

Las Naciones Unidas reflejan de manera única las aspiraciones y las frustraciones de muchas naciones y grupos en todo el mundo. Muchas de las más grandes esperanzas de la humanidad se refieren al progreso económico y social, que debe mantenerse como el objetivo primordial de las Naciones Unidas. Un imperativo mayor de nuestros tiempos es el progreso acelerado de los países en desarrollo. Se ha hecho cada vez

más claro en los años recientes que las cuestiones económicas, financieras, monetarias y comerciales están tan relacionadas entre sí y revisten tan profunda importancia política y social, que sólo pueden ser tratadas efectivamente como parte de un proceso político más amplio. La necesidad de cooperación internacional en asuntos económicos trasciende las fronteras sectoriales tradicionales (representadas a nivel nacional por los diferentes ministerios, e internacionalmente por las agencias especializadas de las Naciones Unidas). Lo que se requiere en muchos casos, es el uso más efectivo y pragmático de las Naciones Unidas como un foro para integrar esfuerzos políticos. Debido a la interdependencia, hoy más que nunca, muchas naciones se ven individualmente afectadas, para bien o para mal, por tendencias y decisiones originadas en otras partes. En un mundo económicamente interdependiente donde el crecimiento y la estabilidad del Norte se entretene con el desarrollo acelerado del Sur, resulta difícil imaginar que los problemas económicos internacionales puedan resolverse de otra forma que no sea a través de una cooperación multilateral intensificada. Si bien se está logrando mucho a nivel de las actividades operacionales de las Naciones Unidas, existe un alto grado de frustración por actividades a nivel global en las esferas comercial, monetaria y financiera. Las dificultades que la comunidad de naciones encuentra para fortalecer la cooperación económica en las Naciones Unidas tienen varias causas: a) no existe un nuevo consenso sobre asuntos económicos a la luz de las nuevas realidades económicas y políticas mundiales; b) hay desacuerdo en torno a la causa de los problemas así como a lo que debe hacerse; c) diferencias ideológicas sobre problemas económicos complican más la cuestión.

Análogamente, se ha hecho cada vez más evidente que los esfuerzos multilaterales e internacionales suministran la mejor esperanza para detener y reducir el tráfico de drogas.

La Organización no podrá tener éxito si su sistema administrativo es inarticulado o insensible a las necesidades reales. Existen restricciones considerables en la libertad de acción del Secretario General y una tendencia a establecer unidades más o menos autónomas para realizar ciertas funciones, sobre las cuales el Secretario General no tiene control claro. Esta tendencia plantea serias cuestiones de responsabilidad organizativa y autoridad y, a veces, puede no ser totalmente consistente con el concepto de la Carta sobre un "secretariado unificado trabajando como un equipo bajo una sola conducción". Está en el interés de la organización en su conjunto que se desarrolle más la capacidad del Secretario General para servir como tercera parte objetiva en el establecimiento de los hechos y observación así como una evaluación más regular y sistemática de la seguridad internacional. En esta tarea deben trabajar juntos el Secretario General y el Consejo de Seguridad.

El desafío más urgente de la organización es llenar el vacío de legitimidad y autoridad respetada, a través de esfuerzos determinados para construir un efectivo sistema político internacional en el cual todos participen. Un sistema que no solamente garantice la supervivencia y el orden sino que haga nuestro planeta más equitativo en el interés de todos sus habitantes. Por eso parece importante examinar el concepto de autoridad internacional y responsabilidad internacional de los Estados, de acuerdo con la Carta de la ONU. La expresión inicial de la Carta, "Nosotros los pueblos de las Naciones Unidas...", señala en este contexto una cuestión muy delicada en la medida en que la independencia nacional y la soberanía de los Estados Miembros es un requisito primordial de la Carta y éstos la ejercen, aunque la soberanía en última instancia reside en los ciudadanos que forman "los pueblos de las Naciones Unidas". Sin duda, Estados nacionales, soberanos e independientes son la mayor entidad política actual y la principal unidad de la estructura de las Naciones Unidas. Por ello, un rol básico de la ONU es servir como fundamento sobre el cual construir el sistema internacional del futuro, un sistema que reconozca plenamente la soberanía nacional pero que, al mismo tiempo, reconozca que algunas de las realidades y preocupaciones del presente demandan algo más, urgentemente. La fundación de las Naciones Unidas debe representar el fin del sistema de acción unilateral, alianzas exclusivas, esferas de influencia y balanzas de poder y todos los otros expedientes que han sido ensayados durante siglos y que siempre han fracasado. Para atender este desafío se formulan las siguientes sugerencias:

1. Los miembros del Consejo de Seguridad, especialmente los permanentes, deberían hacer un esfuerzo decidido y consciente para preservar la paz y evitar que el Consejo sea el campo de batalla de diferencias políticas e ideológicas;
2. En el futuro cercano, el Consejo de Seguridad debería esforzarse por solucionar al menos uno o dos de los mayores problemas que tiene ante sí, y para ello utilizar plenamente los dispositivos de la Carta;
3. Todos los Estados miembros deberían reafirmar las obligaciones contenidas en la Carta, especialmente las relativas al no uso o amenaza de uso de la fuerza, la solución pacífica de controversias, el recurso a los mecanismos previstos en las Cartas para la solución de controversias y el respeto a las decisiones del Consejo de Seguridad. Estas sugerencias pueden parecer simplistas o utópicas, pero no lo son si se tiene en cuenta que la ONU de ninguna manera es un super-Estado. Es una organización de Estados independientes y soberanos, que no tiene soberanía por sí misma, porque ésta la ejercen enteramente en los Estados miembros individualmente.



En el futuro próximo, la cambiante situación mundial podría significar un papel más amplio de las operaciones de paz. “Creo que la capacidad de las Naciones Unidas para establecer la paz se vería considerablemente fortalecida si el Consejo de Seguridad contara con una agenda para la paz”.

“La reforma racional y la renovación de las Naciones Unidas han sido algunas de mis principales preocupaciones. Me gustaría ver a la Organización desempeñando el rol clave que la Carta le asigna, en la promoción del progreso social y mejores niveles de vida para la gente en todo el mundo”. La paz necesariamente requerirá la mejora de la condición humana. Ahora en la post-Guerra Fría tenemos la oportunidad de desarrollar un marco de referencia para relaciones económicas equitativas así como para arreglos para seguridad. Esta necesidad cobra mayor importancia en la medida en que las diferencias ideológicas Este-Oeste están siendo reemplazadas por la amenaza de tensiones globales y regionales debidas a factores económicos y sociales. De ahí la importancia crucial de las dimensiones humanas y sociales del desarrollo. Sin acción internacional concertada esto podría causar desorden político, económico y social a través del mundo. Ninguna nación puede creer que no se verá afectada. La magnitud y la seriedad del problema de la deuda externa demandan un enfoque integral y verdaderamente decisivo. Es imperativo revisar el régimen internacional de comercio. La inestabilidad y la depresión de los precios de las materias primas limitan severamente las posibilidades de progreso de los países en desarrollo. Para asegurar una transición ordenada hay que apoyar la integración de la economía soviética y las de Europa Oriental a la economía mundial. En la raíz de los problemas que afrontamos se encuentra la fractura de estructuras sociales básicas que dejan al individuo desamparado a presiones sociales violentas. La reestructuración de los sistemas económicos no es ni será por sí misma la respuesta a las demandas de justicia social y equidad. En realidad hay un serio peligro de que en las dificultades de la transición, los avances sociales obtenidos en el pasado no puedan ser mantenidos. Los principios fundamentales de la seguridad social y el suministro de servicios esenciales deben conservarse vigentes, independientemente de la configuración de los sistemas económicos. A menos que se encuentren soluciones practicables a los problemas de la pobreza y del desamparo que afligen a la mayor parte del mundo, ningún sistema de seguridad colectiva podrá funcionar efectivamente, por lo que la revitalización del diálogo Norte-Sur se ha hecho ahora más urgente que nunca.

En el futuro la Organización afrontará desafíos de un tipo radicalmente diferente de los que encontró en el pasado. Parecería que en la era a la que estamos ingresando la institución del Estado-nación se verá expuesta a la más dura prueba de su historia. Fuerzas distintas empujan en

diferentes direcciones. Fuerzas económicas hacen al Estado-nación más y más dependiente de la cooperación internacional. Es difícil responder por cuánto tiempo más subsistirá la presente configuración de Estados, pero sería inconveniente ignorar esta cuestión, la Carta de las Naciones Unidas gobierna las relaciones entre Estados. El renacimiento de la Organización ha reflejado un cambio cuantitativo en actitudes y percepciones y ha detenido la erosión de su autoridad y status. También se ha revertido la inacción del Consejo de Seguridad frente a los conflictos. Ahora es notable la coordinación entre el Secretario General y el Consejo de Seguridad.

### III 1988-1989-1990-1991

“Las Naciones Unidas están ingresando en un territorio no recomendado por la Carta y asumiendo tareas de un tipo que no está previsto en su diseño original. Esto reclama el examen de sus órganos principales (...). El único camino disponible es organizar la vida internacional de acuerdo con principios claramente entendidos, generalmente aceptado, y consistentemente aplicado”.

Los acontecimientos de los meses pasados no han sido casuales. Son el resultado de una actividad diplomática sostenida a lo largo de los años por las Naciones Unidas y recientemente intensificada. En materias de paz y seguridad, los órganos principales de las Naciones Unidas han funcionado cada vez más de la manera prevista en la Carta.

El multilateralismo ha demostrado ser mucho más capaz de inspirar confianza y alcanzar resultados. Millones de personas en el mundo han recibido una gratificante prueba del potencial de la Organización y la validez de las esperanzas depositadas en ella.

Por cierto, la situación internacional está todavía marcada por puntos de tensión y peligro. Por lo tanto, no podemos permitirnos caer en la complacencia debido a la reciente resolución de complejos problemas internacionales. Sencillamente ha ocurrido que por primera vez se han observado las posibilidades de establecer la paz a través de los esfuerzos de las Naciones Unidas.

La presente conjunción de esfuerzos y potencialidades abre nuevas perspectivas para nuestro propósito político común. Los asuntos mundiales podrían estar ingresando a una nueva fase. Esta afirmación no es

ni la promesa de un político ni la conclusión de un científico. Pero es una posibilidad y una oportunidad. Para aprovecharla, debemos tener presente nuestra experiencia, nuestros éxitos y nuestros fracasos.

Todo el sistema de seguridad colectiva previsto en la Carta descansa en la aplicación por parte de los miembros permanentes del Consejo de Seguridad, del propósito común de encarar un conflicto tan pronto como se produce. Mientras ellos perciban los problemas regionales en el contexto de sus propias rivalidades, las soluciones permanecerán bloqueadas. Desaparecida esta sombra del paisaje diplomático, los problemas regionales pueden ser abordados en la perspectiva correcta. Un principio subyacente a la Carta es que ambas categorías de miembros en el Consejo de Seguridad, permanentes y no permanentes, deben considerarse como un servicio a la causa de la paz y no como una función de intereses y posiciones unilaterales.

Estas consideraciones se hacen más importantes en vista de la cambiante situación internacional, que bien podría asignar un papel más amplio a las operaciones de mantenimiento de la paz de las Naciones Unidas.

La sociedad mundial se ha visto recientemente muy afectada por la falta de respeto al Derecho Internacional. Si el Derecho Internacional no es respetado por los Estados, no puede haber un marco estable para la cooperación multilateral en nuestro altamente complejo mundo de Estados soberanos e intereses conflictivos. El principio del cumplimiento de los tratados y su ejecución de buena fe (*pacta sunt servanda*) es tan básico como la Carta. El respeto de los acuerdos internacionales no sólo es un principio de Derecho Internacional, sino la base de una comunidad internacional organizada. Si este principio se abandonara, colapsaría toda la superestructura del Derecho Internacional contemporáneo y la de las Naciones Unidas. Todos los Estados, pequeños o grandes, tienen el mismo interés en trabajar por un mundo donde todas las naciones puedan actuar dentro de un sistema de Derecho complejo, coherente y viable. Cualquier desvío de esta pauta significa el mismo peligro para todos. La vigencia de la ley en los asuntos internacionales debe promoverse a través de una mayor utilización de la Corte Internacional de Justicia.

La invasión y pretendida anexión de Kuwait por Iraq en 1990 suscitó una respuesta histórica del Consejo de Seguridad. En una serie de resoluciones sin precedente, el Consejo estableció que tales acciones, que contravienen concretamente los principios de la Carta y del Derecho Internacional, no pueden ser cometidas con impunidad.

La vigencia del derecho en los asuntos internacionales también puede promoverse a través de la mayor utilización de la Corte Internacional

de Justicia, no solamente sometiendo a su consideración disputas de naturaleza legal sino también solicitando su opinión consultiva sobre los aspectos legales de una disputa.

El renacimiento del multilateralismo fortalecerá la capacidad de las Naciones Unidas para responder a los retos y oportunidades del orden internacional de la postGuerra Fría. Ahora existe un viento ligero pero favorable. Podríamos estar ingresando a una nueva fase de los asuntos mundiales. Una nueva situación de seguridad está siendo configurada a nivel global a través de las rápidas mejoras en la relación EsteOeste. Se observa el amanecer de una nueva era en Europa, rayos de luz en algunas regiones. Pero, en otras, se observa el desarrollo de antiguas animosidades y nuevos antagonismos. Hemos empezado a observar el funcionamiento de Naciones Unidas previsto en la Carta. Los dos principales bloques de poder han iniciado la búsqueda de bases para una paz entre ellos. Todo esto es alentador y prometedor. Cada vez más, los principales órganos de las Naciones Unidas están trabajando en la forma prevista en la Carta. Más que cualquier otra alternativa, el multilateralismo ha demostrado ser capaz de inspirar confianza y obtener resultados. En las gestiones para resolver las mayores cuestiones políticas de nuestra agenda, debemos tener presentes las implicaciones de nuestra experiencia, sean éxitos o fracasos. El surgimiento del interés público en la Organización ha sido repentino. Nuestra experiencia ha demostrado cómo el manejo cooperativo de una variedad de problemas globales, reflejando una comunidad de intereses entre los Estados miembros, es una idea enteramente ejecutable. Se necesita un esfuerzo mayor para que la utilización del veto sea más juiciosa y principista, a fin de restaurar la capacidad del Consejo de Seguridad para restablecer la paz. En el ambiente internacional que se está configurando, la protección de los derechos humanos se ha convertido en un asunto clave en la búsqueda de la paz. Cada vez se siente más que la no interferencia con la esencial jurisdicción nacional de los Estados, no puede ser vista como una barrera protectora detrás de la cual los derechos humanos pueden ser violados impunemente de manera masiva o sistemática. Lo que la presente etapa de las relaciones internacionales exige no es un proceso de teorización, sino un mayor grado de cooperación y una combinación de sentido común y compasión.

## Notas

- 1) Javier Pérez de Cuéllar. *Anarchy or Order*. United Nations Publications, ISBN 92-1-100466-7, Nueva York. 1991.
- (2) Durante un decenio que representa una fase formativa y de avance del multilateralismo, desde la Secretaría General de las Naciones Unidas, el Embajador Javier Pérez de Cuéllar condujo al renacimiento a una organización peligrosamente asediada en 1982 por el

efecto acumulado de crisis simultáneas de identidad, funcionalidad y credibilidad en las que la había sumido la rigidez de la dinámica Este-Oeste. Sus informes anuales sobre el funcionamiento de la Organización contienen evaluaciones de los acontecimientos mundiales, desde una perspectiva central. Sin embargo, esta síntesis consigna esquemáticamente solamente sus anticipadas reflexiones sobre el desafío funcional que actualmente encara la Organización y sugerencias para su mejor funcionamiento sobre la base de un proceso racional de reforma que fue el objetivo más importante de su administración. De manera incluso más persuasiva y personal, estos conceptos también los ha expuesto y reafirmado, en sus presentaciones en la Universidad de Burdeos (24 de abril de 1991, sobre el Derecho Internacional como está reflejado en la Carta de las Naciones Unidas), en la Universidad de San Galen (17 de junio de 1991, sobre las implicaciones del conflicto en el Golfo Pérsico para las Naciones Unidas), en la Universidad de Florencia (22 de noviembre de 1991, sobre la responsabilidad internacional de los Estados que han suscrito la Carta de las Naciones Unidas) y en la Universidad de Salamanca (26 de noviembre de 1991, sobre asuntos relacionados con los derechos humanos). Los diez informes se han reunido en tres grupos que constituyen unidades “arquitectónicas” distintas en forma y contenido.

- (3) Completa su primer mandato de cinco años.

## ***COLOQUIO DE LA ACADEMIA DIPLOMÁTICA DEL PERÚ***

*28 de enero del 2010*

**Palabras del Rector de Academia  
Diplomática del Perú**

**Coloquio**

**Rueda de preguntas**

**Trayectoria de Javier Pérez de Cuéllar**



Foto: Palabras del Embajador José Antonio Meier en el coloquio al Embajador Javier Pérez de Cuéllar.



**Palabras del rector de la Academia Diplomática del Perú,  
embajador José Antonio Meier, con motivo del homenaje al  
embajador Javier Pérez de Cuéllar**

Muy buenas tardes a todos.  
Señor Viceministro,  
Señor Secretario General,  
Señores embajadores,  
Señores congresistas,  
Señores subsecretarios,  
Señores colegas,  
Señores estudiantes y profesores de la Academia Diplomática del Perú,  
Señores de la Planta Orgánica de la Academia Diplomática,  
Señoras y señores, amigos todos.

**H**oy es un día especial para la Academia Diplomática del Perú. Especial, digo, porque en primer lugar tenemos entre nosotros la presencia del embajador Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, quien con gran entusiasmo ha aceptado participar en este evento y a quien todos nosotros conocemos y admiramos por su excelencia personal, por su talento en el ejercicio de nuestra profesión y por su encumbrada trayectoria en la diplomacia y en la política nacional e internacional.

Es especial, en segundo lugar, porque con este evento la Academia se suma a las numerosas y diversas expresiones y manifestaciones de homenaje por los 90 años de vida que ha celebrado el embajador Javier Pérez de Cuéllar.

Aquí, en la Academia Diplomática, lo saludamos muy efusivamente, por eso le queremos decir que a nosotros no nos cabe la menor duda de que a estos 90 años le seguirán otros muchos años, no solamente de vida, sino también de pervivencia de su nombre y figura en el corazón de nuestra alma máter, la Academia Diplomática, y en el Servicio Diplomático de la República.

En este centro de estudios tenemos no solo esa convicción, sino también una importante contribución por la cual expresamos en público nuestro agradecimiento al embajador Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, quien ha donado para nuestra biblioteca una de sus valiosas colecciones de libros y de bibliografía de las Naciones Unidas, que son ahora de gran utilidad para la formación de los aspirantes de nuestra diplomacia. En ese sentido, no como retribución, sino como un ofrecimiento, embajador, la Academia

Diplomática del Perú está plena de disposición para publicar los libros que usted ha escrito y todavía no están editados, o cualquier otro escrito que usted considere que pueda llegar a nuestra diplomacia.

En tercer lugar, es especial esta noche porque con estas auspiciosas y buenas señales que he mencionado, la Academia Diplomática inaugura una secuencia regular y periódica de eventos que hemos querido llamar Coloquios de la Academia Diplomática. Estos coloquios tendrán como propósito hacer de la Academia no solo la sede de la formación y de la capacitación de los aspirantes y de los miembros del Servicio Diplomático de la República, sino también para convertirla en un foro, en un espacio de reflexión y de diálogo intergeneracional abierto a la opinión pública y al público en general, para reflexionar sobre el presente, el pasado y el futuro de la diplomacia peruana; para dialogar sobre temas y tópicos de nuestra política exterior y de nuestra historia diplomática, así como sobre las relaciones internacionales del Perú.

El sentido de la presencia de nuestros invitados será recuperar y recrear vivencias y experiencias, así como momentos, episodios y etapas de nuestra diplomacia, para no perderlas, no olvidarlas, para que permanezcan en el tiempo sus enseñanzas y verdades, y, sobre todo, para que nos ayuden a explicar el presente y el futuro de nuestra institución y de nuestro país.

Estos coloquios van a ser grabados en audio y video, y se publicarán en medios magnéticos e impresos.

La Academia Diplomática agradece al doctor Fernando Carvallo, quien generosamente ha aceptado esta noche ser el interlocutor del embajador Javier Pérez de Cuéllar. Para resumir la variada y sustantiva trayectoria del doctor Carvallo, quien es amigo cercano y conocedor de la trayectoria del embajador Pérez de Cuéllar, debo decir que es filósofo, historiador y periodista, y que actualmente forma parte de la Comisión de Alto Nivel para el Lugar de la Memoria, que preside otro insigne peruano, el escritor Mario Vargas Llosa.

El programa que seguiremos hoy, luego de la introducción, será de aproximadamente 1 hora 40 minutos de coloquio, y 20 minutos de preguntas para los presentes, y después los invitaremos a un cóctel que se dará en la parte de atrás de los jardines de la Academia.

Finalmente, estoy seguro que todos estamos de acuerdo en dar la bienvenida al embajador Javier Pérez de Cuéllar con un cálido y fuerte aplauso.

28 de enero de 2010




Foto: Embajador Javier Pérez de Cuéllar y doctor Fernando Carvallo

## COLOQUIO

### Palabras introductorias del doctor Fernando Carvallo

**P**ermitame, señor rector José Antonio Meier, comenzar mis palabras parafraseando las primeras que pronunció el embajador Javier Pérez de Cuéllar en el acto en el cual la Municipalidad de Miraflores cedió el terreno destinado al Lugar de la Memoria.

Él dijo ahí: “Yo estoy aquí por convicción”. Es lo mismo que yo digo ahora: Estoy acá por una doble convicción. La primera es que la trayectoria y la obra de Javier Pérez de Cuéllar tienen un significado que debe ser cultivado y transmitido a las nuevas generaciones de un país que necesita mayores valores enraizados en sus instituciones y sus comportamientos sociales. La segunda convicción tiene que ver con este lugar, con la Academia Diplomática. Me honro de haber sido profesor en ella hace más de treinta años, pero sobre todo, soy conciente, por haber vivido en el extranjero, de la necesidad de que ella imparta la mejor formación posible, porque nuestro Estado requiere hoy más que nunca de profesionales con una dedicación debidamente formada. Es por eso que es una gran idea dar inicio a estos coloquios invitando al doctor Pérez de Cuéllar.

Dicho esto, quisiera comenzar preguntándole –después de haber escuchado el discurso que pronunció durante la inauguración del nuevo local de la ONU en Lima “Casa Javier Pérez de Cuéllar”, en que usted dijo, Javier, que la diplomacia forma parte de la defensa nacional–... *¿Cuál es el acento que usted quiere poner?, ¿qué quiso subrayar cuando pronunció esas palabras?*

**JPC:** Yo creo que bastaría con retroceder en la historia de todos y cada uno de los países de este mundo, para comprobar que la diplomacia tiene como tarea fundamental la defensa de los intereses externos de un país. Ahora, esa defensa no solamente es militar, sería absurdo pensar que solo las fuerzas armadas defienden los intereses del país. Primero, y ante todo, los defiende la diplomacia, es decir, nosotros los diplomáticos. Aquellos que trabajamos dentro del marco de la diplomacia no hacemos otra cosa sino informar y negociar. Negociar es, simplemente, el hecho de procurar pacíficamente la solución de los problemas. Entonces, yo creo que es indispensable que al pensar en la necesidad de la defensa nacional, o en la defensa de los intereses

nacionales, se estudien todos los problemas actuales y potenciales sin descanso y sin descuidar un elemento muy importante, creo yo, que es la prevención; y entonces ahí surge una figura prácticamente nueva de diplomacia que es la diplomacia preventiva, es decir, la que no solamente actúa en el momento en que el problema surge, sino que analiza todo el panorama político internacional y ve por dónde puede venir el problema, de dónde puede venir la amenaza, y eso es la prevención.

En Naciones Unidas, durante los diez años que fui secretario general, en todos mis informes sucesivos siempre puse especial énfasis en la prevención, ya que Naciones Unidas también debe prevenir y advertir a quien corresponda; para eso tiene un equipo muy grande que está destinado justamente a eso. Desgraciadamente, ello no quiere decir que lo hagan a la maravilla; a veces hay, naturalmente, deficiencias.

Recuerdo un caso que fue en realidad sumamente importante. Estoy hablando ahora del plano internacional y no del nacional, pero viene a ser lo mismo. Cuando comenzó la guerra entre Iraq y un pequeño emirato llamado Kuwait. Todos los diplomáticos en Naciones Unidas estábamos observando la situación, que era muy tensa porque Kuwait había sido una colonia inglesa que luego se convirtió, naturalmente, en un país independiente, pero Iraq consideraba que ese pequeño territorio –pero con pozos de petróleo– era parte de su territorio. Entonces, un día llega un informante a mi despacho y me dice: Señor, hay cien mil soldados iraquíes en la frontera entre Iraq y Kuwait. Yo me preguntaba, ¿cómo podía ser que no se hubiera previsto? Esos famosos diplomáticos de todas partes del mundo –sobre todo, me refiero a Estados Unidos y Rusia, y a sus aviones de observación–, ¿no han visto que había cien mil hombres en la frontera entre Iraq y Kuwait? Se comenzó a negociar, pero al día siguiente invadieron Kuwait. Cuando yo fui a ver al presidente Saddam Hussein para tratar de convencerlo de retirarse, le dije: Presidente, tiene usted que tener en cuenta que detrás suyo, detrás de su país, hay la fuerza militar más poderosa de la historia (me refería a los aliados, los norteamericanos, los franceses, los ingleses, todos estaban ahí). Entonces me dijo simplemente: No, mire usted, y me enseñó un mapa, era un mapa antiguo, y en ese mapa no existía Kuwait. Entonces, ¿qué quiere decir? Que los ingleses hicieron una descolonización en su interés y no de acuerdo a justicia. Yo le dije: Presidente, pero para eso existe la Corte Internacional de Justicia, ¿por qué no acude usted a la justicia?; además, entiendo que usted es abogado. No, no –me dijo– yo no soy abogado, yo estudié abogacía, pero muy ligeramente, en Egipto.

Ahí hubo falta de prevención. Cómo puede explicarse que esos aviones maravillosos que cruzaban todos los territorios del mundo no vieran que había cien mil hombres que se habían agrupado ahí... eso ya no era prevención, era, simplemente, comprobar una realidad.

La prevención es mucho más que eso, la prevención en ese caso hubiera permitido iniciar una acción para detener la invasión. Mas la prevención va más allá: la prevención consiste, como acabo de decir, en analizar la problemática internacional y ver cuáles son las medidas que se deben tomar a fin de evitar un problema por medios pacíficos. Para eso sirven las Naciones Unidas: para intervenir, para negociar soluciones pacíficas de un problema de carácter internacional. Y, ¿qué es la diplomacia? La diplomacia es negociar, negociar, negociar constantemente para encontrar soluciones pacíficas a los problemas externos de un Estado, aunque sean los más complejos, y que pueden terminar en instancias internacionales.

Yo espero que esta política siga desarrollándose. En todo caso, cuando yo fui secretario general durante diez años me pasé la vida negociando, y ese era mi deber: prever y negociar. Previendo para evitar tener que ir hasta la negociación, avanzar hacia una negociación cuando ya la negociación tenía lugar y estaba más duro el ambiente para la negociación.

Bueno no quiero hacer un monólogo aquí.

*FC: No, no, todas tus palabras son apreciadas.*

**JPC:** A lo que voy es a lo siguiente: yo entré al Ministerio, como ustedes saben, en el año 1940. Ahí solo era un simple trabajo administrativo el Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores. Entré, pues, al Ministerio cuando tenía 20 años y al mismo tiempo era estudiante en la universidad, pues ya me había propuesto ser diplomático y estudiar Derecho con una inclinación hacia lo internacional, estudiaba sobre todo Derecho Internacional. Yo tengo por esta profesión que es la de los alumnos que por ahí deben estar y que no los veo, el interés de que se formen diplomáticos que estén a la altura de su tarea. Miren ustedes, el diplomático cuando está en el extranjero, inclusive cuando está en el Perú, es un representante; él representa, ¿a quién representa?, al Perú; desde el tercer secretario hasta el embajador, todos son representantes del Perú en el extranjero, ¿y eso qué cosa quiere decir?, que todos ellos deben tener una conducta impecable cuando estén no solamente en el extranjero, sino también en el Perú, porque son los representantes del país, y eso es algo que yo quisiera que lo comprendieran los jóvenes, sobre todo los más jóvenes, que,



evidentemente, no están muy inclinados a la reflexión. Entonces, ayudarlos a reflexionar y a que comprendan que son representantes, y el ser representante quiere decir muchas cosas, quiere decir: estar a la altura de la tarea. Por más que sea un tercer secretario, debe tener la preparación para hablar con diplomáticos de otros países, para hablar inclusive, puede darse el caso, que tengan que ir al Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de un país y tengan que hacer una gestión, por más informal que sea, o menos importante que sea. Lo que tienen también que pensar es en su aspecto físico, en su presentación, eso es muy importante, no se imaginan ustedes a un diplomático que vaya sin corbata al Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, no sé, de Inglaterra, Francia, Alemania, o inclusive dentro de América Latina. Hay que tener ese doble rigor y meterse bien en la cabeza que son representantes y que tienen ellos la obligación de representar bien a su país. Eso creo que es fundamental; de ahí, de ese concepto de la representación se va a derivar una serie de obligaciones, que ya después iremos analizando –con tu ayuda– para comprender qué importante es la diplomacia.

El general De Gaulle –de quien ustedes habrán oído hablar, seguramente, un gran, gran hombre en Francia– ... en todo caso, le contaba a mi amigo hace unos días que [el general De Gaulle] decía, hablando con otra persona: Para mí, hay tres instituciones que son importantes e indispensables en cada país: la fuerza armada, la justicia y la diplomacia. Dicho por un general, no por un diplomático, por un general, un famoso general. O sea, lo que es la importancia de la diplomacia a la que no le damos el mérito que tiene o que debe tener. Por eso, hace unos días decía yo que la diplomacia debería ser considerada como se consideran a las fuerzas armadas. No porque no tengan armas son menos representativos o menos expresión de la defensa nacional, el civil... yo he sido civil, los diplomáticos que están aquí, todos hemos sido civiles, hemos estado en muchas partes del mundo representando a nuestro país, no tenemos uniforme porque ya el uniforme diplomático no existe, pero era nuestra calidad humana, nuestra calidad intelectual, la calidad de nuestra conducta las que nos hacían representantes y nos hacían hábiles. De manera que por eso digo yo que las fuerzas armadas son muy respetables, las respetamos todos, pero nosotros también somos respetables, los diplomáticos y el cuerpo diplomático en general, la diplomacia en general; no tenemos armas, tenemos el arma de la inteligencia; el arma que tenemos, que es la más hermosa de todas, es el luchar por la paz, por la solución pacífica.



Foto: Embajador Javier Pérez de Cuéllar

**FC:** *Usted más que nadie, seguramente, ha tenido contacto con diplomáticos de muchos países diferentes, ha visto la formación que cada uno de estos Estados aporta a quienes quieren entrar en la carrera. ¿Qué cosa es lo que recomendaría usted para la formación de jóvenes que están actualmente preparándose para ser representantes, o que lo quieran ser más adelante?, ¿qué es indispensable?*

**JPC:** Que vengan a la Academia Diplomática.

**FC:** *Sí, ¿pero qué es lo que la Academia puede darles? ¿Cómo definir lo que son las tareas para actuar con eficacia en la diplomacia del siglo XXI? ¿Qué es lo que tienen que aprender y a qué deben concentrar los jóvenes estudiantes sus energías?*

**JPC:** En primer lugar, les voy a decir una cosa que, no sé, creo que alguna vez la dije: yo, cuando era diplomático y estaba en Torre Tagle, era profesor de la Academia Diplomática y uno de mis sueños era ser director de la Academia Diplomática; pero la superioridad, como se dice, quería otra cosa y me mandaron a no sé qué parte del mundo, pero yo tenía ese sueño de ser el director de la Academia Diplomática y ayudar a la formación de mis jóvenes colaboradores. Yo creo que en el fondo todo diplomático mayor –como es el caso mío y es el caso de muy pocos de los que están aquí alrededor– [considera que] su deber es ese, justamente, tratar de educar –aunque no sean sus hijos, son sus hijos, son sus hermanitos, digamos, dentro de la gran idea de la diplomacia–, ayudarlos y enfocarlos para que cada vez se perfeccionen. La diplomacia se considera una carrera, en una carrera se corre, en una carrera uno no se estanca, y estando en la carrera diplomática... pues a correr para hacer cada vez más méritos y servir mejor a su país.

**FC:** *Hay mucha tendencia hoy a creer que en nuestra época globalizada –donde vemos canales de televisión de muchas partes del mundo, en donde la tecnología digital permite que accedamos a información que proviene de los cinco continentes– tenemos una relación que no existía antes con el contexto internacional. Frente a esta imagen que hoy circula, usted ha contado en varias oportunidades cómo en los años 20 se fue forjando durante su infancia, su adolescencia, la vocación diplomática a través de la observación en las calles de Lima, durante los días de fiesta, de las banderas de otros países –creo que usted contaba qué países tenían más banderas el día de la fiesta nacional–, y tiene, también, una relación visual con las estampillas de otros países y con las medallas de otros países, de manera que su acceso a la geografía internacional es, finalmente, visual, plástico. ¿Cómo es que se forma la vocación de un diplomático en esa época?*

**JPC:** Bueno, la vocación de un diplomático, evidentemente lo que acabas de decir es cierto, cuando yo era niño había monedas, me interesaban las monedas, había estampillas, me interesaba de dónde era esa estampilla, de dónde era esa otra estampilla. Me interesaba lo internacional y desde muy joven quise aprender idiomas, aprendí mal que bien dos idiomas. Y entonces, yo, sin saberlo, me estaba encaminando hacia la diplomacia; yo no era conciente de que ese amor a las estampillas, que ese amor a las monedas, que ese amor, por ejemplo, a las revistas que por mi casa pasaban en inglés y en francés –aunque no entendía nada me concentraba en esas revistas– [me encaminaban].

Me acuerdo que cuando llegué a París en el año 1945, me encontré con un amigo muy querido, también diplomático como yo, y nos paseábamos en la Plaza de la Concordia, que es una plaza muy bella. Entonces le decía yo a mi amigo: Oye, cómo se parece esto que estamos viendo a las imágenes que tan ambiciosamente mirábamos en nuestras casas, en los lugares adonde íbamos ¿no? O sea, que las ideas de la diplomacia, del exterior, me venían, justamente, de esa atracción que tenía a lo extranjero, pero una atracción que, naturalmente, no me desviaba ni un milímetro de mi interés por mi país. Ya desde chico, yo lo tenía. Con un pariente mío o dos parientes –tenía 13 ó 14 años–, hacíamos celebraciones de 28 de Julio, cada uno hacía su disfraz, más o menos cachivachero, sí, en todo caso muy patriótico, es decir, el incentivo de lo peruano, el amor de lo peruano. Yo viajaba más o menos. Me acuerdo que una vez, sin querer acabé en Bolivia, cuando tenía, no sé, 21 años. Es la atracción de lo extranjero.

Ahora, lo extranjero, ¿por qué?, ¿porque es extranjero? No, a uno le debe interesar lo extranjero para saber qué puede uno obtener –para sí mismo y eventualmente para su propio país– de la formación que se adquiere inevitablemente en ciertos países. Realmente se respira la cultura y eso hay que adquirirlo y, una vez adquirido, hay que acrecentarlo, afinarlo, perfeccionarlo, y así resulté yo un diplomático, prácticamente sin que lo hubiera decidido; justo cuando tenía 20 años entré al Ministerio, yo ya sabía más o menos cómo era el camino. Entonces, como dije en un discurso hace unos pocos días, para mí Torre Tagle era un barco y entré a ese barco con el deseo de aprender a navegar y, en realidad, durante los años que estuve en el Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores aprendí tantas cosas porque siempre estaba al acecho de lo que yo podía aprender de los demás, tuve excelentes jefes, no solamente los recuerdo, sino que tengo por ellos gratitud. Estoy pensando, por ejemplo, en el embajador Correa Elías, el embajador Irigoyen, el embajador Machiavello, el

embajador La Mata. Todos esos señores siempre me impulsaban: si yo hacía algo bien, me lo celebraban, me ascendían, yo ascendía así como si fuera un globo por eso de que siempre estaba escuchando lo que tenía que aprender. Si yo quería ser diplomático, tenía que aprender a ser diplomático y para eso tenía que oír, tenía que escuchar a mis profesores, a mis jefes.

De manera que yo quisiera que los alumnos de la Academia que están aquí comprendieran eso. En realidad, están adquiriendo una responsabilidad muy grande, la de representar al país, y para bien representarlo tienen ellos que comenzar desde ahora, que están entrando a la Academia, a quererse a sí mismos. Eso de la vocación es cierto, es más o menos como la vocación religiosa. Entonces ¡mejor hubiese sido religioso!, de todas maneras la vocación religiosa es algo más espiritual ¿no?; es decir, tiene una suerte de misticismo. Yo no soy un hombre muy místico, pero sí considero que el deseo de ser diplomático tiene que surgir desde la enseñanza de los primeros grados. Claro que en el colegio algo se ha aprendido, supongo, aunque la formación escolar en nuestro país, desgraciadamente, no es lo suficientemente adelantada. Pero sí, de todas maneras, si yo he escogido el ser diplomático, he asumido una obligación, y esa obligación es representar bien al país.

*FC: Usted ha usado la expresión “amor por el Perú”. Yo recuerdo también que en su discurso en la nueva Casa de la ONU, usted dijo que reclama tener una única virtud, que no está de moda decirlo: “Patriotismo” y, sin embargo, todo el mundo reconoce su sensibilidad por otros países, su apertura a otras culturas, y entre ellas yo pienso que Francia lo ocupa en un lugar particular. Usted sale del Perú en el año 1944, llega a Francia en 1945 y se queda siete largos años. Antes de estar ahí, tengo entendido, que había ya manifestado su amor por la bella Francia que amamos, junto a la profesora de lengua francesa que, siendo alsaciana, tenía simpatía por el régimen nazi de la época. Es decir, como alumno de lengua francesa ya usted señala un afecto bastante definido hacia lo que Francia debía significar. ¿Cómo entender estos dos amores paralelos, ese amor asombrado que usted tiene?*

**JPC:** Es que en el fondo no son paralelos; en realidad, lo que absorbía en el extranjero, ¿para qué era?, para mejorarme a mí mismo y servir a mi país, o sea que era una especie de escuela permanente de formación para al final servir al Perú; y donde yo he estado, siempre la idea mía era servir al Perú. Era secretario general de Naciones Unidas, un señor que tiene una multitud de problemas, pero yo nunca olvidaba que yo era peruano, que lo que yo estaba haciendo

lo había aprendido inicialmente en el Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, y ahí mi devoción al Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y devoción por la diplomacia, porque yo sentía que tenía que devolver mejorado lo que había recibido en el extranjero. Es muy sencillo, me parece que es lógico, una cosa proviene de la otra.

Por ejemplo, el amor a Francia en esa época se vinculaba un poco con la libertad y con la democracia. Entonces, yo, que creo tener una formación democrática muy grande, creo en el estado de derecho, no solamente porque soy abogado o porque soy diplomático, creo en el estado de derecho porque es la única manera de que haya en un país justicia social, y yo, naturalmente, aspiro a que en mi país haya un estado de derecho, y eso lo aprendí mucho más en el extranjero que en el Perú. En el Perú... yo salí cuando tenía 20 años, no quiero recordar qué gobierno había, porque no quiero entrar en evaluaciones políticas, pero me daba cuenta que mi país estaba, evidentemente, atrasado, que lo que necesitaba era mejorar, ¿y cómo mejorar?, aprendiendo del extranjero para verterlo hacia mi propio país.

*FC: Una de las grandes paradojas, sorpresas, milagros, se podría decir también, de su estadía como joven diplomático en Francia, es que le permite asistir a las primeras reuniones instalatorias de la ONU que tuvieron lugar en Londres. Pese a que usted estaba destacado, creo, como tercer secretario en París, es enviado a Londres, y por esa razón, es que asiste usted, a los 28 años, a la elección del primer secretario de la ONU.*

**JPC:** Sí, en efecto, es así. Yo estaba en París, el Gobierno designó una delegación para que lo representara en la Primera Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas, algo pobre –porque Relaciones Exteriores siempre está necesitando dinero para cumplir sus deberes. En realidad, la delegación peruana era muy pequeña, y entonces pensó en destacar a jóvenes secretarios de las embajadas que estaban en Europa. Yo pasé de París a Londres, otro colega pasó de Roma a Londres y el tercero... ya no me acuerdo de dónde fue movido. Pero, en fin, fuimos los tres ahí a cumplir una obligación. Nos habían llamado para eso, para aprender. Primera vez que en grande veíamos cómo funcionaba que 150 países, jefes de Estado, ministros de Relaciones Exteriores estuvieran todos reunidos. Presencé cómo se elegía, por ejemplo –como dice aquí mi amigo–, al primer secretario general de las Naciones Unidas. Yo me acuerdo que junto a Perú estaban Paraguay y no sé qué países con la letra P, nos tocó el fondo de la gran sala, y veía a este señor llamado Trygve Lie, que era noruego, cuando lo eligieron secretario general. No me impresionó mayor-

mente, pues todavía no había percibido bien lo que significaba las Naciones Unidas. Al principio parecía una conferencia como cualquier otra; sin embargo, era el inicio de una verdadera revolución a nivel mundial, a nivel planetario, y digo planetario porque Naciones Unidas excede a lo político –Naciones Unidas como sistema–, porque hay Naciones Unidas en Nueva York y hay Naciones Unidas en París, hay Naciones Unidas en Roma, hay Naciones Unidas en todas partes, que asumen problemas concretos de orden científico, por eso hablamos de Sistema de las Naciones Unidas. Ahí comencé a negociar, porque estaba en juego una candidatura para la comisión económica y había un solo puesto para América Latina; entonces, se trataba de ganar ese puesto para América Latina. Los señores embajadores, muy distinguidos y muy distantes, no se movieron. Los tres secretarios, en el grado más bajo, fuimos los que hicimos toda la negociación con los árabes y con todos los que no estaban comprometidos; las grandes potencias comprometen su voto, en tanto que los países árabes no saben, porque no tienen experiencia, entonces a ese “atacábamos”. Me acuerdo las imágenes de esos embajadores árabes, ministros y algunos emires árabes con sus grandes trajes, y nosotros nos atrevíamos a decirles: Oiga, usted sabe, nosotros somos del Perú, que necesita terriblemente de una asistencia de parte de Naciones Unidas en materia económica y que... no sé qué. Y así ganamos, y luego les dijimos a los señores distinguidos que estaban en la primera fila –como es el caso ahora, que son, además de distinguidas, personas amigas–: hemos ganado esto. ¿Así, y cómo han hecho? Me daban ganas de decirles: trabajando, mientras ustedes estaban detrás de sus asientos en primera fila. Esa es, en realidad, la satisfacción que uno tiene cuando es joven y cuando se siente joven útil. Yo me sentía joven útil, y mis amigos, los tres nos sentíamos jóvenes útiles que habíamos logrado para nuestro país una posición internacional. Imagínense, yo con la edad que tenía en esa época, ¿cómo se me podía ocurrir que iba a ser útil a mi país de esa manera? El empeño de lograr algo sirvió, ¿no?

*FC: Después de haber servido usted en Francia, Suiza, Bolivia, Brasil, Rusia, es nombrado embajador ante la ONU. Poco a poco va asumiendo también responsabilidades dentro del organismo multilateral que se ocupa de casos delicados como el fin de la colonización en Namibia, el problema de la invasión de Chipre, el problema de Afganistán, que veo que usted caracterizó hace poco como uno de los más conflictivos en el mundo de hoy. Y estos pasos que va dando hacia conflictos internacionales lo llevan, finalmente, a la Secretaría de la ONU, donde se ocupó de muchísimas cosas que no podríamos abordar: algunas guerras dolorosas como las Malvinas, cerca de no-*



*sotros; algunas guerras distantes, pero no por eso menos dolorosas, también. Yo quisiera que nos explique algo sobre un proceso general que se produce durante su mandato, que es el fin de la guerra fría. Resulta ahora fácil creer que todo se produjo entre el año 1989 y el año 1991, pero quien haga historia de los años 80, durante su mandato, se acuerda que no fue así, que hubo signos que muchos no supieron interpretar y que usted fue uno de los primeros en el mundo, me parece, que supo interpretar gracias a su relación con el presidente soviético de la época, Mijail Gorbachov, dado que usted conocía el régimen soviético porque había pasado algunos años en Moscú.*

**JPC:** En realidad el fin de la guerra fría, se inicia, diría yo, en la época de Reagan, cuando los rusos llegaron a la conclusión que no podían embarcarse en una “Guerra de las Estrellas” con los Estados Unidos pues no tenían las condiciones, ni militares ni técnicas. Yo había tenido la suerte de ir a Moscú, justo con motivo de la muerte del presidente Chernenko. Durante los años que fui secretario general, fui tres veces a Moscú por el fallecimiento de tres presidentes. Estando ahí, el novísimo secretario general del partido y presidente de Rusia, Mijail Gorbachov, me invitó a verlo, lo que me llamó la atención porque el secretario general ruso, en general, solo recibía a determinados presidentes, como Francia, Italia, etc. Comenzó francamente a decirme que lo que quería su gobierno era darle toda la atención de la diplomacia rusa a las Naciones Unidas, que esta actúe en el marco de las Naciones Unidas y que en ese marco se resuelvan los problemas internacionales. Era una forma de decir que ellos ya no podían con los norteamericanos porque habían avanzado mucho en tecnología, y que querían ir al Consejo de Seguridad y dentro de ese marco empezar a negociar sobre los grandes problemas. Obviamente, yo solo oía, y no hice ninguna intervención. Solamente, como secretario general, traté del cobro de una deuda millonaria que tenía Rusia con Naciones Unidas, y él llamó a su ministro de Economía y le indicó que se pagara la deuda y, en efecto, pagó de inmediato un tercio. Llegué a la conclusión de que como los norteamericanos habían llegado a un nivel de poderío, los rusos se dieron cuenta que no podían competir con los Estados Unidos. Es a partir de entonces que todo comenzó a ser negociado en el Consejo de Seguridad, donde los cinco tienen el derecho a vetar, ya que para eso se creó el veto, pensando en protegerse ellos mismos. Entonces yo aproveché para ir adelantando mis fichas, y se consiguió más diálogo entre los cinco. Pudimos verlo, por ejemplo, en la guerra entre Iraq y Kuwait, y luego en la de Afganistán, en la que intervine cuando yo era secretario adjunto; la de América Central; el fin de la guerra Irán-Iraq, que había durado ocho años.

En todo hubo consenso de los cinco, y creo que fue resultado del fin de la guerra fría.

**FC:** *Recuerdo que al término de su mandato de diez años en la ONU, usted se instala en Francia a principios de los años 90 y empiezo yo a tratarlo con mucha frecuencia. Recuerdo el sufrimiento que le causó el maltrato al servicio diplomático en 1992 y las consecuencias para nuestra diplomacia, y cuando todos pensábamos que usted estaba gozando de un reposo bien merecido, decide entrar en la política y es allí donde decide convertirse en candidato opositor en el año 1995 y usted hace una campaña exigente y dura, yo recuerdo que empieza por Puno. ¿Cuáles son las costumbres, hábitos, que supone pasar de ser diplomático a político?*

**JPC:** Es muy simple, yo había escuchado decir –tanto aquí en Lima como afuera–: este señor ha pasado su vida de diplomático, ha alcanzado posiciones muy altas, Secretario General de las Naciones Unidas, pero, ¿qué ha hecho por el Perú? Yo tuve la ingenuidad de creer que podía ser un candidato a la presidencia por haber acumulado muchas experiencias a través de los años, pero mi cálculo fue equivocado. Además, me decían que había que acabar con ese gobierno, que mi obligación era esa, cambiar las cosas totalmente. El fracaso fue el resultado. Y abandoné la política. Cuando terminé en Naciones Unidas estaba establecido en el Perú un régimen con el que no estaba de acuerdo y pensé que, aunque estuviese de opositor en el Perú, nadie me iba a hacer caso. Ya me habían demostrado que no les importaba mi persona y me fui de regreso a Francia donde estaba instalado. En setiembre del año 2000, luego de la caída del nefasto régimen, me llama el presidente Paniagua para que fuera el Primer Ministro y ministro de Relaciones Exteriores del gobierno de transición. La propuesta era para mí irresistible: moverse dentro del marco democrático y servir bien a mi país. Acepté y fueron ocho meses. Fue una suerte de desquite después del fracaso de 1995: el poder servir en democracia en mi país.

**FC:** *Un tema referido a la cultura. Los testimonios referidos a usted de los años 30, por ejemplo, de Carlos Alzamora, Fernando de Szyszlo y de su esposa, hablan de un joven que siempre está leyendo y hasta en los clubes deportivos siempre se le veía leyendo –me han dicho–, y otro compromiso –que he visto acometer con mucha energía– es, en el seno de la UNESCO, sobre la diversidad cultural. Desde los años 90, durante muchos años, usted reúne a personalidades de todas las regiones y lugares del mundo, lo que más tarde debía llamarse el choque de civilizaciones, predicando la necesidad de reconocer diferencias de origen cultural en el interior de los Estados y entre*

*los Estados. ¿Cuál es la importancia que la cultura tiene hoy en las relaciones internacionales y en la vida de las sociedades modernas?*

**JPC:** A lo largo de los años, he seguido siempre la cultura de los países en los que he servido como diplomático. En realidad, desde mi infancia casi, tuve un gran interés en la literatura y en la música. En la Universidad Católica estudiaba en la Facultad de Letras al mismo tiempo que en la Facultad de Derecho; además, desde niño había siempre tenido afición por el arte. Bueno, tenía elementos que me llevaron a servir en el campo cultural y no solo político. Así que mientras yo estaba refugiado en París qué grato refugio, el secretario general de las Naciones Unidas que me había reemplazado y el director general de la UNESCO, Federico Mayor Zaragoza, me ofrecieron que fuera el presidente de la Comisión Mundial de Cultura y Desarrollo. Esa Comisión era bastante compleja, había que escoger personalidades culturales de muchas partes del mundo, pero vinculadas también con el desarrollo, no solo económico, sino también social. Entonces, durante tres años presidí esa Comisión hasta que emitimos un informe de alcance mundial sobre la diversidad creadora de todos los pueblos. Luego me dediqué a trabajar dentro del marco de la UNESCO, pero a título honorario. Lo que me interesaba a mí era la preservación del patrimonio cultural de todos los países; sobre todo, de los países en desarrollo. Nosotros los peruanos tenemos una riqueza cultural muy grande y no solamente material, sino también espiritual; o sea, que no solo son las maravillas de los monumentos arqueológicos que poseemos, sino también la capacidad artística innata de los peruanos. En todos los rincones del país hay arte.

Yo creo que el peruano es artista por naturaleza; si no, no veríamos las maravillas arqueológicas, los maravillosos huacos que provienen prácticamente desde el norte hasta Lima, y del Cuzco. Somos un país con una gran riqueza cultural. Y a eso estaba dedicado cuando decidí regresar definitivamente a mi país, con la satisfacción de haber logrado algo para mi país y para el mundo, pero eso será lo que la Historia juzgue, no yo.

*FC: Muchas gracias.*



## RONDA DE PREGUNTAS

*Rosa Álvarez: Soy alumna de 2do. año de la Academia Diplomática. Mi pregunta va dirigida a su gestión como ministro de Relaciones Exteriores durante el gobierno de Valentín Paniagua. Quería saber cuáles fueron las acciones más importantes que tomó para elevar la imagen del país después de la caída del gobierno de Alberto Fujimori.*

**JPC:** Primero, la reincorporación de aquellos diplomáticos que fueron separados arbitrariamente del servicio activo. Era para mí una obligación, no solo moral, sino profesional. En los otros aspectos, fue lo que dije al comienzo de mi intervención: la prevención. Surgió una pequeña dificultad tal vez no tan pequeña con Chile, que había montado en la frontera, en el punto 1, una caseta que luego hicimos desaparecer. Luego de ello visité varios países: Chile, Argentina, Ecuador, Colombia y después México. Como solo fui ministro por ocho meses, en ese tiempo no podía dar la vuelta al mundo.

*Juan Díaz: Soy alumno de 2do. año. ¿Qué consejo nos podría dar a aquellos que vamos a ingresar al servicio, especialmente durante los primeros años que serviremos?*

**JPC:** Primero, la dedicación a tiempo completo de su energía para llegar a ser un diplomático perfecto, que no es imposible de obtener, pero que si no se camina en esa dirección no se consigue nada. Para eso hay que representar bien al país, representarlo no solo con su inteligencia, sino también con su presencia, sus maneras, su conocimiento de idiomas, su criterio. Eso es querer representar bien al Perú, y cuando llegue a embajador, pueda decir: la tarea que me dieron hace tantos años la he cumplido.

*Angel Horna. Soy alumno de 2do. año. Es difícil verbalizar ahora la emoción que me embarga y lo que significa para nosotros, aspirantes a la Academia Diplomática. Quería decirle como nota particular –pues usted dijo que no pudo lograr ser director de la ADP, como fue su sueño–, que usted, una de las figuras emblemáticas y conspicuas de la diplomacia peruana, usted es un ícono para todos nosotros, y creo que eso es algo muy importante e inspirador para todos los estudiantes. Mi pregunta es: Se discute mucho sobre la especialización del diplomático en esta época*

Foto: Embajadores Javier Pérez de Cuéllar y José Antonio Meier con los alumnos de la Academia Diplomática del Perú:  
Eduardo Vidal Choroco Loayza  
José Emmanuel Emanuel Álvarez  
Claudia Portillo Gonzáles  
Rosa Giannina Alvarez Núñez  
Alberto Carlos Rodríguez Chamorro  
Coral de Cielo Cano Gallardo  
Kelva Maritza Morales Cuba  
John Connally Diaz Ligarda  
Jimmy Ulloa Rojas  
Natalia Fiorella Navarro Salazar  
Lucía Verónica Amiri-Talesh Ramírez  
Luis Ahmed Cuti Sánchez  
Julio Antonio Ubillus Ramírez  
Angel Valjean Horna Chinchon  
Sergio Aníbal Zapata Huamán (ex alumno)  
Tereza Turznikova (becaria de la República Checa)  
Karolina Vera (becario de Paraguay)

*en que el conocimiento es mas vasto y, en consecuencia, hay muchas materias que abordan las relaciones internacionales; se considera que un diplomático debe tener un enfoque interdisciplinario para poder afrontar en lo posible los retos de la política exterior. ¿Cuál es su opinión en el reto de la especialización de los diplomáticos peruanos?*

**JPC:** Lo ideal sería que el diplomático peruano fuera completo: tan eficaz en lo político, como en lo económico, como en lo social; ese sería el sueño, pero, claro, es difícil. Yo lo digo con toda honestidad: yo nunca fui un buen diplomático económico, en el sentido que no adquirí la formación en esa área, de manera que cuando yo era embajador pedía que me mandaran funcionarios con una alta preparación en economía para completar la poca formación económica de embajador. Y aquí me dirijo al rector de la Academia Diplomática del Perú: lo importante es insistir en la preparación económica porque ahora se resuelve todo, directa o indirectamente, por la economía. Y yo en eso fui imperfecto, y eso lo reconozco a la edad que tengo, descansé en mis colegas que eran economistas porque yo tenía una idea demasiado general. Y su pregunta es pertinente, porque me he dado cuenta con esa pregunta qué es lo que ha faltado, una educación económica adecuada; no digo que sean genios, pero todo se resuelve con criterios económicos.

*Natalia Navarro: Soy alumna de 2do. año. ¿Cuáles son los aspectos de nuestra diplomacia que deben ser potenciados en el exterior, y cómo, en nuestra calidad de futuros diplomáticos de la República, podemos contribuir con ello?*

**JPC:** Es difícil en el sentido que yo quiero creer que la formación que ustedes están recibiendo es buena y que va a mejorar en la medida que van avanzando en su formación como diplomáticos peruanos. Su colega acaba de referirse a lo económico, que es muy importante, sin olvidar lo social, claro, ambas están relacionadas, pero son diferentes. Usted, como mujer, debe saber que son el sexo fuerte -cuando conviene que lo sean. Hay que dar mayor importancia a la labor social, inclusive en el extranjero, porque no siempre van a estar en Londres o París. Tal vez sean enviados a un país en vías de desarrollo en el cual el diplomático peruano puede ayudar a resolver problemas. He visitado muchos países del África y visitar el África es conmovedor. Recuerdo con tristeza cuando en Etiopía, acompañado de un intérprete, visitaba a madres que tenían a sus hijos en brazos, y que hubo una madre a la que yo me acerco y el intérprete me dice que no me acerque porque el niño, sin que ella lo supiera, estaba muerto. Eso es algo muy conmovedor, una mujer que estaba meciendo a su hijo muerto...

Y si vemos Haití, un país que he visitado dos o tres veces por razón de mi oficio, el sufrimiento es algo increíble. Pensemos también en el Cuzco, donde están sufriendo nuestros compatriotas. Pensemos que todos debemos desarrollar una suerte de instinto humano, de caridad, no en el sentido de yo soy el positivo y él el negativo, sino en el sentido de ayuda, de asistencia, sin entrar en detalles de yo soy rico, tú pobre, o yo soy inteligente y tú ignorante. No. Es el ayudarnos unos a otros.

A mí me complace que haya ahora en mi país tantas mujeres inteligentes. Ustedes van a significar para nosotros la humanización, porque no hay nada más humano que la mujer: ella es la que crea al hombre. Por ejemplo, el que ahora dos de ustedes hayan sido mujeres, es una enorme satisfacción. Además, en mi experiencia he visto muchas mujeres diplomáticas que son excelentes diplomáticas y excelentes embajadoras.

*Yo fui alumna del embajador Javier Pérez de Cuéllar en el curso de Derecho Diplomático -cuando la Academia Diplomática estaba en la calle Azángaro, en la casa Ferreyros, en el 4to. piso- que tuvo una connotación muy especial. Fue él quien supo transmitirnos el patriotismo, que es lo que lo caracteriza, en un momento en que nos preparábamos para representar a nuestra patria como diplomáticos, muy dignamente y pensando siempre en los altos intereses de nuestro país. Una feliz coincidencia, porque antes llegábamos como terceros secretarios, y después seguíamos en la Academia y después ingresábamos al Servicio, y el embajador era el director de Personal. Pasó el tiempo, y con el único mérito de los estudios y de haber podido pasar, tuve el honor de ser su subdirectora.*

Muchas gracias.

*Carlos Ortega. Buenas noches, embajador. Yo tuve la suerte y el honor de trabajar con usted en los últimos años de su larga carrera diplomática en París, bajo su mando, en la delegación del Perú ante la UNESCO. Quisiera formularle una pregunta que me preocupa y que viene del multilateralismo. Tengo la impresión de que en el Perú, como en otros países de América Latina, se comienza a tener menos en cuenta la política multilateral... Acaba de suceder en México, en que ha bajado la representación de ese país en la UNESCO... Como digno representante de organismos internacionales y multilaterales, yo quisiera que usted se dirigiera a los alumnos de la Academia Diplomática y les dijera la importancia que tiene la política multilateral, la escuela que puede representar para ellos en el corto tiempo diversas culturas, diversas personalidades de un mundo variadísimo. Quisiera que usted diga la importancia de lo multilateral en la política exterior del país.*



**JPC:** Le podría contestar con dos palabras muy simples: lo multilateral no debería ser otra cosa que fraternidad, es decir, todos estos organismos internacionales, todos ellos tienen principios maravillosos: la paz, el desarrollo, la salud, la alimentación, todo aspecto, toda necesidad humana es atendida por las Naciones Unidas que son más de treinta organizaciones y todas ellas se dedican a ver de qué manera se pueden atender las necesidades del ser humano. Entonces, la multilateralidad es eso, es ocuparse en lo posible de todo lo que concierne al ser humano y de allí se entendería lo que quiero decir: la multilateralidad es la fraternidad de todos los pueblos. ¿Se podrá alcanzar esa fraternidad? Es lo que deseamos todos en el fondo de nuestro corazón, que algún día haya en este mundo fraternidad y todos vivamos en el mismo nivel de satisfacción, que todos puedan alcanzar los mismos niveles de cultura, pero es inalcanzable prácticamente, no obstante toda la tecnología maravillosa que hay ahora... yo me pregunto si harán bien con tanto perfeccionamiento. No me gustaría terminar este monólogo mío con escepticismo en lo que se refiere a la humanidad en su conjunto, por lo menos hay que simular...

Muchas gracias.

## TRAYECTORIA DE JAVIER PÉREZ DE CUÉLLAR

Nació en Lima el 19 de enero de 1920

Educación: Colegio La Salle  
Colegio San Agustín  
Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú

Profesión: Abogado, Diplomático de carrera

### Cargos desempeñados (1945-2004):

- 2001-2004 Embajador del Perú en Francia y Representante del Perú ante la UNESCO
- 2004 Presidente de la Unión Latina
- 2000-2001 Presidente del Consejo de Ministros y Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores
- 1998-2000 Consejero Especial, ad honórem, del Director General de la Unesco, París
- 1992-1998 Presidente de la Comisión Mundial de Cultura y Desarrollo (Naciones Unidas - Unesco)
- 1995 Presidente Emérito del "Inter-American Dialogue". Washington D.C.
- 1982-1991 Secretario General de las Naciones Unidas (electo el 15 de diciembre de 1981, reelecto el 19 de octubre de 1986)
- 1981 Asesor Jurídico del Ministerio de RR.EE.
- 1981 Representante del Secretario General de Naciones Unidas en el asunto de Afganistán.
- 1979-1981 Secretario General adjunto de las Naciones Unidas para Asuntos Políticos Especiales.
- 1978-1979 Embajador del Perú en Venezuela.
- 1975-1977 Representante Especial del Secretario General de las Naciones Unidas en Chipre.

1971-1975 Representante Permanente del Perú en las Naciones Unidas;  
 Vicepresidente de la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas (1971 y 1975); Presidente del Consejo de Seguridad (mayo 1973 y julio 1974); Presidente del Grupo de los 77 - Naciones Unidas (1972)

1969-1971 Embajador del Perú en la Unión Soviética y Polonia

1966-1969 Secretario General de Relaciones Exteriores

1964-1966 Embajador del Perú en Suiza

1960 Ministro Consejero de la Embajada del Perú en el Brasil

1945-1960 Secretario en las Embajadas del Perú en Francia, Gran Bretaña, Bolivia y Brasil

Profesor de Derecho Internacional en la Academia Diplomática del Perú y Profesor de Relaciones Internacionales en la Academia Aérea del Perú

Obras: Manual de Derecho Diplomático (1964 y 1998)  
 Orden o Anarquía (1992)  
 Perigrinaje por la Paz. Editorial Santillana, Lima 2000

#### Doctorados Honoris - Causa

- Universidad de Niza, Francia
- Universidad Jaiellonian, Cracovia, Polonia
- Universidad Charles, Praga
- Universidad de Sofía, Bulgaria
- Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos, Lima
- Universidad Libre de Bruselas, Bruselas
- Universidad de Carleton, Ottawa, Canadá
- Universidad de París (Sorbonne), Francia
- Universidad Visva-Bharati, Bengala Occidental, India
- Universidad de Michigan, EE.UU.
- Universidad de Osnabrück, República Federal de Alemania
- Universidad de Coimbra, Portugal
- Universidad Mongola Estatal Ulan Bator, Mongolia
- Universidad Humboldt, Alemania
- Universidad de Berlín, Alemania
- Universidad del Estado de Moscú
- Universidad de La Valetta, Malta
- Universidad de Leyden, Amsterdam, Holanda
- Universidad La Salle, EE.UU.
- Universidad de Filadelfia, EE.UU.
- Universidad Tufts, Medford, EE.UU.

- Universidad de Laval, Québec, Canadá
- Universidad de Massachussets, EE.UU.
- Universidad Johns Hopkins, EE.UU.
- Universidad de Baltimore, EE.UU.
- Universidad de Maryland, EE.UU.
- Universidad de Cambridge, Reino Unido
- Universidad de Notre Dame, Indiana, EE.UU.
- Pontificia Universidad Católica de Lima, Perú
- Universidad de Santiago de Chile, Chile
- Universidad del Rosario, Colombia
- Universidad de Bordeaux, Francia
- Universidad de Estambul, Turquía
- Universidad de Salamanca, España
- Universidad de Kuwait, Kuwait
- Universidad de Oxford, Reino Unido
- Universidad de Dublín, Irlanda
- Pontificia Universidad Católica de Milán, Italia
- Universidad de San Agustín, Arequipa, Perú
- Universidad Católica Santa María, Arequipa, Perú
- Universidad Católica del Sagrado Corazón, Milán, Italia
- Universidad Nacional San Antonio Abad, Cuzco, Perú
- Universidad de la Amazonía, Iquitos, Perú
- Universidad de Ulster, Irlanda del Norte
- Universidad de Valladolid, España
- Universidad de Lleida, España
- Universidad Ricardo Palma, Lima, Perú
- Universidad de Lima, Lima, Perú

#### Premios

- "Premio Príncipe de Asturias a la Cooperación Iberoamericana", España (29 octubre 1987)
- "Jawaharlal Nehru Award for International Understanding", Nueva Delhi, India (27 febrero 1989)
- Premio Athina Onassis "Man and Mankind", Atenas, Grecia (5 abril 1991)
- "Four Freedoms Award", Amsterdam, Holanda (18 junio 1992)
- "Man for Peace Award 1988", Together for Peace Foundation (25 octubre 1988)
- "1988 Olof Palme Prize Award", Olof Palme Memorial Fund for International Understanding and Common Security, Suecia (10 enero 1989)
- "Great World Peace Award" (1984) e "International Peace Award 1986", International Association of University Presidents, Corea

- "Award for Outstanding Contributions to International Cooperation and World Peace" Harvard Foundation, Boston, Massachusetts, EE.UU. (9 enero 1985)
- "Panamerican Society Award" (Medalla de Oro), EE.UU. (13 noviembre 1987)
- "Humanitarian Award", New York County Lawyer's Association (14 noviembre 1989)
- Medalla Andrés Bello, Academia Diplomática de Santiago, Chile (20 agosto 1990)
- "Eleanor Roosevelt Humanitarian Award", for Lifetime Achievement In The Cause of Human Rights, San Francisco, California, EE.UU. (21 marzo 1991)
- "Golden Dove Peace Award" - Paloma de Oro, Roma - Italia (6 julio 1989)
- CARE's International Humanitarian Award, San Francisco, EE.UU. (1995)
- "Albert Einstein Peace Award" by the International Association for World Peace, (1998)

#### Instituciones

- Miembro de Número de la Academia Peruana de Derecho, Perú
- Miembro de Honor del Colegio de Abogados del Perú
- Miembro de Honor de la "Sociedad Peruana de Derecho Internacional", Perú
- Miembro del Centro Peruano de Estudios Internacionales, Perú
- Miembro del "Institut de France" (Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques), París, Francia
- Miembro de Honor del Colegio de Abogados de Madrid, España
- Miembro de Honor de la "American Bar Association", EE.UU.
- Miembro de la Academia Mexicana de Derecho Internacional, México
- Miembro honorario del Consejo Argentino de Relaciones Internacionales, Argentina
- Miembro de Honor de la "Fondation Bernard Kouchner", Francia
- Miembro de la "Académie Universelle des Cultures", París
- Miembro de la "International Green Cross", Nueva York - Moscú
- Miembro de "World Humanity Action Trust" (WHAT), Londres
- Miembro del "International Advisory Council" - World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), Suiza
- Miembro del Directorio de "Children Action", Ginebra, Suiza
- Miembro del Comité de Honor de la "Association pour l'Action Humanitaire", París, Francia
- Miembro de Honor del "Earth Council", San José, Costa Rica
- Miembro del Directorio de "New World Foundation", Göttenborg, Suecia
- Miembro de la "Carnegie Commission on Preventing the Deadliest Conflicts", Nueva York, EE.UU.

- Fundador de la "Fundación Internacional Olof Palme", Barcelona, España
- Miembro del Jurado de "Gleitsman Foundation", California, EE.UU.
- Miembro del Consejo Internacional de "Americas Society", Nueva York, EE.UU.
- Miembro del Comité de Honor Internacional de "Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation", Uppsala, Suecia
- Miembro del Consejo de "European Action Council for Peace in the Balkans", Amsterdam, Holanda
- Miembro Honorario del "World Environment Foundation", Suiza
- Miembro del "International Negotiation Network" (Carter Foundation), Atlanta, EE.UU.
- Co-iniciador "Global Campaign for Restoring Morality and Humanity - Global Convention", Corea
- Miembro del Consejo Internacional del "Council of Americas", EE.UU.
- Miembro del "International Negotiation Network" (Carter Foundation)
- Miembro del "Patronato de Lima"
- Miembro del Consejo Asesor del "Instituto Universitario de Estudios Internacionales y Europeos "Francisco de Vitoria" (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid), España
- Miembro del Comité Honorario del 59 Aniversario de la "Fundación CARE", San Francisco, EE.UU.
- Miembro del Comité Latinoamericano de "Together for Peace Foundation", Roma - Nueva York
- Miembro de la Comisión de Etica del Comité Olímpico Internacional, Lausana, Suiza

#### Condecoraciones

Perú	Gran Cruz con diamantes de la Orden "El Sol del Perú"
	Gran Orden al Mérito con diamantes por Servicios Distinguidos de la República
	Gran Cruz de la Orden al Mérito de la Policía Nacional del Perú
	Medalla de Honor del Congreso del Perú
	Gran Cruz del Senado de la República
	Gran Cruz de la "Orden Juan A. Távara" (Cámara de Diputados)
	Gran Cruz de la "Orden Peruana de la Justicia"
	Gran Cruz de la "Orden al Mérito del Servicio Diplomático del Perú José Gregorio Paz Soldán"

Coloquio

	Condecoración "Francisco García Calderón" del Colegio de Abogados de Lima	Liechtenstein	Gran Cruz del Principado de Liechtenstein
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Argentina	Gran Cruz de la "Orden de Mayo"	Mali	Comendador de "l'Ordre Matinale du Mali"
	Gran Cruz de la "Orden del Libertador San Martín"	México	Collar del Águila Azteca
Bolivia	Gran Cruz de la Orden "El Cóndor de los Andes"	Nicaragua	Gran Cruz de la Orden "José Dolores Estrada"
	Gran Cruz de la Orden al Mérito Civil Simón Bolívar	Pakistán	Gran Cruz "Nistram of Quaid-Azam"
Brasil	Gran Cruz de la Orden "Cruzeiro do Sul"	Panamá	Gran Cruz Extraordinaria de la "Orden Blasco Núñez de Balboa"
	Medalla del Congreso Nacional de Brasil	Paraguay	Gran Cruz Extraordinaria "Orden Nacional del Mérito"
	Orden del Río Branco en Grado de Gran Cruz	Polonia	Gran Cruz de la Orden al Mérito
Colombia	Gran Collar de la "Orden de Boyacá"	Portugal	Gran Cruz de la Orden de la Libertad
	Collar de la "Orden de San Carlos"	Reino Unido	Gran Cruz de la "Orden de St. Michael y St. George"
	Gran Cruz del Congreso Colombiano	República de Corea	Orden Kang-Wa (Primera Clase)
Chile	Collar de la Orden al Mérito "Bernardo O'Higgins"	República Dominicana	Gran Cruz de la "Orden Duarte, Sánchez y Mella"
Congo	Gran Oficial de "Ordre du Merite"	Togo	Gran Oficial de la "Orden del Mono"
Costa de Marfil	Gran Oficial de "l'Ordre du Merito"	Venezuela	Collar de la "Orden del Libertador Simón Bolívar"
Ecuador	Gran Cruz de la "Orden Nacional al Mérito"		Gran Cruz de la "Orden Francisco de Miranda"
El Salvador	Gran Cruz de la "Orden José Matías Delgado"		
España	Gran Cruz de la "Orden de Isabel La Católica"		
	Collar de la "Orden de Isabel La Católica"		
Estados Unidos de América	Medalla Presidencial de La Libertad		
Francia	Gran Cruz de la Legión de Honor		
	Gran Cruz de la Orden Nacional al Mérito		
Guinea Bissau	Orden Nacional "As Colinas do Boé"		
Guinea Ecuatorial	Gran Cruz de la Orden al Mérito		
Italia	Gran Oficial de la Orden al Mérito		
Japón	Gran Cruz del "Tesoro Sagrado"		
Jordania	Gran Cruz de la "Orden de la Renaissance"		
Kuwait	Gran Cruz Especial de Kuwait		
Líbano	Gran Cruz de la "Ordre du Cèdre"		



